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The thesis explores the significance of moral conflict for an understanding of the role
of law and legal reasoning in contemporary society. In doing so it suggests that there
are contradictions between liberalism, in a version drawn from the work of Isaiah
Berlin, and liberal legalism. The thesis looks at recent critiques of liberal theory, and
centrally on that provided by Alasdair Maclntyre, to help understand the significance
of moral conflict in contemporary society. It then explores how a liberal
understanding of moral conflict ought to view current structures of law and legal
reasoning. It is here that key contradictions emerge.
In focussing on both the internal justificatory practices of liberal legalism, and on
those practices understood from an external point of view, the thesis draws out
incompatibilities between such practices and the liberal theory here expressed.
It concludes that the vested institutional power of the legal system ought to be
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My hypothesis is that liberalism, in the interpretation of it I will offer, and liberal
legalism, defined broadly as the current role, rhetoric, and practices of legal
institutions in contemporary liberal society, are incompatible. Further, it suggests, in
order to hold true to its premises, such a theory of liberalism must challenge the
institutional vesting it presently receives at the hands of the legal system. To explore
why this might be so, I give a reading of liberalism which puts the social
construction of morality at the heart of its critical concerns. In particular, how
meaningful moral disagreement is conceived and articulated is of prime importance.
There is great focus in moral and legal literature on how consensus is or ought to be
achieved. But it is my contention that how disagreement or dissensus is constructed,
and, what dissensus means, has been neglected. In a sense they might be thought of
as two sides to the same coin: how to agree to disagree requires consideration of
what we agree upon. But how we analyse disagreement can often be overlooked in
the rush to create terms of agreement. How and why we disagree needs to be brought
more clearly into focus.
Nowhere is this going to be more important than when courts assemble arguments
applying "community standards" in justifying decisions. But I want to take a
distinctive position when it comes to legal argument. Though I do consider how legal
argumentation constructs standards which will be applied in cases that come before
judges, there is much to be gained from turning away from this to a consideration of
the role and position of law itself in the broader purview and construction of moral
agreement and disagreement. Traditional legal scholarship, and certainly education,
tends to view morality in terms of trying to understand what exactly its relation to
law is: should law embody morality, or are law and morality conceptually distinct?
This old, and no doubt important question, perplexes and re-perplexes old and new
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students in al! jurisprudence courses. But there is a tendency to look at the question
as an either/or issue. This in turn works to limit proper attention to questions of
morality themselves, which may become homogenised in aspects of content and form
since the focus of lawyers and legal philosophers is usually, "How should law (or
lawyers) respond?" Once again, this is an important question, but the vantage point -
of argument and analysis - is a legal one, and its ultimate destination (law's
response) works to obscure the genesis and construction of moral problems in the
first place.
In order to explore my hypothesis I concentrate far more on moral theory than many
jurisprudential analyses do. But I also follow a suggestion in the work of Alasdair
Maclntyre that law is implicated in the way in which we conceive, construct, and
deal with moral questions. As such it is important not only to consider how moral
disagreement is constructed, but to see what role techniques of law, and more
particularly the contemporary institutional dependency on law, plays in how we deal
with moral problems. It is in exploring these issues that I come to suggest the
practices of liberal legalism damage and distort the premises of the liberal theory I
advance.
(2)
"The values of Liberalism should not to be reduced to nought simply because their
practice has historically been so shoddy."1 There is no shortage of critiques dwelling
on such shoddy practice. Critical scholars who often share little else are usually at
one in their demonisation of liberalism. But is this an overreaction? What are these
values that ought not to be overlooked? Liberals will themselves dispute what these
are as they will also dispute their implications. Martha Nussbaum has recently given
1 Elizabeth Fox-Genovese, "The Many Faces of Moral Economy: A
Contribution to a Debate", Past and Present 58 (Feb. 1973) p. 168.
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a succinct three-fold definition of liberal values that will serve as an introduction:
first, "that all, just by being human, are of equal dignity and worth, no matter where
they are situated in society." Second, "that the primary source of this worth is a
power of moral choice within them, which consists in the ability to plan a life in
accordance with one's own evaluation of ends"; and finally, that "society and politics
... must respect the liberty of choice, and must respect the equal worth of persons as
choosers."2 An apparently minimalist position, and not itself uncontested, it is one,
I will argue, that has radical consequences when delineated in a certain way. The way
I choose here is taken from the work of Isaiah Berlin and represents what John Gray
has recently termed Berlin's "agonistic liberalism"3.
In interpreting some of the aspects alluded to in Nussbaum's definition, I argue that
it is important to situate that aspect of "moral choice" she refers to in a specifically
constructivist sense. That is, one that focuses primarily on the contextual and
constitutive relations between self, identity and values, and which draws out the
implications of these relations both for a theory of liberalism and for a liberal theory
of law. As Nussbaum and many others note, one of the major criticisms of liberal
theory, or more precisely perhaps, its "shoddy practice", has been that liberalism has
assumed an unjustifiable and harmful methodological individualism. Additionally, it
has been taken to link such individualism, or atomism as it has been called, with a
specific, though universalised, notion of rationality. Examples abound, but here are
a couple that are indicative of such critiques: "liberal theory insist[s] on positing
individuals as rational, self-interested, and pre-social ethical beings ..."4; and again,
"the denial of dependency on the social other presupposed in the market conception
2 Martha Nussbaum, "The Feminist Critique of Liberalism," Lecture at Oxford
University, Feb. 1996, excerpted in the Times Higher Education Supplement as "The
Sleep of Reason", Feb. 1996, p. 17.
John Gray, Isaiah Berlin, London, HarperCollins, 1995, Chapter 6.
4 Allan C. Hutchinson, Waiting for CORAF: A Critique of Law and Rights,
Toronto, Toronto UP, 1995, p.95.
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of rationality is present in the original liberal account of the individual and of society
and the state ... [which] denies the social and connected nature of the self."5
I argue that such criticism is mistaken. Concentrating on Berlin's version of
liberalism, and touching on the moral theory of Adam Smith in whose name - or
rather against whose name - much criticism of individualism has been directly or
indirectly invoked, I show that individual moral choice, while still a clear value of
liberal thought, can only be understood in a contextual manner. The effect of this is
to suggest that critiques of liberalism along the lines of the two above, set up a straw
man. The liberal theory I delineate here challenges these criticisms, and does so by
concentrating on the way in which a theory such as Berlin's depends upon the
embedded nature of self and values, as well as on the limitations of reason. To do so
I once again concentrate on the construction of moral judgment and the settings and
meanings of moral conflict for such a liberal theory.
I should note that this has two implications. The first is that I refuse to draw a strong
distinction between morality and politics. The tendency to locate moral problems in
the realm of private autonomous individuals, whilst political problems are deemed
merely to concern issues of public welfare or redistribution, has been one of the
misunderstandings both of liberal proponents and their detractors. Such a separation
is, I suggest, not a necessary component of liberal theory. This is not to deny that
liberalism is concerned with the extent of state or any other forms of authoritarian
imposition in what may be thought of as private matters: clearly it is. However, I
suggest that to hold on to a morality/politics or private/public distinction when posed
in this way, fails to recognise both the constitutive nature of identity within social
forms, and, that commitment to values cannot neatly be separated across such
divisions without misunderstanding the source and meaning of such values. It is thus
in this more expansive sense that I use the term morality in the thesis.
Val Plumwood, Feminism and the Mastery of Nature, London, Routledge,
1993, p.152.
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Second, that the implications for the role of law I see in this type of liberalism may
go further than many liberals, even "agonistic" ones, would themselves endorse. But
given the aspirations and meanings of the liberal theory I delineate, it is necessary
to make this further conclusion which challenges the current role of law in
contemporary society. De Sousa Santos has recently suggested that "the absorption
of law in the modern state was a contingent historical process which, like any other
historical process, had a beginning and will have an end"6. Though I do not get into
quite such grand arguments, the more limited point I do want to make is nevertheless
similar in vein. That is, that to hold to the worth and values of the type of liberalism
put forward here, a more fundamental challenge has to be made to the present
positioning of law and particularly the courts, than many liberals, or for that matter
their detractors, have so far made.
Such a challenge follows not simply a recognisably liberal argument about the fears
of an intrusive state, but further points to an analysis of how the common law, as part
of what has been "absorbed" into and in fact bolstered the law of the state, continues
to be an obstacle to the goals and values of the liberalism I describe. The common
law has had, at least since the time of Sir Edward Coke, extraordinarily powerful
integrating, unifying, and consequently excluding, effects, on the shaping of
community, and has used the rhetoric of its, in Coke's words, "artificial reason" to
mythologise and mystify the standards according to which it works. Moreover, the
logic, if not the outcomes, has remained remarkably static over time. "Once the facts
are proved," wrote the current Chief Justice of the Australian High Court in a recent
negligence decision, "all that remains for the court to do in determining the standard
of care is to apply community standards."7 The question this challenge is concerned
with then, is how, given the liberal premise of tolerance towards incommensurable
values, the common law can operate so smoothly to produce the "community
See his Toward a New Common Sense: Law, Science and Politics in the
Paradigmatic Transition, London, Routledge, 1995, pp.94-95.
7 Brennan J., in Gala v Preston (1991) 172 CLR 243.
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standards" by reference to which it justifies its decisions? And the issues that need
addressing are not simply how the judges produce such standards (the problem which
traditional legal scholarship devotes much of its time to), but what is the meaning and
significance of their doing so? In particular, what effects does the institutional setting
and dynamic of law within the community have in turn back on the varied values and
social forms of that community? Again, to explore these concerns it is necessary to
focus more determinedly on the construction of these values and forms themselves,
before considering the legal viewpoint.
(3)
The thesis is constructed in three broad parts. The first provides an in-depth analysis
of the recent work of Alasdair Maclntyre in moral theory. It charts his historical
argument about transitions in thinking about morality from Aristotelian to current
models, and in particular draws out his critique of liberal moral theory. He suggests
that we are witnessing a new Dark Ages, and that this is the result of the necessary
failure of what he calls the Enlightenment project. I focus in particular on the way
in which he sees moral debate taking place in liberal community, and how the
conception of the self informs this debate. To complement this analysis I consider the
liberal theory of Richard Rorty which, I argue, though it celebrates some aspects of
what Maclntyre treats as a failure, nevertheless essentially replicates Maclntyre's
description of liberalism.
I spend some time delineating these arguments because of what they have to say
about the role of law in contemporary society. Maclntyre's analysis of liberalism
provides a way of seeing how the use of law and the position of legal institutions
impacts and in some sense depends upon the meaning of moral conflict in the broader
community. Using a four-level model drawn from his work, I suggest that though
Maclntyre may be incorrect in his diagnosis of liberalism and its conception of the
self (the full critique of which does not emerge until the second part), he does
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provide important insights into the role of law in liberal community, and in doing so
opens out the possibility for challenging the legitimacy of law in the liberal legal
order.
The second part examines and in part develops a theory of liberalism drawn from the
work of Isaiah Berlin. Here I consider the version of liberalism alluded to above, and
one that is clearly at odds with the picture of liberalism usually portrayed by its
detractors. I concentrate on the way in which he treats the meaning and significance
of moral and political conflict, and how this depends upon the constitutive relation
between self and values and the limited role that reason has to play in resolving
moral conflict. Here I draw on the helpful analysis of Joseph Raz which I treat,
particularly in its notion of "constitutive incommensurabilities", as a more subtle
though indirect development of the arguments Berlin is making. Finally I extrapolate
from Berlin's liberalism some tentative conclusions about the role of law, and do so
by way of comparing this theory with Maclntyre's.
The third part considers two strands of critique in recent theoretical developments in
order to address how they conceptualise responses to liberal legal institutions. These
strands are taken from feminist analysis and from postmodern critiques based on what
has been called the "ethic of alterity". In considering several elements to these
positions I look at whether they do two things: first, whether they correctly identify
problems with liberal theory, or whether they tend to set up the "straw man" of
liberalism while attacking instead its "shoddy practices"; and secondly, whether or
to what extent they are able to counter the practices of liberal legal institutions. In
order to explore this, at this stage I consider both how legal justification takes place
in contemporary institutions and some of the often unexamined dimensions to this
process (including for example what Judith Shklar calls the "ideology of agreement"),
and some of the sociological significations of this process, such as the effects of legal
professionalism.
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Here I will argue that in order to give full expression to the incommensurable values
and social forms that liberalism identifies and seeks to respect, and with which, I
suggest, recent critiques espousing difference and "otherness" may be remarkably at
one, fuller attention to the stifling effects of common law reasoning and its
institutional power is required. When postmodern theorists in particular overlook that
institutional dimension, they fail properly to grasp the structural and constitutive
effects of law. Where they talk then of exploring forms of "partial" or "local" justice,
such arguments, I suggest, can only make sense within a more global critique of
vested power and the institutional dynamics of law, an approach that has historically
been one of the core concerns of liberal thought.
Throughout and underlying much of what follows is a view of morality or moral
rationality, and of the self, which challenges the view of liberalism as being
committed to a rule-based individualism, whether that interpretation is given by its
adherents or its critics. But not enough has been done within liberal thought to see
how such a view relates to the role and impacts of justificatory practices of law when
these practices endorse a commitment to a universalism at odds with that initial
position. The Scottish institutional writer Erskine wrote that because of "the depravity
of men's minds", civil powers add to the laws of nature, positive laws "that so all
members of the community, instead of being left to their own partial reasonings, may
be tied down to a set of laws that speak the same uniform language to every
individual."8 This is in many ways emblematic of the liberal legal argument about
law's aspiration to impartiality; to raise law above those "partial reasonings" that exist
beyond the legal realm. But what is the status and nature of these partial reasonings?
Erskine himself believed them to be rooted in a theology of original sin, in the
"depravity of men's minds." Others, including the two critics mentioned above, see
them as allied to an instrumentalist self-seeking market rationality. Alasdair
Maclntyre thinks they exemplify an emotivist set of preferences to be fulfilled. I want
John Erskine, An Institute of the Law of Scotland, 7th edition, Edinburgh,
Elphington Balfour, 1773, 1.17
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to explore a conception different from all three, and one that in turn has implications
for the perceived legitimacy of law and legal reasoning.
The relation between law and "partial reasonings" is of prime concern. Erskine
suggested that law should "speak the same uniform language" to all individuals. For
him, law's partiality itself was not put in question. A century earlier Hobbes had
given perhaps the most powerful argument to defend law's legitimacy, partial or not.
Addressing the same issue as Erskine, he noted that, "Law can never be against
Reason, our Lawyers are agreed ... but the doubt is, of whose Reason it is, that shall
be received for Law."9 Hobbes's answer, of course, was that "It is not Wisdom, but
Authority that makes a Law."10 Here was a striking answer to law's relation to
"partial reasonings", and one that has remained remarkably resilient.
For Hobbes, Erskine and others, the role of law is integrally related to how our
"partial reasonings" are conceived. In a sense, I agree. But what happens when such
reasonings are reconceptualised, when 'partiality' is seen as integral to social forms
within which meaningful values and identities are constituted and maintained? If law
is to speak a uniform language, as Erskine suggests, or is to apply "community
standards" as Chief Justice Brennan would have it, how is this singular voice
construed, and what effects does this have on the language and meaning of the partial
reasonings by which we live our lives outside the formal legal arena? These are the
kind of questions the thesis seeks to explore.
Erskine's contemporary, David Hume, though himself committed to "general and
inflexible rules of justice", nevertheless observed that, "there is a principle of human
nature, which we have frequently taken note of, that men are mightily addicted to
Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, ed. C.B.Macpherson, Harmondsworth, Penguin,
1968, Ch.XXVI.7.
10 Thomas Hobbes, A Dialogue Between a Philosopher and a Student of the
Common Law of England, ed. J. Cropsey, Chicago, Chicago UP, 1971, p.55.
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general rules, and that often we carry our maxims beyond those reasons which first
induc'd us to establish them."11 I contend that such a "mighty addiction" has had a
hold on the mind-set of liberal legalism and has edged it to the place where the
reasons for its institution - the values and concerns of liberalism - may now be being
done a disservice by the continued devotion to a bureaucratic legalism at odds with
the radical spirit of liberal thought. To address this problem requires a focus on the
institutional vesting of common law reasoning and the paraphenalia of power and
expertise which supports it, but above all requires an investigation of the worth and
meaning of those "partial reasonings" without which we could neither make sense of
ourselves nor the commitments and values which we hold so variously and so dearly.
With this in mind, let us begin.
11 David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, second edition, ed. L.A.Selby-




Amongst other things the phrase Dark Ages conjures up a time of cultural loss, a loss
sustained most dramatically as a result of the virtual disappearance of the classic texts
of the past. The loss could be considered as a double one in the following sense. First
there had occurred the fragmentation of a once more whole body of knowledge, and
second, the means whereby the fragments that remained could be brought back
together under a new cohering unity had also been lost. Irreparable damage would
thus have occurred. Described very simply in these terms we might be somewhat
quizzical when we hear the suggestion that contemporary society is experiencing a
new Dark Ages. What, we might ask, is the loss we are alleged to have suffered?
And does not the idea of irreparable damage cut across the grain of our culture of
possibility and innovation? Aside from the run-of-the-mill prophets of doom is not
loss in the sense of fragmentation most often experienced in the form of an idealised
nostalgia for a more simple and just past, a nostalgia, as Lyotard puts it, of the
whole?1 Often it can be. But the purpose of this chapter is to outline and assess a
serious and challenging reconstruction of a part of philosophical history which points
us precisely towards this 'new Dark Ages' conclusion.
In focussing particularly on moral discourse Alasdair Maclntyre attempts to show
how we should see our contemporary moral vocabulary as little more than a series
of fragmented survivals from a once more coherent past. He suggests that, "the
contemporary vision of the world ... is predominantly, although perhaps not always
1 Jean-Francois Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge,
transl. G.Bennington and B.Massumi, Manchester, Manchester UP, 1984. See
Appendix, "Answering the Question: What is Postmodernism?"
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in detail, Weberian."2 Yet his argument is at once more specific and dramatic than
the Weberian description of disenchantment. Disenchantment, which Weber saw
somewhat nostalgically as a loss but nevertheless as an inevitable price to pay in the
rise of modernity, is for Maclntyre a key symptom of fundamental flaws and a
prefiguring of our contemporary malaise. Contemplating the Weberian universe,
where on the one hand we find a moral world without objective foundations and on
the other the rise of an instrumental rationality at home in an efficiency-driven
formalism, is for Maclntyre to contemplate an arena of despair. Entering
contemporary moral discourse with Maclntyre is like finding oneself in the familiar
territory of a Shakespearean tragedy. Here we find a dialogue riddled with
unsustainable dreams and burning ambitions, fatal flaws and doomed revolutions. And
of course, dead bodies.
For Weber "disenchantment" was, literally translated, "de-magification," the world
"robbed of gods" and mystical spirits through which people had once understood the
world and their place in it. It meant
that principally there are no mysterious incalculable forces that come into
play, but rather that one can, in principle, master all things by calculation ...
One need no longer have recourse to magical means in order to master or
implore the spirits, as did the savage, for whom such mysterious powers
existed. Technical means and calculations perform the service.3
These "technical means and calculations" Weber identified with the processes of
rationalisation which had developed specifically in the West largely since the
Renaissance. Though they had many distinct manifestations - in natural science,
Alasdair Maclntyre, After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory, second ed.,
London, Duckworth, 1985, p. 109. Note: page references, in brackets, in this and the
following two sections of the text are to this book.
Max Weber, "Science as a Vocation" in H.H.Gerth and C.Wright Mills eds.,
From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology, London, Routledge, 1991, p. 139.
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architecture, law and government, for example - a commonality could be traced. As
Gerth and Mills have put it,
The extent and direction of 'rationalisation' is measured negatively in terms
of the degree to which magical elements of thought are displaced, or
positively by the extent to which ideas gain in systematic coherence and
naturalistic consistency.4
It may be considered to be one of the paradoxes of modernity that at the same time
structures of thought and organisation worked to improve the efficiency of means
available to humans - the more they helped us to predict and therefore to control the
future "by means of increasingly precise and abstract concepts"5 - the more
disenchanted the world became.
Moreover, for Weber, the success of these techniques had finally driven a wedge
between the normative and the scientific. Where for the pre-modern world a harmony
of man and nature had meant the possibility of a theological unity - where knowledge
came with obligation, so to speak - the modern world could not sustain such a unity.
Yet what the modern world shared with the ancient, though not with the Christian,
was the release of a plurality of lesser, secular, gods and demons. But their context
and status had clearly changed. In modernity we returned to "polytheism", but with
this major difference: the "various value spheres in the world stand in irreconcilable
conflict with each other ... According to our ultimate standpoint, the one is the devil
and the other the God, and the individual has to decide which is God for him and
which is the devil."6 Here we see the link between disenchantment and value
pluralism. In a world "robbed of gods" the individual alone could decide his or her
moral obligations, for their could be no rational resolution of such conflicts as arose.
"Introduction", From Max Weber, p.51.
Max Weber, "Bureaucracy" in From Max Weber, p.239.
Max Weber, "Science as a Vocation", op.cit., pp. 147-148.
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And it is in this sense that Maclntyre sees the modern world as "predominantly
Weberian."
However for Maclntyre the current state of moral fragmentation can ultimately trace
its origins back more precisely to the eighteenth century, which for him consisted not
so much in enlightenment, but was instead, as Lord Grey was later famously to say
in another context, like the lamps going out all over Europe. But in true tragedian
style the main protagonists did not know nor perhaps could never know the
consequences of their plans. It was for them a time of brilliant confidence, of belief
in the idea that new and lasting work could be carried out in the science of society
just as the previous century had produced such stunning results in the natural
sciences. One need only think of the social-scientific remit that David Hume, perhaps
the preeminent sceptic of his time, gave himself in the Treatise - "to introduce the
experimental method of reasoning into moral subjects" - to witness an enlightening
confidence not at all out place in the intellectual climate of the times. But Maclntyre
sees this in quite a different way. He describes these times as displaying "a peculiar
kind of darkness in which men so dazzled themselves that they could no longer
see."(p.92) In setting out to find a new, rational foundation for moral discourse, the
'Enlightenment project', we are told, not only failed but, according to its chosen
method, was bound to fail.
In unfolding this particular narrative which in this chapter relies heavily on an
appraisal of Maclntyre's thesis, the 'Enlightenment project' will come to appear in
two different senses. In the first it will be seen as an attempt finally to demolish what
were seen as the numbing effects of the many illusions and deep-seated despotisms
of a localised and insular traditionalism. Continuing a process already partly in train
- and using, as Weber had made clear, some of the techniques honed in older
disciplines - collapsing the hegemonies formerly in place meant completing what was
essentially a destructive task. But to do so was also to enhance and experience a
liberation, since this transition, this very destruction, was intended to allow, in
Maclntyre's words,
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the emergence of the individual freed on the one hand from the social bonds
of those constraining hierarchies which the modem world rejected at its birth
and on the other from what modernity has taken to be the superstition of
teleology.(p.34)
Thus in completing a liberation from what were perceived to be the particularly
debilitating effects of the past we may consider the project in its second sense; one
which is essentially that of rebuilding, discovering, and creating anew, grand
solutions to moral and scientific problems. But it is precisely as a result of the
success in the completion of the first, destructive task that Maclntyre will find that
the price of the failure of the second, reconstructive one, is a largely irrecoverable
loss. Increasingly seen as failures, the solutions proposed brought with them, he
suggests, a series of problems which carry around them an air of insurmountability.
In understanding this argument we will, following Maclntyre, trace firstly how moral
injunctions were deprived of the context that had been provided for them by the
teleology of Aristotelian philosophy, and the immediate effects that this was to have.
In turn, the consequences of the (failed) alternative attempts to provide a rational
foundation for ethics will be seen ultimately as coming to deprive moral injunctions
of even the formalist, rule-based criteria which, for a large part of Enlightenment
thought, had sought to replace Aristotelian teleology. The result of this is the
emergence of an 'emotivist self, a self whose sense of morality, seen to be
independent of either of these contexts, is to be treated as merely reporting desires
or preferences, themselves subject to no independent or even interdependent rational
scrutiny. It is in the concept of this emotivist self that we will find reason to believe
in a certain, though serious, experience of loss. For in this modern figure exists the
embodiment of the loss allegedly symptomatic of the new Dark Ages.
In bringing out the problematic of the Enlightenment project I hope to situate more
precisely the notions of disenchantment brought out in Weber's description. Yet even
in its most extreme form, this position - which has led some to proclaim the demise
of philosophy as it had been known for over two millenia - can be seen by some as
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a cause for celebration. The work of Richard Rorty will be explored to this end later
in this Part, for though he sees immense possibilities opening up with the end of
traditional philosophy, and particularly epistemology - we can now stop scratching
where it does not itch, he says - his position is fundamentally at one with the critique
of Enlightenment Maclntyre supplies. Thus I will consider along with Maclntyre's
critique elements of Rorty's theory of liberalism, since even though there are clear
discrepancies between the two positions, I will argue that the grounds for Rorty's
optimistic endorsement of post-traditional philosophy are largely the same as those
which lead Maclntyre to despair. And with Rorty, we will come to the relation
between philosophy, the self, and the restatement of liberalism. But this is to jump
ahead. We must first go back to Maclntyre's narrative.
The Rejection of Teleology
We have touched briefly on how Weber saw, in the processes of rationalisation, the
onset of disenchantment and the loss of an identifiable telos in human endeavours,
and how this might explain the irreducible plurality of contemporary morality and
moral theory. But Maclntyre attempts to locate the problem more precisely than
Weber. Its essence lies in the demise of the Aristotelian tradition which had provided
for a shared belief in a summum bonum for humanity, and which had provided
"morality with a point and a purpose, in virtue of which the moral life could be
treated as an intelligible pursuit for a rational being."7 A moral life in a community
imbued with purpose, with a goal, with a shared idea of the good was thought
achievable, and had at its centre a coherent account of the virtues. Due to the schema
on which this model was based, Aristotelianism was, argues Maclntyre,
7 AlasdairMaclntyre, "Moral philosophy: what next?", in Stanley Hauerwas and
Alasdair Maclntyre eds., Revisions: Changing Perspectives in Moral Philosophy,
Notre Dame, University of Notre Dame Press, 1983, p.9.
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"philosophically the most powerful of pre-modern modes of moral thought."8 But it
is the loss of this teleology provided by the Aristotelian model in which Maclntyre
locates the seeds of the failure of subsequent moral philosophies.
Aristotle had provided a schema whereby three distinct elements were interlinked.
The first of these was a conception of a state of untutored human nature, of
'man-as-he-happens-to-be'. This state was original - in the sense of primary as well
as basic - and consisted of the natural desires and emotions of the uncultivated human
being. But this state was considered to exist not simply as such (basic, primal), but
to exist in or as a state of potentiality. That is, untutored human nature was seen as
a primary state in the logically relational sense that there is a further state in which
it can exist. That further state is precisely that of the 'essential nature of man', the
state whereby an initial potential is fulfilled in the sense that its goal has been
worked out and reached, in other words, that its given telos has been achieved.
The mechanism which enabled this transformation to take place and thus provided
the linkage between these two states was provided by ethics. In proper relation
therefore, the Aristotelian model provided
a threefold schema in which human-nature-as-it-happens-to-be (human nature
in its untutored state) is initially discrepant and discordant with the precepts
of ethics and needs to be transformed by the instmction of practical reason
and experience into human-nature-as-it-could-be-if-it-realized-its-telos."(p.53)
The study of ethics was therefore the study of the techniques through which the
fulfilment of given ends was achieved. Thus the catalogues of vices to be shunned
and virtues to be extolled which were the common currency of pre-Enlightenment
moral theory existed precisely to actuate the potentiality that each human being had.
As Maclntyre puts it, "the whole point of ethics was to enable man to pass from his
present state to his true end."(p.54) Furthermore, this also meant that as a
ibid, (original emphasis)
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consequence of the location and as a function of their role, moral directives were
therefore 'testable' in the sense that they could be evaluated in terms of the
likelihood of their being able to achieve those pre-given ends.
It is clear that this Aristotelian schema is concerned essentially with transition from
potential to fulfilment. It is only by understanding the overall functioning of the three
elements and the relationships that exist among them that we can properly understand
them as forming constituent parts. We find a similar set of relations in Christian
ethical thought too. Again the notion of movement from one state to another is
primary, albeit with variations in the content of the intermediate directives. Of course
what these directives were, formed much of the practical deliberation of both
theologians and practitioners alike. But in all the intricacies of natural law doctrine
we never lose the sense of actuating the potential of humanity toward its natural
telos. We find a memorable formulation of this in the opening passages of Stair's
presentation of the laws of Scotland where it is unquestionably given that "Law is the
dictate of reason, determining every rational being to that which is congruent and
convenient for the nature and condition thereof".9 Stair assumes the ends of such
nature to require and include being "humble, penitent, careful and diligent for the
preservation of his self and his kind" and sets law within the framework of how
these, amongst many other given ends, are to achieved.
But during the later sixteenth and seventeenth centuries - indeed by the time Stair
was writing - this model came under great strain, according to Maclntyre, in the
sense that the questions with which it was faced became increasingly difficult to
answer from within that teleological paradigm. As Christian theology came under
secular attack and where the Aristotelian version was rejected on scientific as well
as philosophical grounds, the effect ultimately was that "moral injunctions became
deprived of their teleological context."(p.55) Of course this was also true in matters
'
James, Viscount Stair, The Institutions of the Law of Scotland, (1693) ed.
D.M.Walker, Glasgow and Edinburgh, University Presses, 1981, 1.1.i.
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concerning not just questions of morality. Indicative of if not part of the inspiration
for these broader developments - though of course still working within the Christian
tradition - was the work of Descartes. And although it was distinctively with the
eighteenth century that the decisive break with the past was made, it was Descartes
who was in large part responsible for the creation of a particular methodological
mind-set which was to influence the aspirations of successive generations of
philosophers. In promoting the notion that the form in which truth came - as being
clear and distinct ideas - was essential to its status as truth, and moreover that the
foundations which philosophy could supply necessarily provided unity to the body
of knowledge, Descartes aided the move away from teleological thinking towards a
new type of epistemology. In particular, the role of reason came to represent the
change in a move away from a context of teleology as it was envisiged by Aristotle
and later natural law theorists. As Lloyd puts it, "Descartes' method transformed
Reason into a uniform, undifferentiated skill, abstracted from any determinate subject
matter."10
With this in mind, and as a preface to Maclntyre's argument on Kant, we should
rehearse briefly just what have been taken to be the central strands of Enlightenment
thinking, aware that it is a simplification though one which has been, and remains
today, particularly influential (and noting here only in passing that its depiction of the
role of reason is one that is clearly at odds with the Scottish tradition of Hume and
Smith, and before them of Hutcheson).
Significant elements of the new Enlightenment attitude in moral philosophy had
sought to challenge the (teleological) Aristotelian reasoning that had preceded it. The
release which this provided was thought capable of creating new spaces, and with
that came a certain tolerance and encouragement of diversity. It meant opening up
new avenues of possible knowledge under a new umbrella of rational proof.
Metaphorically it meant not just shedding new light on old beliefs, but seeking out
10 Genevieve Lloyd, The Man of Reason London, Methuen, 1984, p.50.
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and searching with that light in hitherto unexplored areas. As Diderot had said in the
Encyclopedie : reason is "a torch lit by nature and destined to enlighten us". However
these guiding thoughts did not lead to an immediate fragmentation; on the contrary,
what was important was the belief in unity, the idea that all that was found in the
new searches would form a coherent body of knowledge, though in a now differently-
conceived sense. The role of reason here was paramount: as Habermas has put it,
"reason was validated as an equivalent for the unifying power of religion."11 To this
end, Windsor notes, the Enlightenment promoted "a new, autonomous reason which
could provide an ultimate court of appeal, based not on the end inherent in the
phenomenon but on the internal consistency of the system."12 Disagreement or
apparent incommensurabilty could be resolved or overcome for, in the end, truth
(which was still a single truth) would out. And why would this be so? Primarily
because of the domination of a method in which unity was presupposed. This is not
as tautological as it sounds: If it was the aim of the project to uncover law-like
generalisations then it would uncover those or nothing.
We can consider two levels to this. Firstly, the notion of the unity or coherence of
all possible knowledge worked at a meta-level. As a kind of epistemological tale of
the unfolding of truth in and about the world it worked as an over-arching grand
narrative which situated particular and often discreet areas of enquiry. At the second,
working level however we find the use of particular techniques and forms through
which knowledge is uncovered and stored. These techniques which aimed at attaining
objectivity through form included primarily the rigorous application of the concept
of reason and its attendant techniques such as universalisation. The function of this
second level therefore could be thought of as constitutive of knowledge, the creation
of law-like generalisations within disciplines. In distinction, the function of the first
11 Jurgen Habermas, The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity, transl.
F.G.Lawrence, Cambridge, Polity, p.84.
12 Philip Windsor, "Reason becomes contingent in History: can History become
Reason?" in Philip Windsor ed., Reason and History: or only a History ofReason?,
Leicester and London, Leicester U.P., p.23.
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level would remain that of legitimating and situating the results obtained at the
second, more a regulative than constitutive function.
Maclntyre is thus correct in suggesting that the most common form of explanatory
work in the eighteenth century was of the type that assumed unity as its working
hypothesis. Of course however, it is naive to think the Enlightenment on this count
as merely expressing a philosophical optimism. In practical terms there was
associated with this - to varying degrees - a struggle against the perceived tyranny
of a State-sponsored theology. The spirit - the autonomy and professed merit - of
enlightened reason was often put up against traditional sources of authority and
hierarchy in an attempt to undermine that authority, initially in philosophical but then
also in political terms. In the latter case it could be expressed in the form of hostility
towards tradition, towards the constrictions of an ongoing and still-pervasive feudal
present that could be overcome only as a result of being able to show the existence
of a political equality (or a legal equality in the form of rights) based on precisely
the alternative conceptual schema that deemed itself to be adequately coherent and
unified. Consisting, so to speak, of a "move inside", a move into the universalising
system of reason, and one rooted in the desire to challenge a particular social and
political context, this understanding was to fire a significant portion of Enlightenment
thought, and most importantly as we shall see, to release and promote the value of
an autonomous, rational subject.
If we return to the question of teleology, we find that it is one of the facets of
already-existing philosophical thought that in the eighteenth century was found ripe
for rebuttal. Not only had it been consistently weakened by the rise (and the rise in
the prestige) of the new type of scientific thought, but simultaneously there appeared
what seemed like better answers to the thorny questions that had come to be asked
of the Aristotelian schema. What Maclntyre's analysis seeks to show therefore are
the unintended effects this had, and do so by arguing that the method whereby the
old theory was superseded by a new one gave birth to a new creature that was
inherently and fatally flawed.
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As a result of the critical onslaught on the notion of a final state or telos to which
human beings by their nature aspired, the function and idea of ethics was
fundamentally altered. Instead of following through the dynamic of the Aristotelian
schema, the rejection of Aristotelian teleological thought resulted in attempts now
being made to found universal moral principles on the state of humanity as found in
the first, uncultivated state. However, as Maclntyre reminds us, the earlier two
notions of human nature - as potential and telos - were "expressly designed to be
discrepant with each other"(p.55) and as such were not intended as separate nor
indeed separable entities. Furthermore, as adverted to earlier, they only existed insofar
as they formed a coherent schema in which transition through ethics provided the
sense of dynamic relation: the three-fold model could only be sustained as precisely
that. Once one part - here, the essential telos - was removed, the other two remained
in bizarre irrelation.
The effect of this was to be felt most acutely on what had formed the central element
in the old schema, namely in ethics. Any attempt to base a new morality on the
human nature in its primary state was clearly going to be problematic given the way
in which that state had been functionally constituted. Thus as Maclntyre puts it,
Since the moral injunctions were originally at home in a scheme in which
their purpose was to correct, improve and educate that human nature, they
are clearly not going to be such as could be deduced from true statements
about human nature or justified in some other way by appealing to its
characteristics.(ibid)
Moral injunctions therefore, and indeed the very language of morals itself, were
designed for and justified within a framework of transition, namely that of tutoring
towards a given end.
Thus where the primary state had, for Aristotle, "strong tendencies to disobey" the
educating moral injunctions, it is in retrospect absurd, Maclntyre suggestes,
subsequently to attempt to build an ethical theory on that (by definition) errant state.
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Even attempts to refine the notion of a primary human nature did not aid the fact that
they, the Enlightenment moral philosophers, had "inherited incoherent fragments of
a once coherent scheme of thought and action."(ibid) Yet this is precisely the mistake
that according to Maclntyre they did make, though which, in their blinding optimism,
they could not see. Moreover, the nature of the mistake meant not simply that the
project somehow got underway on the wrong footing; worse than that, argues
Maclntyre, it was as such, conceptually, doomed to failure. It is in this sense that we
find Maclntyre describing the Enlightenment project as relentlessly in pursuit of the
impossible.
Earlier in this chapter I put forward the idea that we should think of the
Enlightenment project in a double role: that of demolishing or escaping from a dark
past, and that of rebuilding bright and coherent futures. The case of the rejection of
teleology is a part of that dual strategy. Put in terms perhaps overstated, the
Enlightenment "shattered all previous communities and objective moral systems" and
attempted to introduce in their place, "an abstract universal standard which would
allow one to choose between those systems."13 This formulation however displays
the ambiguity of the project: namely whether such "shattering" was the natural
consequence of the attempt to build new structures of thought or the deliberate series
of moves required before rebuilding could begin. At the risk of appearing to fail to
say which, I will leave this ambiguity to run insofar as such a double role is not in
itself an incoherent possibility, if not yet a fully articulated and attractive one. But
with the break from classical teleology firmly established, it is now appropriate to
look at one of the attempts to refound moral theory in the new era and which,
according to Maclntyre, sows the seeds for our contemporary emotivist malaise.




O'Hagan suggested that the Enlightenment project shattered all previous "objective
moral systems". To an extent this was true. Importantly however, it was generally not
the case that a problem was perceived in the ideal of objectivity per se. Indeed part
of the reason the project might be seen to fail is precisely because it tried to attain
"the objectivity of theism without the embarrassment of theistic doctrines, and an
objective moral code without God as its author."14 We might think then of a move
away from objectivity as signifying a content inherent in nature, to an objectivity
discoverable through form. Perhaps best known of the attempts to rebuild ethics on
such a new rational foundation is that of Kant's, where objectivity was provided
primarily through the formalist structures (and strictures) of reason. The use of such
a technique was not at all out of step with the spirit of the times; as Habermas notes
with reference to Rousseau as well as to Kant, as ultimate justificatory grounds - in
the sense for example of classic teleology or religious cosmologies - were seen as no
longer plausible, and the formal properties of reason in particular gained
predominance, the result was that "the formal conditions of justification themselves
obtain legitimating force."15 That is, formal conditions for the acceptability of
grounds or reasons became important in the sense that it was no longer the
substantive reasons themselves which were convincing (for Habermas, which provide
legitimation), but instead the kind of reason. Significantly, the level of justification
has become reflective: "The procedures and presuppositions of justification are
themselves now the legitimating grounds on which the validity of legitimations is
based."16 In order to trace this development in the context of the present analysis
14 ibid..




it is necessary to see where this solution fits the dynamic of decline towards the
emotivist self in Maclntyre's telling of the Enlightenment story.
Hume and others in the line of Francis Hutcheson in early and mid-eighteenth century
Scotland had developed a highly sophisticated theory of morality based on a moral
psychology of the passions and of their relation to reason. But the notion that, in
Hume's terms, moral distinctions were not derived from reason but from a moral
sense, gave cause for a grave fear in many intellectual circles, a fear that if Hume
were correct then there could be no true objectivity in moral judgements. Moreover
this would have a knock-on effect. So in a critique of Hume by Thomas Reid for
example, Reid suggests that if we were to adopt the openly 'anti-reason' suggestions
of Hume we would have to refer to judges not by that name, but instead as feelers,
for according to Hume's theory that is all they would be!17 Kant, like Reid,
therefore, sought to respond directly to this description of morality.
According to Maclntyre, Reid and Kant shared two features in their moral
philosophies. First they believed that the will could be determined by rational or
non-rational motives. Second, they believed in "moral judgements as an expression
of conformity to an objective moral law."18 However in order for this second feature
to be correct, Hume (and therefore also Smith) had to be wrong about the source of
moral injunctions, for a moral psychology based on the passions was antithetical to
the notion of an objective moral law. What was significant however, says Maclntyre,
was that, by and large, Kant did believe Hume's account of the passions. Therefore,
as far as Kant was concerned if Hume's account of the passions was correct then
because of the consequences for objectivity, he was forced to conclude that morality
"could not be a matter of the passions."19 As such, the considered attack that Hume
17 Thomas Reid, Essays on the Active Powers of the Human Mind, (1813-15),
Cambridge, Mass., MIT Press, 1969, p.474.
18 Alasdair Maclntyre, in Revisions, op.cit., p. 10.
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had made on the objectivity of moral judgments had to be spurned, for it was nothing
less than subversive. For Kant therefore, morality's proper domain had to be shown
to lie elsewhere.
A "rational being", said Kant, had to have the freedom to choose the morally good
way of acting. Either that or - just as a plant might fare poorly under extreme
weather conditions - they would be determined by factors external to them. As
rational beings, persons could make rational choices, yet humans are not, for Kant,
perfect beings, they cannot always do the morally good thing without thinking; doing
so is, for rational human beings, an act of will. However we do know, he continues,
that a morally perfect being would act in a morally good way all the time. The only
way we have then of approximating to such perfect consistency is for us to act
according to the same principle on each occasion. Our desires and subjective
purposes may vary according to the situation we find ourselves in or according to our
own constitutions, but these cannot be determinative of the morality of the way in
which we act precisely because of that variation.
When called upon to justify our actions we instead use what Kant calls a maxim,
which will count as the principle according to which we act. That is, a person's
maxim will be a general rule which they choose to follow in their actions. Clearly
we do not have to be fully conscious of this maxim or principle each time we act,
and more than likely we will only consider it when asked. Nevertheless maxims play
a central role in assessing the quality of an act. But they alone however do not
account for the morality of the act. In order to achieve that status the maxim must
conform to a further test, that is, the test of objective morality. This is not another
maxim but is itself a purely formal criterion. Only by applying this test can we
discover whether the maxim is moral or not. That test is whether or not the maxim
on which we choose to act should at the same time, through the application of our
will, become a universal law. The answer was either yes or no, and had to hold at
all times and in all situations, for all people. If it was morally wrong to lie, then it
would still be so even if by telling the truth we put another's life at risk. For Kant
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there could be no possibility of contradiction. Objectivity could not propose yes on
some occasions and no on others.
In full then, this is Kant's schema:
A maxim is moral if it accords with the moral law, if such exists. It is not
moral because it lies in the desires, purposes, or consequences of the act, of
the doer. The morality of an action, is therefore nothing but conformity to
law in general. My action is moral if and only if I can will that my maxim
should become a universal law.20
There is no direct link therefore with either the desires of the actor or the act in itself
or its consequences, and their moral quality. That quality exists only as a function of
an abstract testing of the maxim, and its application is a matter of the rational agent's
will. Such an application will not add anything to the content of the maxim but is
purely formal; it will only tell the agent whether the maxim - and so the act - is
moral or not.
Let us consider two effects of this. Firstly, the idea of the role of the passions and
of their relation to reason espoused by Hume and followed by Smith in their moral
psychology was effectively disempowered by Kant's theory. The former's relational
view of moral judgment, dependent as it was on those "desires and purposes of the
doer" as they could be reconstructed within a theory of a thoroughgoing and
contextually-situated moral - or as we might say now, social - psychology, was
rejected as being incompatible with maintaining a belief in the existence of an
objective morality. We might usefully suggest then that what has happened is that the
idea of the proper 'ends of man' Aristotelian-based teleology is replaced by the
ability rationally to know and to try to obey the moral law. But the way in which this
occurs under Kant's influence is that the context-based reasoning - such as was put
forward by Hume - is likewise negated by the belief that objectivity could only be
20 Stephan Korner, Kant, Harmondsworth, Penguin Books, p. 134.
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asserted by an abstract and universalising formalism. Thus not only do we see the
teleological context of moral injunctions being lost, but also discover that the attempt
to provide for a socio-psychological one is dismantled.
The net effect of this was to make morality a matter of following the right rules. This
we should consider to be the second effect of Kant's analysis. The form of
justification is prescribed in order that one knows when one is acting according to the
moral law, but it is this form itself which becomes important. Rules and abstract
principles become the common currency of moral deliberation. The technique of
universalisation, although of course in evidence pre-Enlightenment, gains a new
kudos in the Kantian moral universe. But there is also an important flip side to the
way in which this kind of moral theory is constructed. What is integral to Kant's
description is not just the universal form which a moral injunction is supposed to
take, but that the rational agent be able to "will that my maxim should become a
universal law". If, as will be shortly suggested, the drive for a consistency or
objectivity which was thought providable by universalisation, wanes as a result of
powerful critique, then what is likely to be left in its place is simply that vital will
or power, retained significantly in the locus of the individual. Maclntyre suggests
therefore that once the will to provide a universal law is seen as more powerful than
that law, or, what in effect may be the same thing, that universal law is held to be
merely the expression of an arbitrary will, then since the contextualisation of a certain
type of psychology had apparently been done away with, the individual,
decontextualised as it now was from a teleology and further abstracted from social
responsiveness in the rigorous search for rules, begins to appear as a lone, isolated,
yet nonetheless centrally powerful figure in moral theory. This will be the topic of
the next section, but before that it is time to summarise briefly.
It had in the nineteenth century - as was documented by both Weber and Nietzsche
- become abundantly clear that the Enlightenment's attempt to provide new, rational
foundations for morality had failed. Faith in the idea of an objective morality had
been consistently weakened, according to Maclntyre, by the types of historicist
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doctrine espoused by Hegel and Mill. Dreams of a moral Esperanto had led straight
back to Babel. The reconstructive aims of the Enlightenment project had thus failed
to deliver their promise, but had nevertheless in the process of deconstruction dealt
a fatal blow to those philosophies, including Aristotle's and Hume's, that had gone
before them. But the price of failure was high and the consequences far-reaching.
This at least is Maclntyre's interpretation:
the morality of our predecessor culture - and subsequently our own - lacked
any public, shared rationale or justification. In a world of secular rationality
religion could no longer provide such a shared background and foundation
for moral discourse and action; and the failure to provide what religion could
furnish was an important cause of philosophy losing its central cultural role
and becoming a narrowly academic subject.(p.50)
Leaving the last, albeit significant, point aside, we should now move on to the
inexorable conclusion to this drama which Maclntyre believes consists in an emotivist
ethics rooted in the figure of the emotivist self. For as the Enlightenment project had
begun from a set of "fragmented survivals", so, he argues, have we inherited its fatal
flaws. Since then, we might put it, we have merely continued along a similar line,
strengthening as it were, our weak, emotivist culture.
The Emotivist Self
"We are selfish men:
O! Raise us up, return to us again;
And give us manners, virtue, freedom, power."
This was Wordsworth's plea to Milton's spirit in "London, 1802". Yet its sentiments
are recognisable as those also of Maclntyre writing today. Both writers look back to
a better past, finding what is contemporary to them singularly unattractive in its
indulgent, selfish outlook. For Maclntyre, it is the state of contemporary moral
disagreement which holds the key to understanding our culture as an emotivist one.
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What is so striking, he says, about our current moral discourse is both that "so much
of it used to express disagreement" and that the debate which ensues is "interminable
in character".(p.6) These two features point to the conclusion that our moral world
and its vocabulary is in chaos, and, as much symptom as cause, are its emotivist
underpinnings.
Maclntyre defines emotivism as follows: "the doctrine that all evaluative judgements
and more specifically all moral judgements are nothing but expressions of preference,
expressions of attitude or feeling, insofar as they are moral or evaluative in
character."(pp. 11-12, original emphasis.) Emotivism, most closely associated in the
earlier half of the twentieth century with A. J. Ayer and the American C. L.
Stevenson, has become located within a framework which sees morality as essentially
concerned with the subjective emotions and urges of human beings. For Maclntyre,
the point about the character of contemporary moral disagreement is consequently
this: how could any rational resolution of a dispute occur when all we are giving vent
to in the first place is a matter of our own taste? Our moral attitudes would exist in
the same way as our attitudes to what dressing well involved. That I might disagree
with the latest fashions, call them absurd and fanciful and suggest that things were
better in my day, would not mean that I could show by argument that they were
worse than the old style. There would be, as the phrase goes, no accounting for taste.
And this would be as true for morality as it would be for dress. As Wachbroit puts
it, "If moral assertions are seen as mere expressions of approval, there can be
differences of opinion, but no contradictions."21 It is precisely as a consequence of
this that moral debate cannot terminate, since there is no rational way of deciding
what that termination point would be. In order fully to understand how this situation
has been reached, it is vital to understand the role played by the construction of the
self in this picture and the way in which the concept of self has become radically
altered over time.
21 Robert Wachbroit, reviewing Maclntyre's After Virtue, in "A Geneology of
Virtues" 92 Yale Law Journal (1982-83) 564-576 at 565.
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The sense of movement or transition that was central to Aristotelian moral theory had
clear implications for the self. In its teleological framework the self was conceived
of as always "at a point on a journey, moving or failing to move, towards a certain
destination, pursuing a trajectory which form[ed] the object of ethical evaluation."22
The idea of fulfilling or completing life in such a way that its success may be judged
at the end is clearly at one with this picture. The image that the emotivist self
conjures up on the other hand is that of something static and unchanging, a fixed
point in distinterested surroundings. (That is why, says Maclntyre, the ancient Greek
proverb 'Call no man happy until he is dead' is so eerily out of place in an
emotivist's vocabulary; how could you ever possibly express this?)
As suggested above, the demise of such a teleological framework was historically
taken as a signal of liberation. But the emergence of the emotivist self is not made
complete until the Enlightenment project's - represented above by Kant - attempt to
recreate new certainties through the formulation of a universalist ethics, is itself
discredited. Deprived of these two former justificatory contexts - teleology and
universalisation - the self emerges isolated, without either externally imposed or
internally formulated standards. Turning away from such possibilities and so
competely in upon itself, the individual self becomes - as Nietzsche predicted - the
unchallenged locus of all judgment. It has shed the varied contextualism of previous
cultures, and the possibility that the self be defined in different ways as a member
of different groups drops away. It instead becomes a self stripped bare of all context,
now supposedly revealing the true desocialised, dehistoricized self underneath. The
net effect of such change is that morality itself increasingly becomes a separate
domain, cut off from broader political concerns, introspective, losing thereby its
former anchoring meanings. In these moves, the emotivist self, joyously one
supposes, retreats into the private realm. Released from the stringencies of its former
contexts it sets up in an area beyond public scrutiny.
22 C.Beveridge and R.Turnbull, The Eclipse of Scottish Culture, Edinburgh,
Polygon, 1989, p. 103.
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Ultimately in fact this self becomes separated off from even social concerns. For if
all that our linguistic moral utterances report are the feelings or preferences we have,
how can rational public debate on these even begin to take place? As Maclntyre says,
to be a moral agent is, on this [emotivist] view, precisely to be able to stand
back from any and every situation in which one is involved ... and to pass
judgement on it from a ... point of view that is totally detached from all
social particularity.(pp.31-32)
We find therefore that individuals' 'moral' statements, and the processes whereby
they come to moral conclusions, are placed in an inscrutable realm, one not subject
to debate, since such conclusions are taken to exist to the side of any debate.
What is most significant of all of course for Maclntyre, is the apparent loss entailed
by this new-found 'privacy'. Coming hand in hand with the separation off of the self
is the spectre of a radical subjectivism, and with that, the idea of attaining a common
or shared standard through moral discourse becomes quite empty: "I cannot genuinely
appeal to impersonal criteria, for there are no impersonal criteria."(p.24) This is the
crucial point, since any such discourse is now no more than "the attempt of one will
to align the attitudes, feelings, preferences and choices of another with its own."(ibid)
Moral discourse is, in other words, little more than spare, superficial, and inorganic,
as genuine a compromise-producing technique as a game of snap. Yet, says
Maclntyre sarcastically, for contemporary morality the "ultimacy of disagreement is
dignified by the title 'pluralism'."(p.32)
This 'privatised' self, becomes then "liberated" from historical and social context and,
because it has apparently successfully turned its back on these, is now at ease to
"choose freely the composition of its moral world."23 Moreover, the immediate
question of how to deal with competing choices is not at any point considered
23 ibid.
33
problematic at the moral level. This second 'move inside' has neatly surmounted -
by avoiding completely - the question of resolving moral dispute.
Unsympathetic reviewers might see this emotivist self as simply selfish even although
in practice such selfishness has never really appeared without some price attached.
Indeed if we consider the view of the self as it was championed in the existentialism
of Sartre, as Maclntyre does24, we find that though it attempted to break out of what
we might in the present context think of as the dead hand of old philosophies, it was
a self continually strained by having to make its own genuine choices. Though able
to apply its own, pure will, it was a self that was, ultimately, condemned to be free.
To consider how this was so we can think of Sartre's own example.
A young Frenchman during the Nazi occupation is faced with the choice of helping
the free French forces in Britain or staying at home to look after his mother. Whilst
the former is more obviously an attempt to contribute to the common good of the
nation, the latter attends to the wishes only of one individual. The point that Sartre
emphasises is that no ethical doctrine can be simply applied to this situation and an
answer to the problem read off. Such a possibility does not exist, and so all the man
can do is to make a decision in good faith; that is, by being true to himself. "So
when Sartre was consulted by this young man, he said merely 'You are free,
therefore choose'."25 What we might take from this is Sartre's point that no
Maclntyre notes that he is talking of the "Sartre of the thirties and forties"
(After Virtue p.32). This squares with other commentary on Sartre's work identifying
a shift between the earlier and later positions, a shift which Warnock argues "allowed
the individual to be swallowed up in the group, and existentialism to be swallowed
up in Marxism." (Mary Warnock, The Philosophy of Sartre, London, Hutchinson,
1965, p. 134.) For present purposes I take the extreme position of the earlier Sartre
which Warnock puts in the following terms: "Accepting values from another rather
than knowingly and deliberately adopting one's own values in choice, indeed,
accepting any general rules for behaviour, must be Bad Faith." (Mary Warnock,
Existentialist Ethics, London, Macmillan, 1974, p.48.)
25 Quoted in Leslie Stevenson, Seven Theories of Human Nature, Oxford,
Clarendon Press, 1974, p.86.
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philosophical doctrine can externally provide a prescription for the way the man
should act, that no doctrine can provide us with a calculus by which we can compare
the possible benefits of one 'national-inspired' action and one 'particularised' action.
But what is particularly apposite to the present discussion is the very way in which
this problematic is set up.
Sartre's denial of any objective values by which action could be guided leads him to
assume a self alienated from any prescriptive - be it individual or community based
- authority: the moral agent "is himself the source of all values."26 So it is not just
that Sartre cannot advise the young man to care first for someone close to him and
secondly for an ideal of his nationhood (or vice versa), but that, because of the
fundamental alienation or distancing of the self from anything in any way social or
public, no inroads to this problem can ever be made. The problem, given the nature
of the self and its relation to the social, is forever intractable. This incompatibility is
precisely the problem for contemporary moral theory in its emotivist condition.
I will return to Sartre later, but for now Maclntyre's analysis of what the nature of
moral disagreement signifies for contemporary society should be clear. The effects
of this on both the self and the public realm need now to be drawn out, since such
effects consolidate for Maclntyre the very problematic of contemporary liberalism.
Mary Warnock, Existentialism, London, OUP, 1970, p. 125.
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The Emotivist Compromise
The optimistic endorsement of the description of contemporary morality as an
emotivist morality is a position we should now consider. The reason for doing this
is to see how Maclntyre's diagnosis of contemporary moral debate might be at once
condoned and celebrated. This will be done by looking at the work of the prominent
postmodernist philosopher, Richard Rorty. In a way quite different from Sartre and
Maclntyre he argues that, with the liberation from teleology and Kantian formalism,
we ought now to be able to make the philosophical point of not taking, in the public
arena at least, our selves too seriously. Rorty argues that there is a realm for
self-creation which need not be considered selfish, nor necessarily angst-ridden, and,
one that is not dependent upon nor yet a detrimental imposition on, the public realm.
But for Rorty, the realisation of the freedom of the self to choose its own destiny
comes only as a result of realising the situated - historically and socially -
contingency of the self. As far as Rorty is concerned, the self has now, in
contemporary Western liberal democracies, attained the conceptual ability, and
increasingly the secular willpower, to sustain a separated private and public (or
political) programme. This is to be done, no less, by trying to redefine our idea of
morality and political obligation in the light of the claim that "traditional" (that is,
most previous) philosophy has been consistently misguided in following Plato's
"attempt to fuse the public and the private".27 What is most interesting about Rorty
is his refusal, (when we compare it with Maclntyre's analysis), to see this
development, this separation of public and private, as necessarily problematic.
At the core of Rorty's analysis is a theory of language. In a post-referential, linguistic
account of philosophy, truth is only a property of sentences. If we accept that our
language is purely contingent we will see it not as a medium between ourselves and
the world, a filter through which we can discover better or "more adequate"
Richard Rorty, Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity, Cambridge, CUP, p.xiii.
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descriptions of the world as it "really is", of what reality or being human is "really
like",28 but as a tool at our disposal. Any and all the truths we build up of ourselves,
our communities, and our moral beliefs, are constructs of the language games we
invent, sustain, and change, and within which we invent, sustain and change
ourselves. It is in this frame of mind that we ought now, Rorty urges, to face up to
the contingency of our selves and our beliefs, if only because we are aware of the
contingency of the language in which we are situated. This is at once liberating -
since our imagination becomes the boundary to our worlds - and awesome - since we
are forced to recognise the responsibility we now have for ourselves.
Central to Rorty's treatment of how we should consider language is his use of the
term (and concept of) "vocabulary". Its role is significant in both practical and
philosophical pursuits, and its position in Rorty's theory makes it possible here to
consider his thesis as, in a certain sense to be drawn out, supportive of an emotivist
position. Clearly echoing the later Wittgenstein's category of the "form of life",
vocabularies are essentially ways of "describing, evaluating, judging, and even
acting."29 But once we give up the idea that one of the core purposes of language
- or even philosophy - is to represent or discover truths about the world as it really
is, we must simultaneously give up on the idea of "getting the picture right" through
our use of language, as if language was like a television aerial whose function is to
pick up the best picture from the signals available. Instead language should be
considered as a way in which continually to redescribe ourselves and our concerns
that makes us better able to cope with our worlds. So for Rorty, the most important
aspect of our vocabularies is that they are all,
even those which contain the words which we take most seriously, the ones
most essential to our self-descriptions - human creations, tools for the
See for example his "Introduction", Consequences of Pragmatism: Essays
1972-1980, Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, 1982, p.xxxvi.
29 Richard Bernstein on Rorty, in his The New Constellation: The Ethical-
PoliticalHorizons ofModernity/Postmodernity, Cambridge, Polity Press, 1991, p.262.
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creation of such other human artifacts as poems, Utopian societies, scientific
theories, future generations.30
Having got rid of the notion that language ought to provide us with a picture of how
the world, or the self, or justice or morality, really is, we can now only put forward
competing suggestions as to which vocabularies we ought to adopt on these matters.
But since there is no external - real, outwith language - picture against which we
might test or judge our vocabularies, what criteria can we possibly now have for
choosing which vocabulary to adopt? How are we to know whether one description
is more valid than another, or show that one person's vocabulary is immoral and
another's sound? The answer Rorty gives to these questions is crucial and paves the
way for seeing his vocabulary as emotivist. For what Rorty's reflections about
language, vocabularies, and self-descriptions, inexorably lead him to is this
conclusion: that "anything can be made to look good or bad by being redescribed."31
For Rorty, the only constraints on choosing vocabularies (for we are no longer
constrained by "truth" or "reality") are conversational ones. Those who ascribe to this
notion will see themselves as "ironists"; that is, people for whom
nothing can serve as a criticism of a final vocabulary save another such
vocabulary; there is no answer to a re-description save a re-re-description.
Since there is nothing beyond vocabularies which serves as a criterion of
choice between them, criticism is a matter of looking on this picture and on
that, not of comparing both pictures with the original. Nothing can serve as
a criticism of a person save another person, or of a culture save another
culture - for persons are, for us, incarnated vocabularies.32
Continual innovation is thus played out at the level of adapting and inventing









The import of this is exemplified by Rorty's approach to philosophy, in the way he
wants to write himself. So in his Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity he announces
that rather than "offering arguments against the vocabulary I want to replace", he will
instead, "try to make the vocabulary I favour look attractive by showing how it may
be used to describe a variety of topics."33 The suggestion that this would turn our
linguistic (and our philosophical and scientific) practices into mere talking shops is
not denied. Stemming back to Rorty's view of language generally, if we have given
up on the idea of "getting things right" through language or philosophy, then all we
can hope to do is to keep talking. Rorty makes an analogy of language and evolution:
we adapt our linguistic practices to suit our needs, and in so doing we press on "not
to accomplish a higher purpose, but blindly."34
To see debate in this way has a particular significance when turned to moral or social
issues as we shall soon see. And though Rorty will not deny that this is so, his
primary target, his primary suggestion for putting in place of a new vocabulary, is
philosophical. For him, because of the very fact that we are situated in and by our
language and could never have been not so situated, that redescription through
changes in the vocabularies we adopt is the only form of change we have, he seeks
to elude traditional philosophical issues by taking them inside language.
Once we realize that progress, for the community as well as for the
individual, is a matter of using new words as well as of arguing from
premises phrased in old words, we realize that a critical vocabulary which
revolves round notions like "rational", "criteria", "argument" and









This has implications for the way in which argument (if such it can still properly be
called) itself takes place. But it would also appear immediately to raise relativist
objections concerning the use of vocabularies as way of seeing ourselves and the
world. Rorty however, very much aware of this possibility, faces it straight on. He
points out that to take on board the ideas about language and self-description he has
presented to us is to realise that one no longer has to engage with the charge of
relativism. This is because epistemological arguments along the lines of "How do you
know such and such to be true or just or rational or whatever?" are now redundant.
Rorty's intention here is thus "neither to praise nor to blame epistemological
philosophy but to bury it."36 A philosophy which searches for foundational criteria
for knowledge ought to be abandoned, even if this means the end of philosophy as
we knew it.
With this background in mind we return now to issues of the self and questions of
morality. It should be noted that Rorty does not treat morality or moral philosophy
as a separate entity in the way Maclntyre's analysis did, though this will not detract
from my treating what Rorty does have to say as being essentially emotivist, as
should become clear. His primary division is instead between the public and the
private realms. For him there is always a conceptual gap between the private and the
public. This gap cannot be bridged, not by philosophy or politics, metaphysics or
epistemology. There is no social or theoretical "glue" to hold the two together: "There
is no way in which philosophy, or any other theoretical discipline will ... let us hold
self-creation and justice, private perfection and human solidarity, in a single
vision."37
William M. Sullivan, "After Foundationalism: The Return to Practical
Philosophy," in Antifoundationalism and Practical Reasoning: Conversations between
Hermeneutics and Analysis, Edmonton Alberta, Academic Printing and Publishing,
1987, p.22.
37
Rorty, Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity, op.cit., p.xiv.
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Returning to the notion of "ironism" mentioned briefly above, Rorty suggests that in
the private realm the "ironist" self will "face up to the contingency of his or her own
central beliefs" and most importantly, give up on the "idea that those central beliefs
and desires refer back to something beyond the reach of time and chance"38. Having
given up on teleology and metaphysics, any sense of movement for such a self is
quite different from that which might be described as an unfolding trajectory. For the
ironist self, life "cannot get completed because there is nothing to complete, there is
only the web of relations to be rewoven, a web which time lenghtens every day."39
But like painting the Forth bridge the unending character of the job does not detract
from its worthiness; it is (dare one say it?) just the way things are. All that a person
can do is constantly to revise their "final vocabulary", that is the set of words they
employ variously to "justify their actions, their beliefs, and their lives" and in which
they formulate their "deepest self-doubts and highest hopes" and tell "the story of
[their] lives."40 But what is fundamentally "ironic" about this person's "final
vocabulary" is their awareness that no other vocabulary could possibly underwrite
these beliefs or doubts or hopes. And what is "final" about it is not because it is ever
complete, but because there is "no non-circular argumentative recourse" to be had
which will finally justify these words.
I suggest that such an analysis remains at heart emotivist when it comes to deal with
moral issues. Part of the reason for this extends out from the role of language in









What has to be learned in a moral education is not a theorem such as that
good conduct is acting fairly or being charitable, nor is it a rule such as
"always tell the truth", but how to speak the language intelligently.41
We have here a clear if implied rejection of the type of moral theories - Aristotelian,
Kantian - charted above. Any account of morality which is non-linguistic, which
attempts to assert a deeper or a-contextual grain of moral knowledge or action is
denied.
Let us consider two aspects to this as they relate to the "ironist self". Firstly that the
individual self is the source of moral inspiration, and secondly that changes in one's
moral beliefs come about through changing one's self-description. These rely
primarily on being situated within Rorty's more general linguistic framework where
truth is not discovered but created, but also further require the proviso that the
ultimate arbiter of what is true about oneself is oneself. Not only does this
unashamedly self-centred vision demand of us that we give up any and all claims to
"morally privileged" arguments, but also that in so doing it commends to us the
essentially emotivist position that our moral convictions are nothing but the
expression of the urges or preferences that we might have, and, more significantly,
that any ensuing moral "debate" is no more than a matter of urging those expressions
on other people.
This "flattening" of the conceptual landscape attempts to de-problematise
conventionally troubled concepts by putting them on the same plane and thus making
them all equally open for negotiation. What is particularly reminiscent ofMaclntyre's
description of the contemporary culture of emotivism is where Rorty's thesis takes
us to when coming to describe the debating and choosing of competing
"vocabularies". The situating of the self and its moral choices on the level plane of
language entails the loss of the possibility of any hierarchical or external structures
of justification. In this picture there "will be no higher standpoint to which we are
ibid., p.58.
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responsible and against whose precepts we might offend. There will be no such
activity as scrutinising competing values in order to see which are morally
privileged."42
This position is also at the heart of Rorty's enlightened, secular, vision of liberalism.
All or any non-human forces to which previously humanity has thought itself
responsible to or directed by drop away in the completion of the "process of
de-divinisation". Given this, what the emotivist compromise, as I have called it,
consists in, becomes apparent. To live with others, individual self-describing selves
must make a compromise by entering a new public vocabulary which is quite
different from any private vocabulary. But this public vocabulary is not so much
shared, as developed as an aggregate.42 The reason for this is that no necessary
extension can be made from one's privatised desires to the public vocabulary; no
philosophical foundations for the public vocabulary can be based on one's ability and
desire for self re-description. As Rorty puts it, "our reponsibilities to others constitute
only the public side of our lives, a side which competes with our private affections
and our private attempts at self-creation, and which has no automatic priority over
such private motives."44 The self-aware "ironist" self is to be considered freed to
choose the patterns of obligation within which s/he is situated. Obligations for private
self-description are therefore to be thrown in together with public duties, with no
formal pecking order either available or desirable. Talk of compromise necessarily
enters at this stage, but, just as was seen in Maclntyre's description, this compromise
will always be thin and superficial. The reason for this in Rorty's case is his
insistence on holding the public/private distinction firmly in place. No "higher set of
42 ibid., p.50.
43 Cf. Bentham: "The interest of the community is, what? - the sum of the
interests of the several members who compose it." Quoted in Philip Selznick, The
Moral Commonwealth: Social Theory and the Promise of Community, Berkeley,
University of California Press, 1992, p.536.
44
Rorty, Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity, op.cit., p. 194 (original emphasis).
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obligations" could ever bring the two aspects together under one unifying principle;
moreover, previous attempts have been shown consistently to fail. Without any
theoretical "glue" to hold the two together the public and private realms remain
distinct, and the relation between them a bare compromise. As Rorty stresses in the
most telling fashion, "All that is in question is accomodation - not synthesis."45 Thus
in terms reminiscent of Maclntyre's description of our emotivist culture, all that is
achievable, says Rorty, is that - and this, given his earlier post-epistemological
urgings, is as much a definitional point as anything else - there be "enough overlap"
amongst competing private desires to sustain a basic public solidarity. Since there can
be no question of a rationally superior agreement, this is the best one will be able to
do.
To accept this is, however, as I put it, to accept the emotivist compromise. Rorty's
'self must compromise in that as an individual coming together with others in the
public arena they must contribute to the "social self-description" that any group
requires to be able to make communal life viable. But of course being faithful to the
insight that there can be no external "trumping" criteria - such as appeals to natural
justice, inalienable rights, etc. - to override competing claims, here again there can
be no criteria of "success". So just as Rorty tries to imagine rational argument giving
way to the interplay of old and new vocabularies in the private realm, so in the
public realm re-description rather than any type of foundationalist debate is to remain
our guiding metaphor. As he says
We should see allegiance to social institutions as no more matters for
justification by reference to familiar, commonly accepted premises - but also
as no more arbitrary - than choices of friends or heroes. Such choices are not
made by reference to criteria.46




There is no "ground" for such loyalites and convictions save the fact that the
beliefs and desires and emotions which buttress them overlap those of lots
of other members of the group with which we identify for purposes of moral
or political deliberation.47
The only duty we can sensibly speak of is the duty to keep the conversation with
others going and to keep it open; success can be nothing more than continuance,
whatever that might mean.
There now arises a particular issue which Rorty must face and which springs from
his assertions about vocabularies at both the public and private levels, an issue that
Maclntyre we could imagine would find deeply problematic. The awareness of the
contingency of even our most cherished beliefs is seen by Rorty as releasing the self
from the possible intrusions of a publicly imposed morality, since possibilites for
change come only through self-redescription. But as this is true for the private, so too
must it be for the public sphere. To be consistent, in other words, with his
philosophical point, there can be no external constraints on public debate except
conversational ones, again no "trump" arguments which can be introduced into the
political debate. This means that even, perhaps especially, in liberal societies we
cannot condemn public political arguments with which we disagree by asserting
foundational or essentialist claims about what it really means to respect being human.
The philosophical argument that there are no timeless justifications for present
practices but only new and different ways of redescribing what to make of them must
be applied across the board. The effect of realising this is crucial. In terms of politics
and the institutional order, it even means
giving up the idea that liberalism could be justified, and Nazi or Marxist
enemies of liberalism refuted, by driving the latter up against an
argumentative wall - forcing them to admit that liberal freedom has a "moral
privilege" which their own values lacked. From the point of view I have
been commending any attempt to drive one's opponent up against a wall in
47 Richard Rorty, "Postmodern Bourgeois Liberalism" in Philosophical Papers:
Volume I Cambridge, CUP, 1991, p.200.
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this way fails when the wall against which he is driven comes to be seen as
one more vocabulary, one more way of describing things.48
This is precisely Maclntyre's emotivist nightmare, the sure sign that we are going
though a new Dark Ages. But for Rorty the lack of criteria which would allow one
to say "I refute the Nazi because I know s/he is wrong" is an advance for philosophy
for the very reason that it skirts traditional (and especially epistemological)
problematics which have singularly failed in their task to come up with such criteria.
But rather than continually trying - and failing - to produce rational criteria through
philosophical theories that would detail what rational moral and political debate
should be like, Rorty urges us to adopt vocabularies which create solidarity amongst
like-minded people, with no in-built criteria for success except furthering our ability
to cope. What Rorty suggests is that we turn, in the realisation of our contingencies,
away from traditional philosophy and theory towards narrative, towards the "edifying"
philosophies of the "strong poets". In line with his stress on the concept of
vocabulary, "edification" is to be taken as the "project of finding new, better, more
fruitful ways of speaking", and "edifying philosophers" those who "are reactive and
offer satires, parodies, aphorisms" rather than "building for eternity."49 Like poets
they can create and cause a sense of wonder through exploring the notion that there
is "something new under the sun, something which is not an accurate representation
of what was already there, something which (at least for the moment) cannot be
explained and can barely be described."50
But what Rorty is essentially doing, and this move is reinforced rather than
challenged by his division between public and private, is signalling the withdrawal
of the possibility of rational debate, for fear that it might invoke rationalist or
4S Rorty, Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity, op.cit., p.53.
49 Richard Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, (1980) Oxford, Basil
Blackwell, 1989, pp.360, 369.
50 ibid., p.370.
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essentialist or foundational assumptions. (It is no coincidence that elsewhere Rorty
has written that "moral progress has, in recent centuries, owed more to the specialists
in particularity - historians, novelists, ethnographers, and muckracking journalists, for
example - than to such specialists in universality as theologians and
philosophers."51) It is not my purpose to question his intentions for so doing, but the
consequences of his position have I hope become clear: that there can therefore be
no a priori notion of a distinct form of social communication which is more than a
mere aggregate of self-styled desires and final vocabularies. This is for Rorty a
success, a victory for a new type of "self-creating" philosophy, a victory for the
"strong poets", and the death of an impossible project of fusing the public and the
private: "My "poeticized" culture," he writes, "is one which has given up the attempt
to unite one's private ways of dealing with one's finitude and one's sense of
obligation to other human beings."52
At both levels - public and private - this picture is emblematic of what Maclntyre
sees as the loss of the ability to carry on rational debate. The main reason for this lies
in the emotivist-type assumptions which such a vision has at its heart. In effect, the
turn towards narrative (self)re-description champions the criteria-less renewal of
vocabularies over and against the production of "better arguments". As Bernstein puts
it, "The "logic" of Rorty's strategy comes down to making the adoption of a
vocabulary a matter of taste about which there can be no rational debate."53 Yet the
loss Maclntyre finds in the demise of an Aristotelian summum bonum becomes in
Rorty's hands a celebration. It is a liberation of the self, a liberation from the dead
hand of old philosophies, and the acceptance of the most meagre form of community
which is the emotivist compromise:
51 See his "On Ethnocentrism: A Reply to Clifford Geertz" in Philosophical
Papers: Volume /, op.cit., p.207.
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53 Richard Bernstein, The New Constellation, op.cit., p.278.
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human solidarity is not a matter of sharing a common truth or a common
goal but of sharing a common selfish hope, the hope that one's world - the
little things around which one has woven into one's final vocabulary - will
not be destroyed.54
Meagre indeed.
Initial Problems with the Emotivist Self
Such a conclusion is unacceptable to Maclntyre. Moreover, Rorty's thin version of
community fails, I suggest, to treat the consequences of the separation of private and
public seriously enough. His optimism is unsustainable where, in the public realm,
the chances of achieving solidarity turn out to be no more than an expression of faith.
Additionally, his uncritical endorsement of the potential of liberal structures of
contemporary America to support such solidarity, it has also been argued, flies in the
face of a multitude of empirical counter-examples.55 This naivety is compounded at
the theoretical level on the grounds that Rorty fails to acknowledge the difficulties
faced by the vision of separate but co-existent realms of public and private. Where
Maclntyre would argue the definitional point that "a self for which ... regard [for
others] is problematic could only be a self which had become isolated from and
deprived of any community within which it could systematically enquire what its
good was and achieve that good"56, Rorty denies this as a problem at all while
nevertheless celebrating its spirit. Without realising it, Rorty's consistent denial of a
common good and his faith in the separation of public and private therefore
4
Rorty, Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity, op.cit., p.92.
55 See, for example, from a feminist perspective, Nancy Fraser's "Solidarity or
Singularity?" in Reading Rorty: Critical Responses to Philosophy and the Mirror of
Nature (and beyond), ed. Alan R.Malachowski, associate ed. Jo Burrows, Oxford,
Basil Blackwell, 1990.
Alasdair Maclntyre, Three Rival Versions ofMoral Enquiry: Encyclopaedia,
Genealogy, and Tradition, London, Duckworth, 1990, p. 193.
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reinforces Maclntyre's diagnosis of emotivism. In this section I want to explore
difficulties with both writers' analyses and in so doing pave the way for a different
theoretical understanding of the problems of the self and its community.
At this point let us return to Maclntyre, and in so doing raise an objection. We recall
that in Maclntyre's narrative the fragmentation of once whole moral doctrines
resulted in our inheriting a moral vocabulary comprised of fragments of concepts
initially designed to exist within particular conceptual frameworks. The charting of
such developments resulted in the emergence of the emotivist culture within which
we allegedly find ourselves. The primary feature of this is that we have no rational
way of resolving moral disputes or weighing moral claims, because, to use his image,
we have lost the scales. Such inability to resolve moral disputes is in large part the
consequence of the fact that the language - which Rorty does not problematise but
leaves merely at the level of contingency - in which such discourse takes place
excludes resolution because it is thought merely to express our preferences or desires
which are themselves not subject to rational scrutiny. Insofar as this picture further
suggests and indeed demands arguments about liberal institutions to which I will next
turn, I will concentrate briefly on the linguistic point.
What Maclntyre sets up as one of the fundamentals of the emotivist self is, I suggest,
to give too much credence to an incoherent idea. There is a sense, that is, in which
the breakdown of contemporary morality cannot be complete. The progress of the
argument saw a dropping away of certain types - teleological, universalistic - of
contextual constraints, resulting ultimately in an alienated albeit supposedly liberated
self. Prominent amongst the characteristics of this self was its capacity "to evade any
necessary identification with any particular contingent state of affairs."57 However,
I suggest that, even if particular original philosophical frameworks have been
abandoned, it is not a further option to drop altogether the linguistic constraints that
are imposed upon us. Indeed we might even be led to thinking that this is more
Alasdair Maclntyre, After Virtue, op.cit., p.31.
49
obvious in the case of an emotivist morality. For if all that our linguistic moral
utterances report are our urges or feelings as expressions, then such language, even
if fragmented and separated from its original conceptual contexts, still exists as a
social practice. If we take the idea of linguistic communication as a constraint
seriously then it is very difficult to conceive of ourselves as individual, entirely
original, pre-social selves. Taken to the extreme I am not my language. On the other
hand, nor in any meaningful sense could I be outwith it. Thus, and if we follow
Wittgenstein's argument against the possibility of a private language, we must
concede that so long as our language is to a greater or lesser extent the taking part
in a shared enterprise then we must allow for the possibility of agreement, for the
'testability' of meaning. This does not mean that we need ever agree say on some
contentious moral or social issue, but that at the bare minimum, in order to
understand even that we are disagreeing requires a level of agreement.58
Now it may be that contemporary moral disagreement is carried out in such a way
that debate is often ultimately unfruitful, unyielding of substantive consensus. But is
it not to give too much credence to (the definition of) emotivism to suggest, as
Maclntyre does, that this lack of consensus is because the sole function of language
in that particular debate is to report preferences or urges? There are two possible
reasons why such a suggestion might test the bounds of even our most generous
sympathies. Firstly the assertion that my (or anyone's) shared language would be able
to report something which was so pre-social, pre-linguistic, and uniquely personal to
me, is one that we might think extremely difficult to take on board. How would any
communication concerning these personal feelings take place if they were indeed so
original to us as individuals? Besides, even if we could communicate them, why
This is arguably similar to a part of Habermas' argument concerning the
possibility of and justification for communicative ethics and discourse theory, but I
will not go into these arguments here. I will keep to the level of Wittgenstein's point.
See Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations (second ed. 1958) Oxford,
Basil Blackwell, 1989; also Saul A. Kripke, Wittgenstein on Rules and Private
Language: An Elementary Exposition, Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1985. Cf. Jurgen
Habermas, The Theory of Communicative Action, Boston, Beacon Press, 1984.
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would we need or want to? Secondly, if we accepted that such communication was
indeed possible, then we could not escape the notion that once - and even because
- expressed in that language, any subsequent debate about that which had been
expressed would be somehow inauthentic. But to pin any moral disagreement purely
on the role of language would not be correct since language would itself be a part of
the very process of communication, shared in a way that the emotivist self could not
escape. No matter how much we dislike the idea, and no matter how little genuine
consensus it may produce, we cannot discount the fact that the linguistic parameters
within which we operate, though they are not the only ones, necessarily constrain us
in way that is irreducibly social. As such, the language in which we debate moral
questions cannot be merely another "contingent state of affairs" which the self can
evade. The option of evading language, save for becoming mute, is simply not
available.
Whilst Maclntyre finds mileage in the description of contemporary moral debate as
essentially emotivist, this can be properly sustained only if extended beyond the arena
of the 'merely' linguistic. What these points do not yet address however is the
argument that such language as we do use remains a series of fragmented survivals
whose original context has been lost. But it does suggest that there is a difference
between shared meaning - expressible only through language (and to this extent Rorty
is correct) - and shared values or shared patterns of normative justification. What
Maclntyre's argument about "fragmented survivals" draws our attention to, however,
is the dire need for a sensitivity toward the construction of meaning in and through
language, as well as the idea that whatever meaning one person or group ascribes to
a particular usage may or may not be expressible or understood in a quite different
framework. If one person's or group's sense of "ought" is tied to and informed by a
different set of meanings as to the context, authority, or specificity of that "ought",
then Maclntyre is correct to point out the requirement of understanding the historical
genesis and particular present locating meaning of that "ought". (The importance of
recognising the difference, say, between an Aristotelian and Kantian "ought").
Moreover, he is also correct in pointing out that where we fail to pay such attention,
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there exists the danger of, at the least, confusion, and at the worst, corruption and
mistranslation of the other(s)' meaning.
But all this is different from his argument that all contingent states of affairs -
including language - can be evaded. What then of Rorty who brings moral theory
(like everything else) within the domain of language? Why can he still fall prey to
the charge of emotivism when he appears to deny the accusation of de-
contextualisation through his argument about the contingency of language? The
answer here goes back to Maclntyre's more searching insight about moral
disagreement. Whether or not language merely reports or gives expression to
"preference, attitude, or feeling", Rorty remains firmly attached to the idea of
judgments being made without reference to rational, perhaps indeed any, criteria. His
emphasis on redescription is quite at one with Maclntyre's argument that for the
emotivist self's view of morality there can be "disagreements but no contradictions".
But if Rorty's awareness of the contingency of language improves on the above
criticisms made of Maclntyre, he too fails sufficiently to draw attention to the
difference between shared meaning and the possibility of shared justification which
lies outwith the purely private realm of the "strong poet". Though I do not want to
suggest that these two ideas - understanding and justification - are entirely separate,
drawing attention to the difference between them may prove important.
Think back to Sartre's student. What is significant about this - and contra
Maclntyre's understanding - is that we (and he, the student) understand that he faces
a dilemma. And, to understand that he faces a choice between say, familial loyalty
and commitment to his country is to understand that he has a moral dilemma. Of
course this does not mean that we can objectively read off an answer to that
dilemma, and to this extent Sartre is correct. There is a jump between understanding
someone's meaning when they express their choice as a dilemma and saying that
there is a pre-existing solution to that dilemma. All the same, that we do understand
it as a moral dilemma suggests both that its construction is in some sense not entirely
original to him (it is a problem that has been encountered before and is
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communicable as such), and, therefore, that it cannot be a purely "private" problem.
To avoid potential confusion these points require fuller explanation.
Simply at the level of understanding it is possible to recognise the student's choice
as one important enough to be termed a moral dilemma. It is not, in other words,
simply a trivial issue, a decision about which pair of shoes to wear, say. (Though of
course one could imagine a context where such a choice might indeed be non-trivial,
but this is partly my point.) To recognise it as such requires a level of communicative
ability that would seem to be more than the emotivist self is capable of. It is not thus
a purely private matter because it can be (and indeed has been) articulated in a
language in which it understood. As argued above in the reference to Wittgenstein,
there is sufficient shared meaning available to recognise a choice - why otherwise
would it work as an example even of Sartre's argument? In this limited sense of
private and public then the fact of its expressibility brings it into the public realm of
shared meaning. (In fact, "brings it" might seem to suggest that it existed elsewhere
before, in some "truly" private realm, beyond even language, before language. Even
this is, excepting the most solipsistic egos, is unlikely.)
But it is also public in a more expansive sense. The two options the student faces are
brought about in both cases by circumstances beyond his control. On the one hand,
he did not cause the war to begin, and on the other, he did not choose to have a
mother. To say that the ontological construction of the dilemma is his own is
therefore incorrect. (Of course, he could avoid constructing it as a dilemma at all.
Indeed, this would fit Neil MacCormick's suggestion that "the only true existentialists
are psychopaths - and vice versa"!59) And here we might differentiate between
Sartre's position in the actual scenario and his (or our own) in understanding it as a
moral problem. Sartre as listener and Sartre as teller of a story years later is in two
quite different positions. This further reinforces the conceptual distinction between
See his Legal Reasoning and Legal Theory, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1978,
p.274.
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understanding the dilemma and seeking to act according to some criteria. Indeed, we
might even rebuke Sartre the listener for making an irresponsible response to the
initial question. If my brother comes to me and asks, "Should I go to the war or stay
to look after our sick mother?", if we have grown up together and we are close, my
response, "You are free, therefore choose," would seem a singularly inappropriate
one. In the two cases (as immediate listener and as listener to a hypothetical) I can
understand the problem, but between the two there is a difference. So for example,
it would not be correct to say that we fully understand yet the student's dilemma
even though we understand that the one he faces is a real and a moral one. For sure,
this does not yet mean that there are readily available criteria according to which one
can justify the decision; a choice remains and an option may have to be taken. But
this is not a purely private choice. It is a public matter in the sense that the
construction of the dilemma, factually - the war, a sick relative - and normatively -
loyalty versus patriotism - constitute features that the individual could not construct
alone. In this sense it is incorrect to say even of the emotivist self that it can "choose
the composition of its moral world." To say with Sartre that the individual is "the
source of all values" is therefore to miscontrue the nature of the situation.
And here is the crux of the matter: a choice there may be, but it cannot be an
unconstrained choice. The reason for this is that for it to be an unconstrained choice
there would have to be no dilemma in the first place. One who was truly the source
of all his or her values, one who was truly free, would not, could not, be faced by
such a dilemma.
Harry Frankfurt, in a response to Maclntyre's essay "How Moral Agents became
Ghosts,"60 makes out a case that would seem to argue against both Maclntyre's
conception of the emotivist self and against Rorty's privatised self on precisely this
f See Harry Frankfurt's "Comments on Maclntyre" Synthese 53 (1982) 319-321;
responding to Alasdair Maclntyre, "How Moral Agents Became Ghosts, or, Why the
History of Ethics Diverged from that of the Philosophy of Mind," same edition,
pp.295-312.
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issue. If we start, says Frankfurt, with the presumption that "To identify something,
or even to characterize it, is essentially a matter of distinguishing it from what it is
not", then "in order for the nature or uses of a thing to be understood, the limits of
the thing must be known." Consequently
... anything which enjoys altogether unlimited freedom must be
unintelligible, even to itself. It can remain limitlessly free only if it
continuously faces the option of recreating itself, since otherwise its freedom
is impaired by dependence on its own past; and the way in which it deals
with this option must be entirely arbitrary, for it cannot be wholly free if it
acknowledges or submits to the authority or the superiority of any constraint
whatever. Hence it is doomed to proceed blindly, with no basis at all for the
commitments it must unendingly make.61
I believe that this criticism strikes at both Maclntyre's and Rorty's versions of the
self. Even minimally, as I have suggested, Maclntyre's emotivist self cannot escape
linguistic constraints. What Frankfurt now adds is that the idea of acting without any
constraints makes even the notion of identity incoherent. In fact, Frankfurt cannot
even present the argument for a self acting with unrestrained choice without lapsing
into error; presenting such a self in the way he does (the option that "it" continuously
faces, that "it" acknowledges the commitments "it" must make) founders on the
original assumption that a thing without limits has no identity - "it" does not exist.
The radical freedom ascribed to the emotivist self - that "it" "can choose the
composition of its moral world", or, per Rorty, that "it" can, indeed should, constantly
redescribe itself - is then erroneous in two senses: one, the very existence of such a
"self" is highly questionable, and two, as such, so is the very existence of a "moral
world" at all where morality includes any hint of constraint.
Where does this leave us? I suggest Maclntyre's version of the emotivist self is too
unconstrained to be coherent. A self which acts without constraints could not even
recognise Sartre's example of a dilemma. Therefore it certainly could not recognise
it as a moral dilemma. Moreover, if this is correct, then even Maclntyre's initial
Frankfurt, ibid., p.319.
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insight about the nature of contemporary moral disagreement would become
meaningless; moral debate would not just be interminable it would be non-existent.
In his darker moments - who knows? - Maclntyre might believe this to be true. Yet
given the need for his argument to start with the "state of contemporary moral
disagreement", I cannot think he could seriously hold this position. As such the
difference between shared meaning and shared normative understandings becomes
vital.
On the other hand Rorty's recognition of linguistic contraints is insufficient to counter
the point that for the notion of a constantly redescribing, 'privatised' self to be
coherent, his theory must recognise the one contingency that it does not deal with,
for all its talk of contingency. That is, that the relation between the public and the
private is itself contingent. Rorty continually jumps between the level of the "self-
creating self" and the level of "one's fellow citizens." What he fails to grasp is the
conceptual and practical connection between the 'private self' and the public realm.
In one of the clearest cases of this, he chastises Foucault for failing to "separate his
two roles ... his moral identity as a citizen from his search for autonomy."62 But to
accept this, as Nancy Fraser rightly points out by reference to Marxist, feminist, and
indeed Foucauldian critiques, "is to turn our back on the last hundred years of social
history."63 It is to neglect their insights that, contra Rorty's liberalism, the economic,
the personal, and the cultural, may well be political. At the very least it fails properly
to recognise that there is no a priori way of deciding what is to be private and what
public; that this distinction is as contingent and contestable as any other. Yet Rorty's
defence of an intolerably crude, harm-principle liberalism - a defence without
argument remember - seems stubbornly to reject this contingent relation.
62 See Rorty's "Moral identity and private autonomy: The case of Foucault",
Philosophical Papers: Volume II, Cambridge, CUP, 1991, p. 196.
Nancy Fraser, op.cit., p.313.
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The effect of this - as Maclntyre would predict for an emotivist culture - is to
squeeze the meaning of morality until it becomes meaningless. There is nothing left
between the self and the citizen that might recognisably be called the realm of shared
and conflicting values. "Public morality" becomes a misnomer and an oxymoron
where it is defined by reference solely to aspects of a legally-defined citizen whose
only means of debate and deliberation are the "institutions of procedural justice"64
and whose outcomes are "codifiable in statutes and maxims."65 Determined, in the
face of decades of critique, to maintain the separation of public and private, "private
morality" becomes equally anomalous. "Rorty's 'private morality'" suggest Guignon
and Hiley66, "is morality in name only." If as they suggest, it is the case that
"People generally stand 'unflinchingly' for their convictions because they see these
convictions as pointing to a good life," once again Rorty's refusal to hold private
redescription and the good life in community in the one vision effectively reduces to
nothing the idea or even point of talking about morality in the private sphere. The
failure to recognise the contingency and mutuality of the public and private thus
signals the incoherence of the self in Rorty's vision; a self which is at once radically
contingent yet hopelessly unattached, committed to itself in a way that precludes any
reasons why it should be committed to anything at all. For as Bernstein argues
When we turn to Rorty's attempt to privatize irony, to encourage the playing
out of private fantasies, it is difficult to understand why anyone who
becomes as narcissistic as Rorty advocates would be motivated to assume
public responsibilities.67
See Rorty's "On Ethnocentrism", op.cit., p.210.
Rorty, "Freud and moral reflection" Philosophical Papers: Volume II, op.cit.,
p.153.
'
In "Biting the bullet: Rorty on Private and Public Morality," in Malachowski
ed., Reading Rorty, op.cit., pp.358-59.
67 Bernstein, The New Constellation, op.cit., p.287.
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But, I would suggest, not just "public responsibilities", become problematic, but the
very coherence of such a self. As indeed the myth of Narcissus suggests, the youth
who is so obsessed with his own self-image, turns into a flower; not a human being
at all. Rorty's self veers dangerously to the same conclusion.
So where Maclntyre's version of the emotivist self failed to account for the
irreducibly social nature of language, both Maclntyre and Rorty fail to give a
coherent account of the social reflexivity of the self and the intimate relation between
that reflexivity and the idea of meaningful normative constraint, points I will seek to
address in a later chapter. Yet while I have argued that their conception of the self
is untenable, their arguments concerning the ultimate irresolvability of questions of
value in contemporary society remains a live one. To turn now to these brings us into
two more reeognisably public domains, the domains of politics and of law.
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CHAPTER TWO
The Politics of the Emotivist Compromise
I have argued that both Maclntyre's and Rorty's conception of the self is flawed.
Nevertheless, their arguments have a further dimension that needs to be engaged with,
a dimension that has been hinted at in the previous sections but will now be brought
properly to the fore. It concerns the understanding of liberalism and the liberal legal
order that is taken to be consequent upon and supportive of the self and its moral
understandings in the modern world. While I have used Rorty's work to identify the
construction and function of the emotivist compromise, given that his political
analysis is underdeveloped and consists largely - as I have just noted - in an
uncritical endorsement of American procedural justice and institutions, I will return
to Maclntyre's writings to draw a fuller picture of the argument. Once again it should
be noted that to lump together Maclntyre and Rorty here may seem to overlook the
discrepancies between the two. But as I have tried to show, the premises for the
latter's optimism are essentially the same as those for the former's pessimism. As
such, it is the issue of the compromise deemed to occur in liberal institutions rather
than the authors' evaluative reactions to it that are of importance.
The institutions and procedures of the emotivist compromise - of liberalism for
Maclntyre - go hand in hand with the conception of the emotivist self. We will recall
that the defining characteristic of such a self was its expression in language of
nothing but "preferences, feelings or attitudes". Such preferences will, he says,
usually take the form "I want it to be the case that such and such".68 As each self
(or group) will have its own preferences or ranking of preferences there will
inevitably be conflict. Hence the necessity for compromise. But that there must be
Alasdair Maclntyre, Whose Justice? Which rationality? London, Duckworth,
1988, p.338. Note: page references, in brackets, in the text of this section are to this
book.
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compromise does not yet deal with the question of how compromise is to be reached.
Maclntyre's breakdown of this issue into four levels of "activity and debate" is
instructive and raises serious questions for liberal theory, and for liberal legalism. The
charges they raise will be discussed both here and later on, for ifMaclntyre is correct
the consequences are broad and far-reaching. The underlying ideas in what follows
have been canvassed already, but consideration of their institutional aspect will now
push the debate further.
The first level of Maclntyre's four-level analysis "is that at which different
individuals and groups express their attitudes in their own terms, whatever these may
be."(p.342) As we have seen however, since these expressions are deemed to have
been set loose from the contexts of teleology or from justification through
universalisation, debate at this level, says Maclntyre
is necessarily barren; rival appeals to accounts of the human good or of
justice necessarily assume a rhetorical form such that it is as assertion and
counterassertion, rather than as argument and counterargument, that rival
standpoints confront one another.(p.343)
The resultant interminable nature of debate - if "debate" is the right term - at this
level we have already discussed, and do not need to go into again here. However, the
response to this impasse raises us to the second level.
Here "preferences are tallied and weighed", but in order to carry this out there is a
presumption that
the procedures which govern such tallying and weighing are themselves the
outcome of rational debate of quite another kind, that at which the principles
of shared rationality have been identified by philosophical enquiry.(ibid)
Here we are dealing with what Maclntyre terms the production of the "principles of
justice" (rather than the more precise discourse conditions exemplified in the work
of say Habermas and Robert Alexy, though as attempts to clarify the presuppositions
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and justifications for the procedures that may be identified at this level, these might
be closely related to the "principles of justice"). However it will come as no surprise
that Maclntyre rejects the unending search for such procedures as necessarily elusive
on grounds with which we are again familiar. That is, no "principles of shared
rationality" have been nor will be identified for the reason that both the starting point
(the self and its preferences) and the lack of contexts (such as a teleological common
good) have deprived practical reasoning of any sense of what it would mean to
successfully find such a shared rationality. In other words, the very reason there has
to be a move to the second level effectively precludes the possibility that resolution
will occur at this level. Nevertheless, says Maclntyre, this does not mean that
pragmatic or "socially effective" rules do not operate. What they lack, for him, is
conclusiveness at the level of philosophical enquiry.
Such principles as do come into operation for the weighing and tallying of
preferences at the second level must then be seen to be able to justify how
individuals are treated as individuals according to these principles. The third level -
which might be thought to constitute in essence the particularisation, or justification
back the way, of principles to preferences - therefore works as a "certain kind of
sanction for the rules and procedures functioning at the second level."(p.344) Here,
to use Maclntyre's example, what "equality" as a principle of justice at the second
level means in its application to certain individuals, groups, or interests has to be
justified. So if absolute equality is unattainable, the third level operates to show how
certain inequalities (economic, say) are nevertheless justified according to principles
of justice. Initial preferences will therefore be upheld or not, and rules at this third
level will ideally be used to show why the application of second level principles
occurs as it does.
But once again we find that third level questions such as "Does the principle of
equality sanction positive discrimination?", or, "On what occasions and for what
groups is economic freedom curtailable?" are as contested and irresolvable as debate
at the previous two levels. The reasons for this are again familiar and the inability
61
of liberal theorists to agree moreover attests as much as anything does to "the
necessary inconclusiveness of modern academic philosophy".(ibid) Yet decisions are
and indeed must be made. How they are achieved brings us to the fourth level and
to the crux of Maclntyre's argument.
The fourth is that level "at which appeals to justice may be heard in a liberal
individualist order, that of the rules and procedures of the formal legal system."(ibid)
It is important to remember that although Maclntyre has argued that the
inconclusiveness of debate in liberal societies is clearly evident at all levels of debate,
and has sought to explain this in terms of the lack of "scales" on which arguments
can rationally be weighed, he cannot of course deny that argument about and
resolution of social conflict does occur. But what is significant now is the way in
which he sees such resolution taking place, and the reasons behind it. Ostensibly
unable to produce rationally-based criteria of morality or justice at lower levels, he
argues that at the fourth level
The function of the [legal] system is to enforce an order in which conflict
resolution takes place without invoking any overall theory of the human
good. To achieve this end almost any position taken in the philosophical
debates of liberal jurisprudence may on occasion be invoked.(ibid)
It is in this last point that the real tragedy of modernity is to be discovered. For the
consequence of this is that
the mark of a liberal order is to refer its conflicts for their resolution, not to
those debates, but to the verdicts of its legal system.(ibid)
The progression through the emotivist self, its preferences, and their compromise,
find their institutional vesting in the legal system not because of the wisdom or
justness of law, but because of the failure of contemporary philosophy to provide any
other means for rational resolution. The difference between the terms "resolution" and
"verdict" is telling: the force of argument and rational debate has been usurped by the
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force of law to decide. But such usurpation is not a contingent victory for an
imperialistic legal system - though the latter is the consequence: it is a necessary
result of the failure of all other levels of debate to produce sufficient standards of
rational justification. As Maclntyre concludes somewhat disdainfully, "The lawyers,
not the philosophers, are the clergy of liberalism."(ibid)
Some points come out of this analysis that are worth taking up. First there is the
assumption that liberalism's basic unit is the individual, who expresses preferences
in the "I want ... " form. While I have already touched on problems with such an
atomistic view of the self, the combination now with preferences in this form is a
strong - though in fact commonplace - argument against liberal theory. Marx gives
one of the clearer expositions of it when discussing the consequences of the way in
which rights, and in particular property rights, were delineated after the French
Revolution. Looking at the 1793 "Declaration of the Rights of Man and of Citizen"
he sees the contradiction between "man as a communal being" and "man as a private
individual" in civil society as existing in the definitional opposition of the two, the
result of which is to disallow anything but a thin meaning of community. The
language and substance are all but identical to Maclntyre's:
not one of the so-called rights of man goes beyond egoistic man, man as a
member of civil society, namely an individual withdrawn into himself, his
private interest and his private desires and separated from the community ...
society appears as a framework extraneous to individuals, as a limitation on
their original independence.69
While Marx goes on to examine the role of private property and its relation to
interests, in moral theory Maclntyre treats the issue of preference as integral to the
construction of his argument about the inability of rational debate to take place at the
first level (which is in turn essential to his critique of debate at the other three
! Karl Marx, "On the Jewish Question", in Karl Marx: Early Writings, ed.
Lucio Colletti, transl. R.Livingstone and G.Benton, Harmondsworth, Penguin Books,
1975, p.230.
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levels). Given the form of preferences ("I want Maclntyre suggests that as no
impersonal criteria can be brought in to evaluate between competing preferences,
what we are witnessing is the "obliteration of the distinction between manipulative
and non-manipulative social relations."70 That is, when debate occurs, any ensuing
compromise takes the form - in Marx's terms - of coincidence of interests rather than
genuine communal resolution; and where such preferences can only be aligned, not
argued out, it becomes perfectly feasible to "treat others as means not ends." The
distinction between self and society is then premised on the inability to do anything
communally or in terms of philosophical enquiry that could do any more than line
up and arbitrarily decide between any amount of "I wants".
In line with my point earlier about the questionable originality of such "desires,
feelings, or preferences" I want to suggest here that the ahistorical, abstract, or
atomistic version of the self this picture presupposes is also unrealistic. Though it
appears on the surface to be a telling point against liberal theory, and though some
writers are more susceptible to this criticism than others - Rawls's "original position"
argument has for example come under continued critique from many sides on this
point - it is not however a conclusive rebuttal of liberalism. One reason why not
(which is I believe more telling against Maclntyre than Marx), is aptly presented by
Alan Hunt in his criticism of the use made of the "fundamental contradiction" (that
between self and others) by the Critical Legal Studies movement. He argues that
while their critique is directed at liberal philosophy, it
slides over into using the same conceptual categories in the critique of liberal
capitalist societies. What occurs in this process is that the conceptual
categories through which liberalism seeks to understand the world become
converted into real relations; it comes to appear as if the dualities of liberal
thought are sociological categories through which we can make sense of
contemporary society.71
70 Alasdair Maclntyre, After Virtue, op.cit., p.23.
71 Alan Hunt, Explorations in Law and Society: Towards a Constitutive theory
of Law, New York, Routledge, 1993, pp. 145-46.
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Now this raises a particularly searching point for Maclntyre who insists that "a moral
philosophy characteristically presupposes a sociology"72: is his position
sociologically valid? Is his description of the decontextualised self, seemingly capable
only of aligning preferences through substantively non-justifiable procedures,
accurate? Or does he make the same mistake Hunt attributes to CLS? One way of
answering these questions is to turn a later part of Maclntyre's thesis back on this
earlier part as Steven Lukes has done.73 In part of Maclntyre's work I have not dealt
with, he suggests that we need to resurrect Aristotelian theory and argument as a
means of clawing our way out of the "New Dark Ages". But as Lukes has cogently
argued, if one of the defining features of contemporary society is, for Maclntyre, that
we lack the means to conduct rational debate, how are we to go about convincing
others of the worth of Aristotelianism? If all we can do today is line up preferences,
what rational means exist to persuade others to endorse the theory he supports?
Surely not Aristotelian ones since he has precisely denied their effectiveness in
contemporary debate. So, says Lukes, if Maclntyre the sociologist is right, then
Maclntyre the diagnosing philosopher must be wrong.
This alone is insufficient to refute Maclntyre's thesis about the the isolated nature of
the self. Later I will suggest that an analysis of the constitutive relation between the
socially-situated self and shared and disputed values, offers a better description than
that of self and preference offered by Maclnytre. However for the moment I believe
Lukes's criticism sets in place sufficient doubt about the coherence of Maclntyre's
philosophical project and its relation to sociological observation to make us question
whether the real existence of such a self is, even for Maclntyre, acceptable. The
alienated self aligning preferences in an emotivist compromise is not I think a
warrantable description of moral judgment or of what compromise and disagreement
After Virtue, op.cit., p.23.
73 See his "Alasdair Maclntyre: the Sociologist versus the Philosopher," in
Steven Lukes, Moral Conflict and Politics, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1991, pp.248-
256.
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is over. This picture of the self fails to pay sufficient attention to the different and
subtle contexts in which values, disagreements, and compromises occur; a point I will
come back to in a later chapter in the discussion of Raz's theory of "constitutive
incommensurabilities". It is also, I think, to fail to pick up on Hunt's argument that
the arguments against liberal philosophy should not be conflated with the arguments
about the reality of contemporary political and economic life. As Stephen Holmes has
noted on precisely this point: "the unwillingness to examine liberal theories and
liberal societies separately is a trademark of antiliberal thought, for some antiliberals
assume that liberal societies perfectly embody liberal ideals."74 In essence therefore,
I believe Maclntyre makes the mistake of attributing too much credence to the
reasons why he thinks debate today to be interminable. While the latter aspect of
interminability may well be true, there may be other - and good - reasons for this
than those he puts forward in terms of the de-socialised self.
To suggest this raises another issue from Maclntyre's four-level schema which, even
if his description of the self and its compromises is incorrect, nevertheless can still
stand as an independent criticism. This brings us out of the realm of preferences into
that of the political compromises at levels two and three. Whether or not Maclntyre
is correct about the causes of moral and political disagreement, it would be nearly
impossible to argue that it did not all the same exist. The issue here is the way in
which that disagreement is constructed and the possible consequences of how it is
constructed. To understand the significance of this let us consider an apparent
anomaly.
On the one hand Maclntyre argues that contrary to its own premises about the
plurality of goods and the desire to promote no one in particular, liberalism does
indeed subscribe to one such theory. The principles of justice at level two, he says,
Stephen Holmes, The Anatomy ofAntiliberalism, Harvard, Harvard UP, 1993,
p.xiv.
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are not neutral with respect to rival and conflicting theories of the human
good ... they impose a particular conception of the good life, of practical
reasoning, and of justice upon those who willingly or unwillingly accept the
liberal procedures and the liberal terms of debate.(p.345)
And what is that conception? It is "no more and no less than the continued
sustenance of the liberal social and political order."(ibid.) But if this is the case,
where does that leave his earlier arguments that contemporary society lacks consensus
on any shared goods; surely here is an idea of the good which, albeit different from
an Aristotelian theory, is nonetheless a shared standard against which we can judge
the Tightness of individuals' moral actions? Where does this leave his argument that
our society is so conflict-ridden that rational debate cannot even occur? Is then the
radical inconclusiveness of conflict more apparent than real?
To answer this we must begin to enquire into the characteristics of the way in which
disagreement occurs in liberal societies. The argument Maclntyre makes is that the
effect of the anomaly is that conflict is made to be both real and unreal. Thus he
writes:
It is not just that we live too much by a variety and multiplicity of
fragmented concepts; it is that these are used at one and the same time to
express rival and incompatible social ideals and policies and to furnish us
with a pluralist political rhetoric whose function is to conceal the depth of
our conflicts.75
Conflict is real in this scenario in the following sense: in line with his argument
about "fragmented survivals", contemporary moral theory's interminable debates do
not allow for rational resolution; individuals and groups genuinely do hold conflicting
opinions which an emotivist culture is philosophically at a loss to do anything about.
However, conflict is made to be unreal because of the rhetorical and institutional
channelling that it receives. What tends to occur is that where the common good of
liberalism may be expressed ultimately as "the continued sustenance of the liberal
After Virtue, op.cit., p.253.
67
social and political order", challenges to this order tend to be dealt with in one of two
ways: either conflict is brought within the rhetorical structures of liberal debate and
is thus made amenable to debate on liberalism's terms, or it is denied a hearing in
debate at all. In the former case what appears as genuine conflict turns out to be in
fact no more than debate within already-defined liberal parameters. As Maclntyre
notes: "the contemporary debates within modern political systems are almost
exclusively between conservative liberals, liberal liberals, and radical liberals."(p.392)
And the effect of this, he concludes, gives evidence for the second technique, that of
exclusion: "There is little place in such political systems for the criticism of the
system itself, that is, for putting liberalism in question."(ibid) So even when
Maclntyre says that at level one "different groups or individuals express their
attitudes in their own terms, whatever they may be," we must treat this with more
caution than he himself does. This way of putting it may be to underestimate the
power of rhetorical structures at the least to distort the manifold possibilities of
individuals' expression of meaning "in their own terms." For here is precisely another
way in which genuine or radical conflict can be masked or "concealed".
This is a particularly important facet of debate at level four, the legal system, which
we will come to in a moment. But at the level of debate on principles of justice and
their particularisation, Maclntyre must undoubtedly be correct to point out that the
effect of this is to diminish the reality of meaningful dissensus. Where the effects of
rhetorical and institutional restraints tend towards some variation on the position
"Adapt your aspirations to our ends, or else," or reduces choice simply to a series of
pre-given arguments, this appears to put in jeopardy the flourishing of radical
disagreement at all. What may be put forward as a moral issue or issue of justice
may or may not register within liberal debate as conflict at all depending on the
ability of the arguments to attract liberal stakes. Moreover, in some important sense
the unreality of (allowable) conflict works to devalue even liberalism's own premise
that there is no one justifiable overarching good for human beings.
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The significant theoretical questions then are not just, What moral conflicts are there
and what should we do about them?, but How does disagreement take place and how
is it structured? And here we come to the final issue I want to take from Maclntyre's
four-level analysis. For it will be recalled that what Maclntyre perceives to be the
failure of modern philosophical debate to produce justifiable resolution at the first
three levels, leads to the way in which the legal system is drawn in for its ability to
produce "verdicts". What this use of the legal system, the most important part of the
overall "structure" of dealing with contemporary disagreement, signifies, is essentially
the capitulation rather than the embodiment of philosophical debate. This is
potentially his most damning argument against liberal institutions and jurisprudence,
for it attacks not just the rationality or reasonableness of legal decision-making and
justification, but its very rationale. It is an external critique of the function and role
of the legal system within liberal societies rather than one aimed at its internal
justificatory arguments and substantive conclusions. For my purposes I want to
extrapolate three related strands of this argument.
First, it is indicative of liberal orders, as Maclntyre has noted, that because of their
inability to provide for rational, consensus-based resolution of moral conflicts at
lower levels, courts, and particularly supreme courts, play the role of ultimate arbiter
on issues of serious contention, such as abortion, the extent of free speech, or the
legitimate interest of the state in people's private lives. Now few liberal legal
theorists would deny this. In a recent article Neil MacCormick makes precisely the
same point:
Issues of [this] kind ... are not the subject of moral consensus among
contemporary citizens of contemporary states. Yet for the purposes of social
life in complex societies they are issues upon which it seems necessary to to
have some determinate norm of public action.76
76 Neil MacCormick, "The Relative Heteronomy of Law", European Journal of
Philosophy 3:1 1995 69-85, at 76.
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The production of such "determinate norms" by the legal system seems to attest to
Maclntyre's placing of level four as the supreme feature of resolution in his schema,
But what Maclntyre emphasises in his reading of this, is the nature of the public,
legal, compromise that is made; that is, the issue is to problematise how and why
such compromise occurs, not simply that it does. In criticising Dworkin's law-as-
politics thesis which sees the Supreme Court "invoking a set of consistent principles,
most and perhaps all if them of moral import," the problem is that which Maclntyre
has pointed out all along (and is the same one acknowledged by MacCormick): that
the court cannot invoke "our shared moral first principles. For our society as a whole
has none."77 If it did, so the argument goes, the role of courts would not be that
which it presently is.
What Maclntyre does then is to transfer his arguments about the unresolvability of
moral debate into the fourth level. This, I will argue, opens the possibility for
radicalising both the question (and its consequences) that liberal legal theorists often
refuse to draw: how from the morass of disagreement, can rational or consensual
norms be invoked by courts when the premises of liberal society preclude this
possibility at the previous three levels? In contradistinction to most liberal legal
theories that from this point go back to try to retrieve some such minimally
consensual norms - which may find their expression in integrity, coherence, rational
argumentation, or whatever; the invocation in other words as I have noted already,
of "almost any position in the philosophical debates of of liberal jurisprudence" -
Maclntyre refuses to get into this debate. The point he wants to make instead is that
the form, structure, and relative positioning of legal resolution in contemporary debate
works to devalue pretty much any attempts of liberal jurisprudence to justify its
decisions on coherent and shared principles of justice. For if such did not exist at
levels one, two, or three, they will not magically appear at level four. It is no wonder
then that lawyers, to take a liberty with a well-known phrase, postulate an "artificial
reason and judgment of law"; given the nature of contemporary disagreement they
After Virtue, op.cit., p.253.
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could not find a "real reason" in the realms of morality, determinative of solutions
in the realm of the legal.
Yet for Maclntyre, the fact of the real and inconclusive nature of moral disagreement
should not be elided. This brings us to the second consequence that can be taken
from Maclntyre's analysis. Using the same type of argument he makes against the
way in which liberal argumentation may work to produce collaboration or exclusion,
so too, he says, can genuine disagreement be distorted or masked at the fourth level.
In making this point he is essentially emphasising what Robert Cover has called the
jurispathic function of judges in the legal system. That is, on a broad definition of
law as the diverse and varied sources and meanings of social norms, Cover argues
that the problem the legal system encounters in resolving any particular issue is not
that the law is unclear, but that "there is too much law" emanating from these
sources. The court exists not because it embodies any community morality, not, in
other words because law is needed to express such morality, but "to suppress law, to
choose between two or more laws, to impose upon law a hierarchy."78 Judges must
therefore "kill off law" - hence their jurispathic function - in order to produce what
MacCormick above termed "determinate norms of public action." So, as Maclntyre
puts it,
The nature of any society is not to be deciphered from its laws alone, but
from those understood as an index of its conflicts. What our laws show is the
extent and degree to which conflict has to be suppressed.79
In saying this he links the existence of interminable conflict at levels one to three
directly to the function and extent to which law in liberal societies must act, in
Cover's terms, to "kill off law."
78 Robert M. Cover, "The Supreme Court 1982, Foreword: Nomos and
Narrative," 97 (1983-84) Harvard Law Review 4-68 at 40.
After Virtue, op.cit., p.254.
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The way in which conflict is suppressed is something we will come to in a moment,
but the thrust of Maclntyre's argument here can be taken as being directed toward
the role he assigns to law. While liberal jurisprudence does acknowledge the need to
produce a single coherent and authoritative system of law, it tends to downplay the
meaning of this in relation to moral and legal argumentation by, as I have pointed
out, returning quickly back to debates internal to liberal jurisprudence. So rather than
bringing the argument about the philosophical origins and nature of disagreement, as
Maclntyre suggests, completely and consistently from the first three levels into the
fourth, the tendency is to announce that while there is indeed a problem about moral
conflict, it is essentially a practical one with which law must deal, rather than a
philosophical one which may in fact work to undermine the very validity of the law's
response. Then to work in principles of justice - as say Dworkin does - to give
substance to that response tends to neglect the utilitarian function and requirement of
using law in the first place. It is to downplay - because, for Maclntyre, of the failure
of contemporary moral philosophy - the purely instrumental role of law at the fourth
level as an expedient coordinating and peace-keeping force whose self-reproducing
tactic is to suppress the conflicts which would threaten the liberal order. In fact, the
contrast with Dworkin could not be clearer: even though Dworkin's theory of
adjudication will note the existence of conflict over any particularly contested issue
(as he says, "if we wish to use the concept of a community morality in political
theory, we must acknowledge conflicts within that morality as well"80), he is still
prepared to assume, and see no problem in asserting, that how his super-judge
Hercules decides the case will be to enforce the "institutional right, as defined by the
community's constitutional morality"81; that is, for Dworkin, a right answer will
somehow magically appear at level four. Yet for Maclntyre, quite to the contrary,
such sophistry in legal reasoning as produces such a Herculean result will be merely
indicative of, like liberal government is itself, "a set of institutional arrangements for
Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, (1977) London, Duckworth, third
impression 1981, p. 126.
ibid.
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imposing a bureaucratised unity on a society which lacks genuine moral
consensus."82
Though Maclntyre does not acknowledge it, his argument clearly has overtones of
Hobbes. Indeed, perhaps only positivist theories have fully developed this point.
Again taking MacCormick as our exemplar, he notes that "What the law's institutions
can do is that which moral deliberation cannot itself achieve. They can lay down a
common [authoritative] rule in relatively determinate terms ... 1,83 Moreover for the
positivist this fact constitutes the
clear conceptual distinction between the moral and the legal ... Law is
heteronomous [externally binding on the will] as well as authoritative and
institutional; it thus stands in clear conceptual contrast to morality, which is
autonomous, discursive and controversial.84
Yet it is not the conceptual separation of law and morality that particularly interests
Maclntyre, but the limited, though highly prominent role that law comes to play in
a liberal order, given the nature and meaning of moral conflict as he has described
it. While MacCormick rightly acknowledges that there is "a moral price to be paid
for the utility of law as an institutional establishment of common norms for conduct
in society"85, Maclntyre might extend this in two ways: first, by suggesting that a
moral price has already been paid before enforced resort to the fourth level is made,
and second, - to push the metaphor one last step - that the legal system creates a
further, unpayable, debt by imposing for reasons of pragmatic utility what cannot be
justified at the level of coherent principle.
After Virtue, op.cit., p.254.




Maclntyre, it seems to me, is then prepared to question further the implications of the
authoritative nature of law given its relative positioning in the schema of debate in
contemporary liberal society. By approaching the role of law in this way and by
problematising the meaning of morality as he does he arguably goes further than most
positivists would in emphasising the brute power of law in a society where there are
"no shared moral principles". But in doing so he also offers a glimpse of a problem
that needs to be taken seriously. That is, if at levels one to three contemporary liberal
society, because of its emotivist underpinnings, fails to produce rational resolution to
moral conflict, then the likelihood is that, "the contrast between power and authority
...is effectively obliterated as a special instance of the disappearance of the contrast
between manipulative and non-manipulative social relations."86 In other words,
regardless of the issue about the conceptual separation of law and morality, if - even
positivist - liberal jurisprudence neglects to account for the state and meaning of
moral conflict as it impinges on the role of law and how this role in turn impinges
on the moral realm, it risks becoming merely an endorsement of the non-rational use
of power and one that is, moreover, blinded to the fact that this is all it is doing. To
acknowledge this transcends the positivist's question of legal validity at a formal
level and raises the far more serious question of the legitimacy of the modern liberal
legal order.87
I will return to aspects of this argument later but want now to turn to a third
implication raised by Maclntyre's four-level classification. This also concerns the
question of power but not this time in terms of the authoritative positioning of law,
but as something more akin to a sociological critique, one that concentrates on the
locating of various levels of power as they are manifested in different constituencies
within the state. As this brings together arguments about conflict, law, and the liberal
state that have already been touched on it can be dealt with briefly here though it will
be raised again, specifically in relation to law, in a later chapter.
After Virtue, op.cit., p.26 (discussing Weber).
See After Virtue, op.cit., p.254.
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I pointed out above that whether or not Maclntyre is correct about the sources of
moral disagreement in the emotivist conception of the self, it is nevertheless the case
that conflict does occur and that it may have to be dealt with institutionally. One
dimension of how such resolution is attempted has been covered, namely the
philosophical and legal attempts to construct rational debate at all four levels. But the
other dimension to this concerns who participates in these processes. What Rorty had
seen as the benefits of the separation of public and private, Maclntyre translates into
the nightmare of modern life, the separation between the atomistic self and the iron
cage of bureaucracy. "Modern societies," he writes, "oscillate between a freedom
which is nothing but a lack of regulation of individual behaviour and forms of
collectivist control designed only to limit the anarchy of self-interest."88 Bleak if
nothing else, what still lacks from this picture is the shading in of the personnel who
dominate the agenda-setting of this "collectivist control." Given the link between the
self and the expression of the preferences it brings into the public domain, it matters
who controls the "weighing and tallying" of these preferences. And here Maclntyre
follows other sociological critiques by attending to the significance of elites in these
processes. Thus
... in a liberal order power lies with those who are able to determine what the
alternatives are to be between which choices will be available. The consumer,
the voter, and the individual in general are accorded the right of expressing
their preferences for one or more out of the alternatives which are offered,
but the range of possible alternatives is controlled by an elite, and how they
are presented is also so controlled.(p.345)
This is again in line with his points about the way in which liberalism may distort
debate and meaning so that even the extreme of the oscillation which is the freedom
from a lack of regulation is a freedom tempered by constraints of which the
individual may or may not be aware. While this might suggest a reading tending
ibid., p.35.
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toward the kind of dispersal of power advocated by Foucault89, Maclntyre is
ultimately more concerned with the philosophical - and, one could add by
extrapolation from the above arguments, legal - smokescreens that are set off to mask
and control the kind of argumentative strategies that would challenge liberalism itself.
As he says (with a characteristic lack of charity), "The ruling elites within liberalism
are thus bound to value highly competence in the persuasive presentation of
alternatives, that is, the cosmetic arts."(p.345)
The appearance of preferences as genuine choices as well as how they come to be
channelled at the various levels, is thus an essential part of the way in which
liberalism manages both to exult in and to stifle genuine moral disagreement. The
elites Maclntyre has in mind presumably range from the politician and the lawyer to
the liberal (of whatever persuasion) philosopher. Though he does not go on to explore
this at the fourth level, I will argue later that the combination of these arguments
presents an opening for a critique of liberal legalism, though one that will diverge in
its underpinnings from Maclntyre's own. But for the moment it is sufficient to flag
the connexion between this kind of power - as opposed to the power of state law
already discussed - and the chanelling of conflict and debate in the contempory
liberal order, a point we will return to later. As such it is time to draw together the
strands of these arguments.
See for example his "Two Lectures", reprinted as "The Juridical Apparatus,"
in William Connolly ed., Legitimacy and the State, Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1984.
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We have travelled a long way from Aristotle and the good life, and the more
technical arguments of moral philosophy. But the significance of these arguments
should be clear for my approach. To end up in debates about the construction of
moral conflict is - as my interpretation of Maclntyre has sought to show - integral
to an understanding of several features of liberalism and of the legal system within
a contemporary liberal order. Let me summarise what I take to be the most
prominent:
(1) that the way in which the conception of the self is understood is integrally
related to questions that liberalism seeks to address. However, what my criticisms of
both Maclntyre and Rorty have attempted to show is that that relation is a contested
one. That is, it is possible for Maclntyre to be wrong about the existence of the
barely articulate "emotivist self", and Rorty to be wrong about the limits of its
freedom, yet for the idea of the self still to be relevant to an understanding of
liberalism. Conversely, both writers could still be wrong about their understanding
of the self, yet still (Maclntyre especially) have important things to say about the
meaning of moral disagreement in contemporary liberal societies. Considered in this
way the possibility exists for an alternative, historically-based picture of the self to
be drawn that is neither complicit with the perceived failures of contemporary liberal
structures, nor as inarticulate and as self-ish as the emotivist self.
(2) that the existence and significance of moral conflict is necessarily related to an
understanding of the role of law in liberal societies. Furthermore, it matters how
liberal legal institutions respond and relate to, construct and deal with, questions of
moral conflict. It is thus vital to recognise that the dynamic between law and morality
- or more precisely, between liberal legalism and moral conflict - must be explored
in a way that pays attention to constitutive and destructive dimensions of that relation
in a way that many liberal theorists, or their detractors, may not fully pursue.
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(3) that if the construction of self and its relation to moral values espoused by
liberalism is a contingent one, but that the role of law in contemporary liberal
societies may presently mask and distort these values or their expression as
conflictual, then there may be a discrepancy between the values of liberalism and the
role of law - that is, between liberalism and liberal legalism. The influence of what
I have termed "rhetorical and institutional restraints" as well as the power of elites
within such liberal orders may therefore have to be addressed in a way that sees them
as potentially antithetical to the values and insights they are supposed to uphold. To
explore this requires presenting a critique of the institution of law in light of the




Time and again Maclntyre has complained that there are no shared standards of
rationality to which contemporary societies can have recourse to solve their moral and
hence legal conflicts. I have hinted that despite this point of view it might be possible
to defend an alternative reading of liberalism, but that this is only feasible where the
role and techniques of law in liberal societies is seriously put in question. Is such a
version of liberalism available? Before coming to the institutional dimension I want
to recover some elements of the meaning of moral conflict in liberal society that may
allow for two things: first, the radicalisation of conflict in a way that releases it from
Maclntyre's criticism that liberalism tends to stifle conflict by taking debate into the
liberal paradigm, whether consciously or not. While some liberal theories do tend to
do this I will look now at one which arguably does not. This is the version put
forward by Isaiah Berlin in his "Two Concepts of Liberty".1 It is possible, I will
argue, that it is not liberal theory as such that stifles conflict in the way Maclntyre
suggests, though the institutional vesting it takes in contemporary liberal societies
does do so. On the contrary, the insights of a certain understanding of liberalism,
when they challenge current institutional settings and attitudes do allow for conflict
to be made explicit, and, possibly, do so in a way that other theoretical visions for
society do not allow. The strength of such a liberal theory is to put moral conflict
over values rather than preferences at the heart of its concerns. If the logic of such
conflict is pushed through to a greater extent than many contemporary liberal
theorists are willing to do, this version of liberalism is defensible against the charges
1 Isaiah Berlin, "Two Concepts of Liberty," in his Four Essays on Liberty
(1969), Oxford, OUP, 1991 reprint (hereafter, respectively, "Two Concepts" and Four
Essays). Note: page references, in brackets, in these sections are to the text of this
edition.
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that either liberalism stifles debate into certain pre-ordained forms, or, that such
debate as does exist amounts to no more an inorganic alignment of preferences. But
of course this is only feasible where the institutional dimension is rethought, and I
will come to this aspect once I have considered this alternative reading.
The second aspect to retrieving worthwhile dimensions of moral conflict relates to
the first, but adds a rigorously socialised version of the moral self and moral
understanding which challenges the picture of the emotivist self that Maclntyre saw
as the embodiment of the failure of liberal morality. It opens up the possibility of
meaningful dissensus while at the same time challenging the atomism ascribed to
liberalism by Rorty and Maclntyre above. While I have already hinted at problems
with the feasibility of the concept of the emotivist self, I now want to suggest that
the reflexive dynamic between the socialised self and moral values undercuts the
picture of the isolated self Maclntyre describes. The meaning of moral conflict one
can find in the work of Berlin can be upheld only when the constitutive relation
between values and self is fully delineated. As I point out there exists an antecedent
to this in the historical trace that has largely been ignored in liberal theorising (and
in most contemporary blanket critiques of the Enlightenment), but which provided
understanding of the embeddedness of moral judgment without primary reliance on
reason or moral rules to secure its validity. In some respects the version of the
socialised self relevant to Berlin's liberalism was preceded by the moral theory of
Adam Smith in the way that it sought to analyse moral judgment as deeply contextual
though concerned still with the ability critically to reflect on social practices. While
I touch on this in what follows I will however use Berlin's theory to examine how
this version of the self can be seen in a way that allows disagreement to flourish
without reducing that disagreement to the type Maclntyre has suggested is prevalent
in contemporary liberal societies.
Once again however, to follow this insight through involves a questioning of the role
of the legal order that many liberals would not endorse. But to treat moral values and
the possibility of their conflict in liberal societies seriously, this further step needs to
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be taken. In drawing out these two strands of thought I have just outlined I hope to
show that a certain understanding of liberalism is defensible, but only when it forces
conclusions many liberals would fail to draw. As I suggested at the end of the last
chapter, Maclntyre might be correct about the role law plays in liberal societies, but
he may be wrong about this being a failure of liberalism as such. By looking at
Berlin I want to consider a different understanding of liberalism through the relation
between values and the self, but one that has important implications for the role of
law. To the extent that Maclntyre correctly captures that role, the ultimate destination
of my arguments here is to show that law cannot be part of a solution to the
understanding of the meaningfulness of moral conflict espoused by liberalism,
precisely for the reason that it is part of the problem.
Berlin's Liberalism
Some forty years since it was written Isaiah Berlin's "Two Concepts," despite the
critical battering it has taken, is still a remarkably profound piece of work. Its central
distinction, between positive and negative concepts of liberty, has been interpreted,
reinterpreted, challenged, reworked, and generally been subject to the full gamut of
academic treatments that befall an important philosophical argument. But rather than
concentrating on that distinction, I want here to explore the intellectual framework
within which, for Berlin, the significance of the distinction made sense. So in what
follows the differences between positive and negative liberty will only be relevant to
the extent that they might exemplify the broader issues they raise. They will not be
the main focus of this reading.
Instead I want to concentrate on the presuppositions that underpin his version of
liberalism. There is, curiously enough, some affinity between his position and that of
those theorists who have endorsed certain aspects of postmodern thinking about
conflict and difference. There is a strong sense in which Berlin's attack on the kind
of thinking that justifies totalitarian regimes - and in whose service the concept of
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positive liberty is usually employed - resembles critiques made of the "grand
narratives" of modernity by Jean-Francois Lyotard and others. Berlin's distrust of
those who believe in, postulate and act upon insights into "all-embracing final
solutions" and the ultimate compatibility of human ends and aspirations - an "ancient
and almost universal belief," he says - mirrors more recent onslaughts onto the
perceived consequences of these self-same goals as they are deemed to be expressed
in the mind-set of a modernity identified largely with the spirit of the Enlightenment.
And Berlin himself, like many postmodernists, does not spare, for example,
consequences of theories such as Kant and Rousseau from his critique of the dangers
which pertain to belief in an aspirational unity of either morality, peoples or ideas.
In this sense then, there is something about his defence of liberalism that should
make us wary about seeing it simply as another version easily amenable to the often
undiscriminating attacks of postmodernists who too readily link modernity and
liberalism as copartners in the denial of difference or the creation of oppression. That
said however, the nuances of Berlin's analysis should be brought out in order that
such distinctive features there are in his defence of liberalism are seen precisely as
that; an argument in support of liberalism. Where appropriate I will draw attention
to similarities and differences with certain postmodern writers, though my aim, as
stated above, is to look at the meaning and supports for conflict in Berlin's work. To




Politics thrives on conflict. Even more basically, conflict is the condition for politics;
without conflict, politics is neither possible nor necessary. Such is Berlin's opening
gambit in "Two Concepts":
Where ends are agreed, the only questions left are those of means, and these
are not political but technical ... That is why those who put their faith in
some immense, world-transforming phenomenon, like the triumph of reason
or the proletarian revolution, must believe that all political and moral
problems can thereby be turned into technological ones.(p.ll8)
The end of conflict is thus the end of politics; and the "all-embracing" solutions
proposed for how humans should act signals this end. Moreover - it hardly requires
saying - with the end of politics comes the end of political theory, with the end of
moral conflict, the end of moral theory.
The shadow of totalitarianism spreads over Berlin's writing, yet his is not an attitude
that can be relegated to a Cold War past. The main reason for this is that he does not
spare Western democracy from his critique either, though politically there is no doubt
of his absolute rejection of recent totalitarian regimes and of his (qualified) support
of certain aspects of Western democracies. His position takes a long view of the
political developments culminating in the twentieth century's broader political
landscape which has, in hugely varying degrees in totalitarian and democratic
regimes, resulted in an increased homogenisation of perspectives and intolerance of
dissent. Such homogenisation, he argues, sees the shift from conflict over political
theories and ideas to the increasing side-stepping of politics in favour of the finding
of technical solutions. The general tenor of Berlin's argument can be found in the
following passages:
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We are often told that the present is an age of cynicism and despair, of
crumbling values and the dissolution of the fixed standards and landmarks
of Western civilisation. But this is neither true nor even plausible. So far
from showing the loose texture of a collapsing order, the world today is stiff
with rigid rules and codes ... it treats heterodoxy as the supreme danger.
Whether in East or West ... conformities are called for much more eagerly
today than yesterday; loyalties are tested far more severely ... [The
individual's] area of choice has grown smaller not in the name of some
opposing principle but in order to create a situation in which the very
possibility of opposed principles, with all their unlimited capacity to cause
mental stress and danger and destructive collisions, is eliminated in favour
of a simpler and better regulated life, a robust faith in an efficient working
order, untroubled by agonizing moral conflict.2
We might read this situation - where the "possibility of opposed principles" is denied
- as at one with Maclntyre's criticism of liberalism's ability to stifle debate. But
Berlin's conclusion is precisely the opposite. It is the anti-liberal tendencies of the
contemporary political landscape that close off debate; liberalism, as Berlin
understands it, allows for the flourishing of conflict, and this - and hence the
possiblity of politics at all - is reduced as societies move toward programmatic
solutions to unchallengeable ends already given or imposed. The range of Berlin's
attack can be seen then as remarkably broad. For it criticises not only communitarian
and communist versions of political organisation, but also a range of liberal theories
too. And it will do so on exactly the same grounds for all of these, namely, their
willingness to homogenise, to diminish the possibility for conflict, whether that is
carried out in the name of the proletariat, the "community", or a rationalist-based
liberalism. As he says,
Today the tendency to circumscribe and confine and limit, to determine the
range of what may be asked and what may not, is no longer a distinguishing
mark of the old 'reactionaries'. On the contrary, it comes as powerfully from
the heirs of the radicals, rationalists, 'progressives' of the nineteenth century
as from the descendants of their enemies.3
"Political Ideas in the Twentieth Century," in Four Essays, op.cit., pp.37-38.
ibid., p.37.
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To understand where this broad critique comes from, and hence to understand the
distinctiveness of Berlin's version of liberalism, we need to explore further what he
envisages by the notion of conflict.
If the "general pattern" of socio-political organisation in the twentieth century has
been toward increased homogenisation, what does Berlin mean by conflict? In what
does conflict consist? One way to introduce the idea is to think about one of the best
known lines from his "Two Concepts". That is, "Everything is as it is: liberty is
liberty, not equality or fairness or justice or culture, or human happiness or a quiet
conscience."(p. 125) This claim is both a call for analytical clarity and an insight into
the grounding of Berlin's observations on conflict. Conflict lies in the
incommensurablity of the values we may hold most dearly: liberty conflicts with our
desire to do justice; it conflicts with claims to equality. Most significantly, it conflicts
with alternative understandings of itself; liberty might well be liberty and not justice
or equality, but what liberty is, is itself contested. Negative liberty - the lack of
obstacles in one's path, a "free area for action"(p,131) - competes with its "twin
brother", positive liberty - "self-mastery, the elimination of obstacles to my
will."(p. 146) Concepts of liberty - freedom from, and freedom to - may be related,
they may both be profoundly important to how we live our lives, but they are not the
same; they are certainly not identical. Just as human "twin brothers" might look the
same but cannot be exactly the same being, the values inherent in the two concepts
contain elements that cannot be reduced to a single proposition. The two concepts
conflict in such a way that to make them identical or to make either concept of
liberty identical with another value (liberty with equality, liberty with justice) denies
what is distinctive about the value of the other. To move toward the endorsement of
one may impinge detrimentally on one's ability to uphold the other.
What pushes Berlin to this conclusion? For him conflict is intimately linked to the
notion of the incommensurability of values. It is negative liberty as a value that
clashes with positive liberty as a value; at other times it will be equality as a value
that conflicts with liberty as a value. And such clashes of value are not finally
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resolvable. Everthing is as it is, and two values in conflict are two values in conflict,
not one value mistakenly masquerading as two. "If the claims of two (or more than
two) types of liberty [or of any other values] prove incompatible in a particular case,
and this is an instance of the clash of values at once absolute and incommensurable,
it is better to face this intellectually uncomfortable fact than to ignore it."4 Moreover,
as we shall see shortly, the most profound danger lies in assuming that all values are
or can be made commensurable.
If incommensurability is sometimes equated with or charged with relativism, how
Berlin recognises incommensurablity must go some way to avoiding that charge. His
response then to the question of how he knows that values are incommensurable -
and thus also to the issue of why the existence of conflict is so important for politics
- is an empirical one. It is based on observation. That values - of liberty, justice,
equality or whatever - conflict, seems to be an
irremovable element in human life ... [I]f we are not armed with an a priori
guarantee of the proposition that a total harmony of true values is somewhere
to be found - perhaps in some ideal realm the characteristics of which we
can, in our finite state, not so much as conceive - we must fall back on the
ordinary resources of empirical observation and ordinary human knowledge.
And these certainly give us no warrant for supposing (or even understanding
what would be meant by saying) that all good things, or all bad things for
that matter, are reconcilable with each other. The world that we encounter in
ordinary experience is one in which we are faced with choices between ends
equally ultimate, and claims equally absolute, the realization of some of
which must inevitably involve the sacrifice of others.(pp. 170-71)
The incommensurability of values may or may not be desirable, but it is a fact of
life. "Ordinary experience" tells us so. Of course someone like Maclntyre reads this
same feature of contemporary life as one of conceptual breakdown. What is
interesting and significant about Berlin's analysis however is the particular way in
which he reads this observation and the different conclusions he draws. In "Two
Concepts" the immediate example of a clash of irreconcilable values is that between
"Introduction" to Four Essays, op.cit., p.l.
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positive and negative concepts of liberty. These two concepts evidence what was
called above "an instance of the clash of values at once absolute and
incommensurable." The conflict, put in its most concise form is, he says, precisely
this: those who seek to promote the value of negative liberty "want to curb authority
as such"; those who cherish positive liberty "want it [authority] placed in their own
hands."(p. 166) "These," he says, "are not two different interpretations of a single
concept, but two profoundly divergent and irreconcilable attitudes to the ends of life
... each of them makes absolute claims. These claims cannot both be fully
satisfied."(ibid) That the "attitudes to the ends of life" conflict is not for Berlin a
failure of contemporary moral philosophy; it is not a sign that modern societies are
facing a new dark ages. On the contrary it is the demise of such conflict that signals
a loss.
But is incommensurability nevertheless the end of reason, the end of the hope that
the human intellect through rational discourse rather than irrational violence, say,
might provide a way of resolving disagreement over differences? Does not
incommensurability result in the endorsement of an essentially emotivist self whose
commitments (a la Rorty) cannot be grounded in anything other than contingency and
the uncommitted hope for common survival? Berlin's response to these issues is, in
one sense, both ambiguous and determinedly clear. It is ambiguous in the way in
which he treats the issue of rationality, but clear in the way in which it finds
commitment unproblematic. And both can be brought together only when we see how
incommensurability and the value of conflict come to focus on the relation between
values and the self. Let us begin with the ambiguity.
(ii) Rationality
What Berlin rejects for the notion of rationality is the possibility that it can direct
humans in resolving the fundamental conflicts they have over the ends of life and the
values they differently adhere to. He argues variously that when values conflict, the
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conflict "is not to be solved by any hard-and-fast-rule"5; that "clear-cut solutions
cannot, in principle, be found"6; that there can be no "correct, conclusive solution
[which] must always in principle be discoverable."7 As noted earlier, this line is
directed as much against rationalist liberal theories as anything else, for it is the
uniformity that claims to reason engender that Berlin is reacting against. So in
explaining Kant's theory he writes that
the limits of liberty are determined by applying the rules of 'reason', which
is much more than the mere generality of rules as such, and is the faculty
that creates or reveals a purpose identical in, and for, all men ... The
authority of reason and the duties it lays upon men is identified with
individual freedom, on the assumption that only rational ends can be the
'true' objects of a 'free' man's 'real' nature.(p. 153-54)
But why should Berlin find the notion of reason or rationality in this sense
problematic?
The answer lies in two directions. One concerns the assumptions that have to be
made in order to support such a role for reason. The second deals with practical
consequences of making such assumptions. In the former, the assumptions made
require the belief in the idea that "man has a 'true' self, a 'real' nature". Only where
such a belief is held, can reason be applied to discover true ends or purposes
"identical in, and for, all men." To be rational requires uniformity - and here we
might think back to what makes an action moral in Kant's theory, the categorical
imperative: "My action is moral if and only if I can will that my maxim should
become a universal law" - and as such a morality (or politics) based on this
uniformity assumes that where differences appear in ends sought or standards
formulated such differences pertain to an improper grasp of what it is rational for the




"real" moral self to do. In Berlin's words, "[Reason's] laws will be the rides which
reason prescribes: they will only seem irksome to those whose reason is dormant,
who do not understand the true 'needs' of their own 'real' selves."(p. 147) Hence if
reason is uniform, and if its dictates are to have authority in the moral realm, the
assumption must be made that it is possible to discover what the true moral self is
or requires; if there is no true self then claims to reason cannot attain an authoritative
objectivity, morality cannot be the "correct use of a universal human faculty". Thus,
"The rational ends of our 'true' natures must coincide, or be made to coincide,
however violently our poor, ignorant, desire-ridden, passionate empirical selves may
cry out against this process."(p. 148) In this picture no-one has rights against reason
he says, quoting Fichte. Reason, otherwise, would become fragmented, useless; in
Hume's phrase, inert.
The belief in the existence of a "true nature" for all humans, is intimately linked,
Berlin says, to the conception that all ends are, in the end, commensurable, that there
can be harmony and not permanent discord in human lives and goals, either now or
in some point in history yet to come. Yet for that harmony to exist, it must be
possible to rank values, to weigh them up against each other in a way that denies that
they can each be equally ultimate, that denies they can clash incommensurably. This
draws us toward the second problem he has with such a notion of reason. He argues
that where "no-one has rights against reason" it is up to those who do accurately
perceive the dictates of reason, to make sure that those "poor, ignorant, desire-ridden"
others who do not properly grasp such dictates, are shown the path to enlightened,
rational, behaviour. Moreover, to act in this way will not be autocratic since it merely
requires the "defective" others to live up to the rational requirements of their own
"true selves"; and being told to do what is rational according to one's true nature can
hardly be an imposition. But it is this assumption that Berlin finds problematic.
Where the authority of reason assumes that two ends or values or duties cannot
conflict if reason is properly applied - for reason could not require one to act in two
contradictory ways - then any conflict "is due solely to the clash of reason with the
irrational or the insufficiently rational."(p. 154) To make such an assumption
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consequently allows for the practical conclusion that some individual or group can
direct others to act in the way they prescribe because such direction is authorised by
reason.
It thus clears the way for an imposition of value-ranking based on the
commensurability of all values. Just how far this is carried out in practice may well
vary, but the logic of any such enforcement will be the same:
In the name of reason anything that is non-rational may be condemned, so
that the various personal aims which their individual imagination and
idiosyncrasies lead men to pursue ... may, at least in theory, be ruthlessly
suppressed to make way for the demands of reason.(p.l53)
The conjunction of such ideas is why Berlin rejects reason or rationality when given
this form. The tendency to impose the single, "all-embracing solution" based on
claims to reason and the ultimately harmonious nature of the world when "properly
understood", is clearly implicated in tendencies toward a homogenised view of human
being. Based as it is in the treatment of fundamental conflict as essentially rooted in
mistake or an inablility to grasp the true nature of things or beings, its logic drives
it, seemingly inexorably, toward the suppression of conflict itself. And the end of
conflict, as we already know, is the end of morality and politics as such; once the
ends are fully grasped, whether by everyone or in fact only those who have seen the
light (of reason, revolution, or true justice), the only issues left are those of means.
Now we must appreciate the ambiguity in Berlin's analysis of rationality. If Berlin
is prepared to disavow the techniques and consequences of reason as just described,
he is not however prepared to abandon the idea of rationality entirely. What is left
though, one might ask? We should recall firstly that a part of what makes Berlin
reject the "all-embracing solutions", the possibilities for harmonious resolution of
conflicting views as to the ends of life to which a uniform reason grounded in beliefs
in the true self aspires, is that empirically, these beliefs do not square with our
observations of the world as it is. True it is that there is a tendency toward
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homogenisation, observable in specific twentieth century political doctrines. Yet
conflicting attitudes as to the ends of life continue to appear in moral and political
beliefs. In this sense, aspired-for unities which would resolve such conflicts seem to
fly in the face of experience. Of course, this experience cannot be empirical in some
"pure" sense; our understandings of conflict (and not just our observation of the fact
of disagreement) must be mediated through conceptual categories which themselves
may be incommensurable. This is most significant in Berlin's reading. As he says,
"since some values may conflict intrinsically, the very notion that a pattern must in
principle be discoverable in which they are all rendered harmonious is founded on
a false a priori view of what the world is like."8 Simultaneously then, the empirical
observation that our understandings of certain values do conflict incommensurably,
justifies the argument that, as such, claims to the ultimate harmony of values go
against what the world as we know it is actually like, and, it also acts to support an
argument that the existence of incommensurable conflict over values ought to be
maintained rather than suppressed.
For Berlin, to act as if the conflict over values was merely the result of an error that
could be corrected by the proper application of reason or understanding or whatever,
does damage to the very real existence of conflicting attitudes to the ends of life. In
the example used above, to reduce the notion that one seeks to curb authority to the
notion that one seeks to put authority in one's own hands (or vice versa) fails to take
account of the clash of these values or ends as "at once absolute and
incommensurable". There is an (empirically observable) conceptual clash which is
informed by radically differing attitudes toward what is valuable. To collapse them,
and hence to assume that that (or any other similar) clash can be resolved in some
harmonious schema, neglects, or more usually unjustifiably suppresses, that difference
in the name of some higher or greater good or goal.
"Introduction" to Four Essays, op.cit., p.li.
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Here again we see in part an unholy alliance of ideas between Maclntyre and Berlin.
Conflict between values is ineradicable, though such conflict may well be distorted
in practice by acting as if it were not. Such is Berlin's bottom line, and it is here that
his understanding of rationality becomes significant. For if appeals to reason are
potentially dangerous in the way just described, what is it rational to do in any
situation of incommensurable conflict? Berlin cannot answer this question in the
abstract. To do so would be to provide a prescriptive framework of the type he shuns,
where all values or ends could be brought together and made commensurable. Where
the ends of life conflict, where concepts (such as positive and negative liberty, or of
equality or justice) clash, one can only act rationally in the concrete situation, not
rationally in the abstract. "The concrete situation," Berlin writes, "is almost
everything."9 And here we have his distinctive view of rationality: where choices
must be made in such circumstances then the ability of that choice to be made by
individuals or groups themselves "is part of being rational or capable of moral
judgment."10 Being reasonable may include aspects of following rules or principles,
"but when these rules or principles conflict in concrete cases, to be rational is to
follow the course of conduct which least obstructs the general pattern of life in which
we believe".11
Here we reencounter the ambiguity I have suggested exists in Berlin's approach. If,
as he says, the "capacity for choosing is intrinsic to rationality"12, then he must
acknowledge (as he does) that harm is done to individuals or groups "in an instrinsic,
Kantian, not merely utilitarian, sense" when the capacity for choosing is curtailed.
And yet he cannot support any Kantian or other version of reason that would allow
Isaiah Berlin, "The Pursuit of the Ideal," in his The Crooked Timber of
Humanity, London, Fontana Press, 1991, p.18.




such individuals or groups to resolve such conflict in a conceptually harmonious way.
The reasons for this wariness we have touched upon and will deal with again more
fully shortly, but what compels this conclusion is his vision of the essentially tragic
quality of human life. "That we cannot have everything," he says, "is a necessary and
not a contingent truth"(170); "The need to choose, to sacrifice some ultimate values
to others turns out to be a permanent characteristic of the human predicament."13
Hence choice, rationality, and the meaningfulness of conflict, are rooted in the fact
"that ends collide", "that one cannot have everything"14. Still, even though hard
choices must be made, this does not mean that such choices are or must be arbitrary.
To be rational then must involve the ability to choose between values or concepts
where that choice cannot be determined a priori by reference to abstract principles
of rationality. "Conditions," Berlin argues, "are often unclear, and principles incapable
of being fully justified or articulated."15 Berlin treats reason or rationality thus in a
reduced sense, and one in which the fact that we cannot rationally ground our
arguments once and for all is not problematic. Yet his argument is different from
Rorty's here. The ambiguity in Berlin's treatment of rationality can only be properly
understood when we consider the situation-specific location in which rational
judgments are made, and involves consideration of the relation between self and
commitment in which the above arguments about rationality make sense. While
Berlin does have important things to say about self and commitment (which we will
come to in a moment) he does not, to my mind, sufficiently delineate the ambiguous
nature of rationality itself. To understand it, we need to turn to a more rigorous








In a consideration of the issues that arise over questions of incommensurability in
moral theory, Raz writes that (and the full significance of this will only emerge in
the following section), "Incommensurability speaks not of what does escape reason
but of what must elude it."16 One of the criticisms made of the belief that ultimate
values are incommensurable is that where a conflict occurs, the conflict may well be
over competing values, but this does not mean they are incommensurable in the
absolute sense in which Berlin uses the term. To assume incomensurability, the critic
argues, assumes that the ends are equally valuable, so that there is no way in which
a point of view can be found to resolve the conflict. But this, so the argument runs,
fails to recognise two things: one, that all ends are not equally valuable, and, two, the
fact that decisions are made in cases of conflict between values and that such
decisions are not made arbitrarily, but made according to some standards. The critic's
point is therefore that incommensurability may be more apparent than real.
To concretise this dispute let us use an example of the type Raz himself uses. Is it
possible to put a monetary value on friendship? Assuming we live, as we do, in a
society where having money plays to some degree an important part in our lives,
could we weigh up the choice between having a large sum of money against having
a particular friendship? The critic of the incommensurability thesis argues that if we
decide that friendship wins out against having the money, we thereby do make the
two values commensurable in the very act of comparing the two. Even though we
choose friendship we do so on the grounds that friends are more important than
money. And in this way when a decision is reached, it will not be arbitrary but come
with reasons why one option is preferred over the other. In other words, we compare
the two options, rank them, and decide. This could not be an example of
incommensurability therefore since the values are not equal, they can be ranked on
a scale which treats them as comparable, and a decision can be reached on the basis
of such a ranking.
16 Joseph Raz, The Morality ofFreedom, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1986, p.334.
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Raz's response to this is however instructive. In the first instance, he says, two values
do not have to be of exactly equal weight in order to be described as
incommensurable. They may, in Berlin's phrase, be equally ultimate in the demands
they make on someone, but the idea that one is neither better nor worse than the
other, does not amount to saying they are therefore of equal weight.17 In the second
instance, Raz notes, it is often the case that people asked such a question in the
abstract, in the example we are using say to compare friendship and monetary value,
will refuse to compare the two. But this refusal alone does not yet answer the critic's
argument; the fact that someone refuses in the abstract to engage in comparison does
not signal on its own the incommensurability of two values. What of the case when,
as a matter of practical reasoning in a concrete situation, a response is sought
regarding the two values and a decision is in fact given? In that case, says Raz, we
should pay close attention to certain features.
First, "The ability and willingness to choose does not depend on valuing the chosen
option more than the rejected one. One is able to choose when the two are of exactly
the same value, as well as when they are incommensurate." It might well be
significant therefore that, "The fact of the choice does not reveal why it was
made."18 But when such a choice is made, does not this still amount to a
comparison at some level being made between the two? To suggest otherwise, so the
critic would argue, is to suggest the choice is made without criteria. Again, Raz
would argue no. The second feature of a choice made in such circumstances would
thus be as follows: the fact that a reason can be given still does not assume that a
ranking between the two options has been made. As Raz says, "Though the reason
[given] is incommensurate with the reason for the alternative it shows the value of
that option and when that option is chosen it is chosen because of its value."19 In
17 As Berlin has suggested elsewhere, "in concrete situations not every claim is
of equal force." See "The Pursuit of the Ideal," op.cit., p. 17.
18 Raz, op.cit., p.338.
19 ibid., emphasis added.
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the example we are using, the choice to value friendship over money may be made
in a particular case not because a comparison has been made, but because of the
(again to use Berlin's phrase) ultimate value of friendship itself. One might, when
pushed, say that one prefers the option of friendship over money, but that is because
of what friendship is - what it means - in itself, not because it is better or worse than
having a large sum of money. To suggest otherwise is to fail to pay attention to a
third, temporal, feature. The fact that a choice has been made and a rationalisation
given which appears to have ranked the two options, does not mean that the way in
which the decision was reached corresponds precisely with any reason that can be
given after the event. As Raz puts it, "If one takes seriously the early sincere refusal
to compare the value of the different options then one must conclude that the test [for
assigning judgments of comparative value] changed these people's valuations rather
than revealed them."20 This would seem to be an important, if not decisive, point.
For to suggest that original valuations were revealed requires a specific mind-set in
the first place. That is, it is only by making the "a priori methodological commitment
to commensurability"21 that could preclude us from seeing this final feature.
Here we come to the crux of the argument, and a better way of understanding the
ambiguity in Berlin's work as described above. The fact that a choice must be made
does not assume that all values are commensurable. But, neither does this mean that
choices are arbitrary. There is still a role for reasoned conclusions in such cases. That
there are, in Berlin's terms, no hard-and-fast rules according to which a decision must
be made, does not preclude the possibility that in the particular case a rational
decision can be made. There is a difference between giving good reasons for deciding
one way, and giving poor (or seemingly arbitrary) reasons. Coin-tossing may provide
a reason for doing something, but while it may be a good one for deciding who kicks
off a game of football it is not a good one for deciding between money and
friendship, and there may be good reasons for this difference. But there is also a
ibid., p.339, emphasis added,
ibid.
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difference between producing good reasons in a particular case and suggesting that
it is the application of reason that compares and decides between two options when
a choice is required. As Raz puts it, "Rational action is action for (what the agent
takes to be) an undefeated reason. It is not necessarily action for a reason that defeats
all others."22 Berlin's concern with the use of the kind of reason he ascribes to those
who endorse the "single all-embracing" power of reason, is thus precisely directed
against those who would query this statement. To defeat all other claims assumes the
possibility of a ranking; but as Raz suggests, in the kind of example we are
considering, "Refusals to evaluate must be significant."23 That is, rationality in this
sense does not require the commensurability of all claims necessary in the production
of a ranking. Indeed, as we shall see in the next section, rationality might require the
denial of such ranking.
But for Berlin not only is the overriding of such a point dangerous, it is unfeasible;
it treats incommensurability as a mistake, an error to be corrected, rather than (as
Raz's example tends to show) a coherent possibility inherent in a genuine clash of
values. Where refusals to rank are treated as insignificant or are overridden, such
treatment acts as if incommensurability was not a reality on exactly the same grounds
for both Berlin and Raz: the "a priori methodological commitment to
commensurability". Berlin denies the soundness of this commitment and it is vital to
understand why. In order to do so, we need to go further into his analysis of the
relation between values and commitment. Only then will we find that his reduced




(iii) Values, Commitment, and Identity
A question Maclntyre raised might come back to haunt Berlin. Does Berlin's thesis
about conflict and rationality mean that we have no shared standards of rationality
to which we can appeal; no scales, in Maclntyre's image, on which we can weigh
competing claims or conflicting ends or values? Moreover, if there are no such
standards, and incommensurability of values is indeed the case, does this not reduce
the self to a mere chooser of preferences, a self for whom the ultimate directive in
making choices takes the form of "I want such-and-such to be the case"? Is his
version of rationality no more than a smokescreen hiding what is in essence merely
the will to power of an emotivist self? My reading of Berlin's version of liberalism
will argue that such criticism is made ineffective given the setting in which both
rational judgment (in the sense I have begun to outline) and the incommensurability
of values makes sense. To justify this reading I will again complement Berlin's
analysis with some insights from the work of Raz.
Everything is as it is, but we cannot have everything. The need to choose is therefore,
as noted above, an inalienable part of being human. Attempts can be made to deny
that need, to ameliorate it by proposing harmonious systems where ends do not
conflict. But, as ends do conflict - an empirical observation - curtailments of the
ability to choose them for ourselves curtails a part of our humanity. Hence for Berlin
the importance of negative liberty as a value, though not one that itself is to be
upheld at all costs. Conflicts with other values must be addressed, though we have
no clear-cut means of resolving a priori such conflicts. We seek, says Berlin, in a
phrase that might be at home in many postmodern arguments, "to adjust the
unadjustable."24 But in doing so, in order to retain a semblance of the rationality that
constitutes our being human as opposed to being automatons, we must maintain the
possibility for our participation in such adjustment by allowing for the emergence of
"Introduction" to Four Essays, op.cit., p.lv.
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conflict as part of that ever-changing process of adjustment. Even if this "freedom to
choose ends" is, as Berlin suggests, historically contingent, this makes it no less
significant a part of our lives, and certainly no less valuable to us.
Why not? The reasons for Berlin lie in the reciprocal relations between the ability to
choose between values, commitment to these values, and the understanding of our
identity. In fact the notion of reciprocity does not fully embrace the meaning and
significance of these relations; they may be reciprocally related, but they are also, in
a most important sense, constitutive relations. To choose between values that conflict
incommensurably, whilst essential to our rationality, is also a constitutive part of
what it means to be human. In the most totalitarian regimes of the century, we find,
Berlin argues, that when denial of incommensurability of values (in the name of a
race, a nation, a greater good, or whatever) occurs, the price to be paid will include
not just curtailment of certain liberties, but the very denial of humanity, of human
identity, to individuals or groups. The reason for this is that the relations between
values, choice, and commitment, are constitutive relations. As Berlin says
In the end, men choose between ultimate values; they choose as they do,
because their life and their thought are determined by fundamental categories
and concepts that are, at any rate over large stretches of time and space, a
part of their being and thought and sense of their own identity; part of what
makes them human.(p. 172)
Thus the commitment to the values we hold, the meaning of these values to us, make
us what we are as much as we make them what they are. This awareness of the
constitutive relation of values and the self has important consequences. For one, it
recognises the social construction of the self as a starting point for any further talk
of morality and moral conflict. As he says, "My individual self is not something
which I can detach from my relationship with others, or from those attributes of
myself which consist in their attitude towards me."(p. 156, emphasis added.) What this
entails is thus the realisation of the inseparability of identity and its social
embeddedness. Moreover it also collapses the possibility of maintaining the
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distinction between public and private in the way that we have seen Rorty trying to
do. For as Berlin argues
Even Mill's strenuous effort to mark the distinction between the spheres of
private and social life breaks down under examination ... some, perhaps all,
of my ideas about myself, in particular my sense of my own moral and social
identity, are intelligible only in terms of the social network in which I am an
element.(pp. 155-56)
With these words, Berlin gives the lie to the critique of liberalism based on the
"fundamental contradiction" between self and society. How could this be a
contradiction when the very relation between self and society is a constitutive one?
There may well be political debate about what is to be defined as a private realm free
from state intrusion, say, but this is different from saying that conflict begins when
the self enters an arena in which it encounters multiple other selves that necessarily
impinge upon its domain. As Gray writes (of Berlin's theory), "the particular selves
which engage in self-creation by choice-making are themselves deposits of common
forms of life."2:i Indeed for Berlin himself, "I am in my own eyes as others see me
... I feel myself to be somebody or nobody in terms of my position and function in
the social whole; this is the most 'heteronomous' condition imaginable."(p. 156)
There is, as I have suggested, a remarkable similarity here with Adam Smith's moral
theory. David Hume's challenge to conventional epistemological enquiry had
focussed in part on the fragmentary or protean nature of identity26. "We may
observe," Hume wrote for example, "that what we call a mind, is nothing but a heap
or collection of different perceptions, united together by certain relations, and
suppos'd, tho' falsely, to be endow'd with a perfect simplicity and identity."27 The
John Gray, Isaiah Berlin, op.cit., p. 159.
For an interesting overview of this issue in Scottish literature broadly at the
time, see Kenneth Simpson's The Protean Scot: The Crisis of Identity in Eighteenth
Century Scottish Literature, Aberdeen, AUP, 1988.
27 Hume's Treatise, op.cit., p.207, original emphasis.
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problem that his theory worked within saw its solution in the notion that, as George
Davie has put it, "self-consciousness is inseparable from mutual consciousness."28
At the level of perception it is also quite clear that Smith adopted this approach, as
the following passage shows:
Were it possible that a human creature could grow up to manhood in some
solitary place, without any communication with his own species, he could no
more think of his own character, of the propriety or demerit of his own
sentiments and conduct, of the beauty or deformity of his own mind, than of
the beauty or deformity of his own face. All these are objects which he
cannot easily see, which naturally he does not look at, and with regard to
which he is provided with no mirror which can present them to his view.
Bring him into society, and he is immediately provided with the mirror
which he wanted before.29
This is indeed strikingly similar to the "heteronomous condition" Berlin has just
noted. Moreover, the problem transferred from Humean epistemology became evident
in moral theory too, and became this: how on the one hand to accept that moral
judgment is not based on reason and is always to some extent subjective, but on the
other to explain actually existing shared moral standards and show that individual
judgment is not simply a direct reflection of these standards.
To answer this Smith too argued that moral judgment, and indeed, like Hume, the
self's identity itself, was inescapably rooted in its social context. As such his view
of identity is replicated in terms of moral judgment. Again, for Smith:
We begin, upon this account, to examine our own passions and conduct, and
consider how these must appear to [others], by considering how they would
appear to us if in their situation. We suppose ourselves the spectators of our
own behaviour, and endeavour to imagine what effect it would, in this light,
produce upon us. This is the only looking-glass by which we can, in some
George Davie, The Crisis of the Democratic Intellect, Edinburgh, Polygon,
1986, p.136.
29 Adam Smith, The Theory of Moral Sentiments, (sixth ed. 1790), eds.
D.D.Raphael and A.L.Macfie, Oxford, OUP, 1976, III.1.3.
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measure, with the eyes of other people, scrutinize the propriety of our own
conduct.30
Smith's was a highly sophisticated account of the development of morality from these
social and spectatorial roots, and one, as Maclntyre noted, that was fundamentally at
odds with the other Enlightenment tradition that stemmed from Reid and Kant. For
Hume and Smith, morality could never be legitimised a priori by abstract rules of
reason. On the contrary, moral evaluation lay in the realm of the interactive relations
between real and imaginary spectators. Moral understanding was thus a process of
mutual perception and adjustment amongst spectators, and, where the particular
details of each case were of paramount importance, judgment could not be abstract
nor found to be based on a priori criteria. In such a theory, and again in a way
similar to Berlin's, the particular contexts of judging were of the utmost importance:
as Smith says, sympathy, the human faculty for relating to others, "does not arise so
much from the view of the passion, as from that of the situation which excites it."31
Smith (and Hume before him) saw that questions of morality always came back to
the sympathetic reactions of spectators, real or imaginary. Again, as Davie puts it,
man
cannot know the limits and possibilities of his own personality until he is in
a position to compare what he knows about himself by direct observation of
his behaviour with other aspects of his behaviour, which are directly
observable, not by himself, but by those living in day-to-day contact with
him, and which he learns about from them, and could know nothing about
apart from them.32
30 ibid., III.i.5.
31 ibid., I.i. 1.10.
32 Davie, op.cit., p. 116 (discussing C.M.Grieve's A Drunk Man Looks at Thistle).
Robert Burns, said to be conversant with Smith's work, succinctly summed up this
position in his poem "To a Louse" as, "to see ourselves as others see us." Cf. Smith,
TMS III.4.6: "If we saw ourselves in the light which others see us ... a reformation
would generally be unavoidable."
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The concept of the impartial spectator was the highpoint of Smith's moral theory
because it showed how, even though moral judgment was rooted in social practice
rather than in the dictates of reason or of moral rules, an individual's judgment could
transcend and critically reflect upon that social practice. But any such transcendence
was always an outgrowth of such practice, and could never be separated from it. As
Haakonssen points out
... just as with Hume, we must remember that in Smith's view men can never
start morally from scratch: they are always living in a society and thus in a
context of aims, values, and ideals. Moral evaluation is therefore only
relevant in such a context. It is never a matter of goodness or badness,
justice or injustice, per se\ but of goodness or badness, etc., against the
background of a number of other values.33
Significantly, and as a consequence of this approach Smith in turn reinforced the
limited role that reason played in moral judgment. Hume had argued that
Reason is the discovery of truth and falsehood. Truth or falsehood consists
in an agreement or disagreement either to the real relations of ideas, or to
real existence and matter of fact ... Now 'tis evident our passions, volitions,
and actions, are not susceptible of any such agreement or disagreement ...
'Tis impossible, therefore, they can be pronounced either true or false, and
be either contrary or conformable to reason.34
Smith clearly followed this approach - as he wrote, "reason cannot render any
particular object either agreeable or disagreeable to the mind for its own sake"35 -
tracing it to his teacher Hutcheson, and argued - with uncharacteristic derision - that
"if any controversy is still kept up about this subject [that morality is not derived
from reason], I can impute it to nothing, but either to inattention to what that
Knud Haakonssen, The Science of a Legislator: The Natural Jurisprudence
ofDavid Hume and Adam Smith, Cambridge, CUP, 1981, p.62.
34 David Hume, Treatise, op.cit., III.i.1 (p.458).
Adam Smith, Theory ofMoral Sentiments, op.cit., VII.3.2.7.
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gentleman [Hutcheson] has written, or to a superstitious attachment to certain forms
of expression, a weakness not very uncommon amongst the learned ... 1,36 But if
reason was, as Hume put it "wholly inactive" as a source of morality, it was not
completely redundant. For Smith the production of moral rules was an inductive
process, and here reasoning from observation was valid. However, it is a mistake to
presume, he says, that such rules as are produced can themselves be the original
source of moral judgment. The rules of morality, he argues, "are ultimately founded
upon experience of what, in particular instances, our moral faculties, our natural sense
of merit and propriety, approve or disapprove of. We do not originally approve or
condemn particular actions because, upon examination, they appear to be agreeable
or inconsistent with a certain general rule."37 Here we see quite clearly the
sensitivity to the particular instance, yet, as with Berlin, the refusal to endorse the
collapse of moral judgment when the role of reason is seen to be reduced.
Two other features of Smith's work are worthy of note in this context. Firstly, Smith
had an antipathy to what he called the "man of system" in much the same way as
does Berlin. The problem with the "man of system", says Smith, is that he "erect[s]
his own judgment into the supreme standard of right and wrong"; he thus fails to see
that, "in the great chess-board of human society, every single piece has a principle
of motion of its own, altogether different from what the legislature might chuse to
impress upon it."38 Within a theory of natural liberty, and though this was taken to
be of greater import when applied to his writings on economics, it can be treated as
a response to the kind of moral theory that would seek externally to impose standards
and which neglected to account for the social contexts of moral judgment, the
attention to particular circumstances which this required, and who was best placed








it has been argued that Smith had in mind the recent revolution in France when
revising his book in 1790) was to be treated with concern for precisely the reason
that he tended to overlook the variability of contexts and reasonings that constituted
the very existence of moral judgment.
Secondly, it is worth noting merely in passing for we will return to this in more
detail when we compare Berlin's thesis to Maclntyre's, that morality for Smith could
never be seen as merely a way of (in Maclntyre's terms) satisfying preferences.
Smith opened his Theory of Moral Sentiments by arguing that, "How selfish soever
man be supposed, there are evidently some principles in his nature, which interest
him in the fortune of others, and render their happiness necessary to him, though he
derives nothing from it except the pleasure of seeing it."39 While Berlin's theory
may question the use of human nature in Smith's sense, it seems nevertheless at one
in seeing that morality is concerned with real relations with others, and in the
processes of mutual adjustment that comprise moral understanding, that these
processes can neither be divorced from their constitutive settings, nor be treated as
a way of simply lining up preferences. For Smith, and I would say Berlin, processes
of adjustment, conflict and compromise, are organic in a way that Maclntyre's
conception of the emotivist self fails to grasp. Indeed it was precisely a failure to
grasp this element of Smith's work that led to much intellectual effort being spent
on trying to figure out "Das Adam Smith problem"; that is, how Smith's moral and
economic theory could be thought of as compatible. Of course, this was not Smith's
problem, but one created by an ironic turn of intellectual events that saw his
economic theory being divorced from the moral contexts within which he himself saw
economic progress occurring. Smith was arguably the last great thinker who tried to
hold these two strands together in a conceptual unity, and it is a further, sad, irony
that it was the power of his own economic thought, or rather the way in which it was
utilised, that perhaps led him to be the last one who could do so.
39 ibid., I.i.l.
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Leaving Smith and returning to Berlin, it is for him impossible to separate self-
identity (including moral and political identity) from its constitutive setting in social
norms. As such, moral conflict cannot be simplistically treated as individual selves
(and/or their wishes or preferences) colliding with others (and/or their wishes or
preferences). Furthermore, nor can (political) morality merely be treated as a way of,
in the phrase used earlier, lining up those wishes or preferences that individuals
express. For what collides in Berlin's analysis of moral conflict are not individuals
or their preferences, but the values that they hold most dearly and which are
constituted in and by them only as part of a "social pattern" in which those values
and the individuals themselves exist. It is values that conflict incommensurably, not
individuals or their preferences. Commitment to a particular set of values may well
come from individuals themselves (it may come from groups too), but what those
values themselves mean cannot be severed from their social and intellectual location:
the "concepts and categories that dominate life and thought ... are difficult, and
practice impossible to think away."40 They could certainly not be thought away by
individuals for precisely the reason that they constitute the very ability to think - and
even exist - as an individual. Of course, and just as Smith had shown in his notion
of the impartial spectator, this did not mean that individuals were simply a reflection
of external norms. It was possible, and indeed desirable, for the individual to
transcend and reflect upon such norms; but, it was not possible to escape them
entirely. To realise this is finally to begin to answer the question of Maclntyre's
about how shared or objective (or intersubjective) values are possible in a society
where values conflict in a way that allows of no ultimate resolution. To see why, let
us once again turn to the work of Raz to amplify Berlin's argument here.
In The Morality of Freedom, Raz argues for the existence of what he calls
"constitutive incommensurabilities". These exist, he says, when, in circumstances
where two options are presented - A and B - one of three general features is
observable. First, "If A and B are incomparable options of this kind then if an agent
Isaiah Berlin, "Introduction" to Four Essays, op.cit., p.liii.
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is in a situation in which option A is his and B can be obtained by forgoing A he
will normally refuse to do so." Second, such incommensurabilities "obtain between
options which have special significance for people's ability successfully to engage in
certain pursuits or relationships: the refusal to trade one option for the other is a
condition of the agent's ability successfully to pursue one of his goals." Third, "it is
typical, where options of this kind are involved, for agents to regard the very thought
that they may be comparable in value as abhorrent."41
In relation to the first and third features, we are already familiar with the significance
that a refusal to evaluate might have on our understanding of the juxtaposition of two
values as incommensurable. In the example that was used we saw that a refusal to
compare friendship and monetary value did not necessarily mean that a ranking -
based on the commitment to commensurability - had occurred, and that this was so
even when a decision between the two was required of someone. We now turn to a
further aspect of this scenario raised in particular by the second feature of constitutive
incommensurability just introduced. For simplicity we will use the same example.
Two related aspects of the second feature are of paramount importance. They concern
(from the quote above) the "special significance for people's ability ...", and, the idea
of the refusal to trade options as a "condition". In Raz's analysis - which again I take
to be a better developed though essentially similar one to Berlin's - the implications
of a refusal to compare options depends upon the constitutive nature of the values
involved. This in turn, as was seen, is a function of a practice that can only be
understood as a social practice in which the meaning to the individual only makes
sense as part of a wider "social pattern". Raz breaks these features down into two
closely related parts: the "convention-dependency" of values, and their "symbolic
significance."42 Consider again our example: Can one compare friendship with
monetary value?
Joseph Raz, The Morality of Freedom, op.cit., p.346.
ibid., p.350.
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Take friendship: the idea and existence of such an "institution" depends on certain
socially-grounded conventions. This would seem to be uncontroversial. At its most
basic level, one cannot be or have a friend without at least some other person with
whom such a convention could be instituted. (One could, colloquially, be a "friend
to oneself", but this still requires the existence of such an institution beyond oneself
to make such a claim undertandable in the first place.) Such a convention will, in
Raz's phrase, be most likely one of many "social forms which delineate the basic
shape of the projects and relationships which constitute human well-being,"43 and
one which, as the case of friendship makes quite clear, could not be reduced to a
purely "atomistic" level. The institution is thus convention-dependent and is,
therefore, irreducibly social.
But such conventions also have a symbolic dimension. By this Raz means, in brief
terms, that "actions which are otherwise similar may differ in their meaning."44
Consider the following example given by Raz. Imagine a situation in which it is
proposed that someone leave their spouse for a specific time because they were
offered a sum of money. Regardless of what one would do, the symbolic significance
of one's act would differ (especially if one went away) in the situation where the
money was to be gained by going away to carry out one's job, as compared to the
situation in which the money was to be gained merely because it was a bribe to get
one away from one's spouse. Where, in this example, one refused to go away in the
second situation, the "crucial fact", says Raz is that "what has symbolic significance
is the very judgment that companionship is incommensurable with money."45
And here we reach the general claim that he makes for constitutive








having certain relations."46 That is (and as it was expressed above in the second
feature), the "special significance" of one of two proposed options leads to a refusal
to trade options, and this refusal is itself "a condition of the agent's ability
successfully to pursue one of his goals." So, for example, that one refuses to compare
the value of friendship to the value of money is a condition for being capable of
friendship at all; when asked how much friendship is worth - 10 pounds, 1000
pounds, whatever - if the friendship is "worth" anything at all, one will reject the
comparison out of hand. One refuses to put a (comparative) monetary value on
friendship because a part of what constitutes the very meaning of friendship depends
precisely on such a refusal: "Only those who hold the view that friendship is neither
better nor worse than money, but is simply not comparable to money or other
commodities are capable of having friends."47 To return to the language of
commensurability, in such instances "failure of commensurability is a success."48
For if one does otherwise, namely to put a monetary price on friendship, then, says
Raz, one is simply not capable of having friends. And it is the existence (or not) of
this "capability" that shows the constitutive nature (to the individual) of commitment
to certain values as they are expressed through the dimensions of convention and
symbolic significance.
One more point needs to be added to this, and it ties in with something mentioned
in the previous section. For Raz adds that just because one were to choose money
instead of friendship - it must be expressed this way since one could not successfully
bring the two comparatively together without losing the capability for friendship -
does not mean that one acts (in words reminiscent of Berlin's) "mistakenly, wrongly,
or against reason." One simply becomes incapable of having friends. Similarly, were





ibid., p.352, original emphasis,
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position. But in this latter instance such reasoning is internal to the convention and
cannot be used to make commensurable two conflicting values. To repeat what was
said above, "Though the reason [given] is incommensurate with the reason for the
alternative it shows the value of that option and when that option is chosen it is
chosen because of its value."49 Reasoning is internal to the practice in which the
value of friendship, say, is found and cannot emerge across or transcend the two
options given; thus "incommensurability forms the foundation of duties"50 such as
friendship.
To come up with reasons that could compare friendship and monetary value could
only be done, so to speak, at a price; in this case, the loss of the ability to participate
in the institution of friendship. Hence the full significance of the line also quoted in
the previous section: "Incommensurability speaks not of what does escape reason but
of what must elude it." That is, what must elude it if the conventions and "social
forms which delineate the basic shape of the projects and relationships which
constitute human well-being,"(supra) are not to be devalued or collapsed out of
existence. It is clearly possible that they could be - as the case of choosing to
compare money and friendship shows - but as Raz rightly points out, "then life
according to commensurate principles will be radically different from our own."51
But if this is so, then the application of reason must have its limitations.
It is in this sense that I talk of ambiguity in Berlin's use of the idea of reason. For
if reason's capability is not reduced, then success will mean failure: in making
commensurable certain values, one is in serious danger of losing the distinctive
institutions with which we are familiar because the institutions which we value, and








retaining their incommensurability with other institutions. As Tolstoy once put it,
"Once say that human life can be controlled by reason, and all possibility of life in
annihilated." Not quite, we might say, but it would certainly be unrecognisably
different.
But "not quite" in an important sense. For again as Raz's argument shows, not all
reason is lost once one accepts incommensurability. Reasoning - and evalution and
commitment - internal to an institution (such as friendship) is still required once one
has accepted rather than rejected the possibility of that institution. And here again the
dual aspects of convention and symbolic significance have to be constantly negotiated
and weighed up. One can be a good friend or a poor friend. One can be a good
lawyer (or parent or spouse or whatever), or a poor one. And being that "good"
whatever is not something that any individual alone can define or seek simply as a
preference. These are standards that cannot emanate from the individual; as
Wittgenstein said of the practice of rule-following, there is a difference between
thinking one is following a rule and following a rule.52 In other words, within such
conventions of the type we are discussing, there exist standards, the extent to which
one's own input of definition will vary, but for which one will never be the sole
source of definition so long as they remain rooted in social practices and in "concepts
and categories" that as individuals we cannot choose, for the very reason that they
choose us - they constitute our own sense of self - as much as we choose them.
Berlin is adamant that his version of value-incommensurability does not equate to
relativism. This latter doctrine rests, he says, on the belief that all judgment is "the
expression or statement of a taste, or emotional attitude or outlook ... with no
objective correlate which determines its truth or falsehood."53 In the context of
Raz's argument, it should be quite clear that although certain things must "elude
52 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, op.cit., s.202.
"Alleged Relativism in Eighteenth-Century Thought," in The Crooked Timber
of Humanity, op.cit., p.80.
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reason" if we are to maintain them as they are, this does not mean that all standards
of behaviour have no rational or intersubjective basis. Moreover, because of the
constitutive nature of values and practices it would be difficult to shed such standards
without losing (at least a part of) who we are. And this has been Berlin's point all
along. The conflict of incommensurable values plays a vital role in being able to hold
on to certain institutions and ultimately a certain understanding of who we are or
might want to be. When that conflict is thought to be eradicable - when "all values
can be graded on one scale ... to represent moral decision as an operation which a
slide rule in principle could perform"(p,171) - we are in danger not just of
suppressing contradictions, but insofar as these contradictions are constitutive,
suppressing parts of who we are.
Incommensurabilities can therefore be seen as constitutive of institutions in and
through which we commit and define ourselves. That we refuse to put a monetary
values on friendship, say, makes us capable of participating in that institution. And
commitment to the value of friendship helps - among a variety of other constitutive
commitments - define who we are as persons at all. Moreover, admitting
incommensurability does not, as we have seen, deny the possibility of rational
behaviour - we are not mistaken, or deluded, because a greater reason or goal or
value should not be allowed to overcome incommensurability. Reason, in the sense
used by Raz and Berlin, is capable of directing our actions, but we should be aware
that to maintain certain institutions it must be confined within these institutions. That
reason can be circumbscribed within limits does not lead to reason's complete demise
since "it is not a requirement of reason that there should be one value which in all
cases prevails over the other."54 Just when such limits must be placed on reason
must always remain open; they cannot be foreclosed by appeal to a higher standard
that comes with the "a priori commitment to commensurability." Openness to conflict
requires a commitment to conflict, and to incommensurability as a value itself. But
54 Isaiah Berlin and Bernard Williams, "Pluralism and Liberalism: A Reply",
Political Studies (1994) 306-309 at 307.
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as we have seen, this not a sign of some emotivist anomie for the very reason that
it is a commitment to standards that are inescapable in large part because of their
constitutive role.
When values are emaciated to become mere interests or preferences, they lose one
of their most vital features. That is, interests or preferences (say as Maclntyre defines
them) can indeed be tallied according to some ranking scheme. In Maclntyre's
critique of liberalism such ranking usually takes the form of merely "lining up" or
counting preferences; an inorganic process in other words. But Berlin's
incommensurability thesis is equally critical of any such attempt to treat moral
conflict as resolvable through any "operation which a slide rule in principle could
perform". Openness to conflict clearly has a price in that it is messy conceptually and
demanding politically. But for Berlin, unlike Maclntyre, that there are no "rational
standards" which could resolve deep-seated conflicts is the - all too precarious -
success of, and reason for commitment to, his version of liberalism.
(iv) Authority and Expertise
It is a notable feature of Berlin's liberalism that he is just as wary of the use of
authority and expertise as is Maclntyre. His - Berlin's - antagonism towards experts
stems from, as we have seen partly already, his fear that politics turn into merely an
exercise in technical skill, into operations that, in his words, a slide-rule might
perform. In decrying the state of affairs in which the possibility of politics is
subverted, his language is, if not redolent with scorn, then at least reminscent of
Foucault:
human behaviour can be manipulated with relative ease by technically
qualified specialists - adjusters of conflicts and promoters of peace both of
body and of mind, engineers and other scientific experts in the service of the
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ruling group, psychologists, sociologists, economic and social planners, and
so on.55
What I want to explore in this section is the relation between expertise and authority,
and to do so in order to draw out conclusions for the role of law within the picture
of liberalism Berlin has portrayed. I will also, where appropriate, draw in part on a
comparison with Foucault himself.
(a)
In an earlier section we considered Berlin's analysis of Kant as an example of just
how it might be possible for well-intentioned rationalist theories to be used to stifle
conflict when they employed a singular use of reason allied to the notion of "man's
true self." It will be recalled that where the latter idea was proposed it became
possible for some to speak in the name of others where those others were taken to
be defective in their use of the universal faculty of reason, and to do so without
necessarily appearing to constrict either their freedom or their rationality. "Even
Kant," Berlin writes, "when he came to deal with political issues, conceded that no
law, provided that it was such that I should, if I were asked, approve it as a rational
being, could possibly deprive me of any portion of my rational freedom."(p. 152)
While Berlin is prepared to admit that the argumentative steps traceable from a
rationalist theory such as Kant's to practices of "an authoritarian state" are "not
logically valid" - they indeed constitute a "strange reversal" - they remain, however,
"historically and psychologically intelligible."(ibid) Why this is so was hinted at
earlier, but needs now to be brought out in the present context.
Berlin's by now familiar complaint against a use of reason that sees deviance as the
result of irrationality, suggests that while perhaps not faulty at a purely intellectual
Isaiah Berlin, "Political Ideas in the Twentieth Century," in Four Essays,
op.cit., p.29.
114
level, nonetheless creates in its sociological dimension practical consequences of great
magnitude. Again returning to Kant, the problem lies in the institutional vesting that
occurs when considering the notion that (as noted above) "no law ... provided that it
was such that I should, if I were asked, approve it as a rational being, could possibly
deprive me of any portion of my rational freedom." The problem is primarily a
practical one, but is for all that a highly significant one. For the problem is precisely
that when it comes to "political issues" one "cannot consult all men about all
enactments all the time."(p. 152, emphasis added) That is, theories such as Kant's may
lose much in translation to practice. And in this divergence, says Berlin, "the door
was opened wide to the rule of experts."(ibid)
The philosophical argument here should be reasonably familiar. Since "the
pronouncements of reason must be the same in all minds"(p.l53), those who do not
act according to reason must be treated as having an incomplete grasp of what reason
requires. Beyond reason in this scenario lies unreason, irrationality. But, when it
comes to practical or political matters or the creation of laws, the gap exposed - that
"one cannot consult all men about all enactments all the time" - becomes even more
important. Berlin, in the following passage, assumes the voice of the benign
rationalist legislator to explain the consequences:
I issue my orders, and if you resist, take it upon myself to repress the
irrational element in you which opposes reason. My task would be easier if
you repressed it in yourself; I try to educate you to do so. But I am
responsible for public welfare, I cannot wait until all men are wholly
rational. Kant may protest that the essence of the subject's freedom is that
he, and he alone, has given himself the order to obey. But that is a counsel
of perfection. If you fail to discipline yourself I must do so for you; and you
cannot complain of lack of freedom, for the fact that Kant's rational judge
has sent you to prison is evidence that you have not listened to your own
inner [objective] reason, that, like a child, a savage, an idiot, you are not ripe
for self-direction or permanently incapable of it.(ibid)
The link between expertise and authority is made when one substitutes in that last
sentence the word "judge" for any other expert in a given field. The institutional
vesting, as I have called it, of expertise can and does occur in a broad range of
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activities, and the assumption of authority that it adopts follows the logic of "reason
versus unreason" in its justification for directing behaviour. Here we find entering the
"psychologists, sociologists, economic and social planners" - all the "adjusters of
conflict" - that were mentioned at the start of this section. But there is more to
Berlin's critique here than a rehashing (or in fact prehashing) of ideas with which we
are familiar since at least the work of Foucault. As far as Berlin is concerned, again
with his eye on the totalitarian regimes of Europe in the earlier part of the century
(though once again he says his observation applies to "all stable societies"56), the
use of experts is intimately linked with the notion of system-maintenance. Here the
"adusters of conflict", in whatever guise they may appear, are "harnessed to
producing the maximum of unclouded social contentment compatible with opposition
to all experiment outside the bounds of the system".57 The tendency to reduce
conflict, through a calculus of utility and albeit for the contentment of the many, thus
requires the ability to suppress dissent in the name of a system which requires
stabilisation through the ability to neutralise attacks on itself. The most effective
means of doing so is of course to attempt to place beyond the bounds of conflict
those matters that appear to challenge the system; in other words to turn the sources
of political challenge and conflict into disagreement merely about the means to ends
already assumed. Moreover, once this stabilisation is seen to be protective of the
interests of a significant "many", the desire to curtail conflict, to curtail meaningful
politics, becomes potentially overwhelming. This is how Berlin puts it, and his
observation now applies equally he says to "western" societies:
Growing numbers of human beings are prepared to purchase this sense of
security even at the cost of allowing vast tracts of life to be controlled by
persons who, whether consciously or not, act sytematically to narrow the
horizon of human activity to manageable proportions, to train human beings
"Political Ideas in the Twentieth Century," op.cit., p.29.
ibid.
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into more easily combinable parts of a total pattern ... to stabilize, if need be,
at the lowest level.58
Clearly in these circumstances the role of experts becomes crucial. In the "end of
politics" scenario with which Berlin is centrally concerned, experts play both the
stabilising role within the system as well as providing opportunities for removing or
"adjusting" conflictual debate to the realm of disagreement over fact. When this
neutralisation occurs, authority ceases to be challengeable on political terms, since it
tends to assume a form in which that authority appears as simply the application of
expert technique, as unproblematic, and therefore incontestible. Here, in other words,
Berlin sees the danger of (quoting St.-Simon's phrase) the government of man being
replaced by the administration of things; the instability and inefficiency of critical
pursuits being subjected to the "approbation of the official auditor"59.
Once again the issue of commensurability raises its head though this time we find its
exemplification in more expressly sociological rather than philosophical terms. For
the tendency Berlin identifies which sees the reduction of political conflict to debate
over means to pregiven ends has as its adjunct the rhetoric and authority of experts
to define or "canalize" dispute in a particular way, to reduce what may or may not
be genuine value conflict over "ends equally ultimate" to the homogenising language
of the expert. In contemporary settings, says Berlin, that language is most often one
associated with therapy. Today, he says,
interests are all conceived almost entirely in therapeutic terms: tensions that
need to be released, wounds, conflicts, fixations, 'phobias' and fears,
psychical and psycho-physical abnormalities of all sorts which require the aid
of specialised healers - doctors, economists, social workers, teams of
diagnosticians or engineers or other masters of the craft of helping the sick








It is interesting to note here that in one respect Berlin is openly ambivalent about
such developments. He is quite clear that progress has been and is being made in
certain areas often associated with the power of experts. Indeed, he gladly endorses
many such developments. As he says, "to the degree to which such suffering exists
and can be treated by the applied sciences ... such policies are, of course, entirely
beneficent and their organized support is a great moral asset to an age and a
country."61 He writes elsewhere of such institutions as public education and public
health services that would easily fit this mould. But what he does not problematise
is the apparently relaxed claim that "where such suffering exists and can be treated"
then it is worthwhile; that is, he does not go into the particular realms of therapeutic
practices to pursue in detail issues of the construction of knowledge and its effects
within them. Moreover he does not dwell on the interrelations between bodies of
expertise to any great extent. Instead his ambivalence comes to rest on the
assumption that there is always a flip-side to advances in the use of expertise as a
justification for state or professional intervention. There is always, in other words, a
danger, a "tendency", an incipient threat, that exists when the exercise of authority
becomes clouded in the language of the expert. This danger takes the form of a
tendency "to assimilate all men's primary needs to those that are capable of being
met by these methods: the reduction of all questions and aspirations to dislocations
which the expert can set right."62
The use of the term "dislocations" signals the return of an idea we explored earlier,
namely Berlin's treatment of techniques which work to rectify a disjuncture between
reason and unreason, which act upon the assumption of correcting mistakes in the
name of a single authoritative reason (or indeed of any overarching theme - the
victory of the proletariat, the destiny of a race, whatever). But just as Berlin argued
against the desirability of such a notion of reason because its dependency on an




and evaluative claims together when he comes to deal with the sociological realm of
the expert. For the problem with attempts to set right, to "heal" wounds, phobias, etc.
as part of an overall therapeutic approach, is that it tends to assume that very same
logic of commensurability that reduces conflict to irrationality, deviance to error, and
values to interests. And this, he says, is the ever-present danger:
Some believe in coercion, others in gentler methods; but the conception of
human needs in their entirety as those of the inmates of a prison or a
reformatory or a school or a hospital, however sincerely it may be held, is
a gloomy, false, and ultimately degraded view, resting on the denial of the
rational and productive nature of all, or even the majority of, men.63
Once again the bottom line for Berlin is the empirical evidence that people will
disagree about the ultimate values of life, and where the existence of this
disagreement is threatened by the "adjustment" of conflicts by experts as if it did not
exist, then Berlin sees the potential for the occurrence of the denial of that which
makes us human. Two of the trends Berlin identifies with the collapsing of values
into interests and the denial of the "rational and productive nature of all" are
"American 'materialism'" and "communist or nationalist fanaticism"64, and it is easy
to see that his antipathy exists towards both to the extent that they deny conflict
through the endorsement of a therapeutic commensurability instituted by experts of
the market, the party, or any other promoters and stabilisers of the "system". Thus
we discover his wariness of expertise, and, in his ambivalence, his fear that any
"remedy grows to be worse than the disease."65
But still the ambivalence remains, and indeed, for Berlin, so it must. The main reason
why is that Berlin's approach is not an emancipatory one. As we saw earlier, for





because these, and the values that co-exist in and through them, constitute our sense
of understanding in the first place, constitute in fact our very sense of being. The
problem he associates with the power of experts is that where there must be
compromise between ends equally ultimate, those tendencies to think conflict away
that he sees being a part of even the best-intentioned therapeutic institutions and
discourses, are always in danger of overriding the potential for conflict between those
disparate and equally ultimate ends. It is not that there can ever be an undistorted
compromise, but instead that the institutional and rhetorical power of experts usually
tends to obscure the nature of fundamental disagreement and treat it in the same way
as it treats an illness in need of a cure.
The issue here is as much definitional as anything else. That is, it concerns the power
to define: "what this age needs," argues Berlin,
is not more faith, or stronger leadership, or more scientific organisation.
Rather it is the opposite - less Messianic ardour, more enlightened
scepticism, more toleration of personal idiosyncrasies ... more room for the
attainment of personal ends by individuals and minorities whose tastes and
beliefs find (whether rightly or wrongly must not matter) little reponse
among the majority.66
The power to define, or define away, idiosyncrasies or values or goals, given that
such power is linked inextricably to the very possibility of identity, must be treated
cautiously, suspiciously. And, when its effect is to reduce identity to merely
following a programme or treatment diagosed by the experts, thereby reducing
identity and politics to the patient or schoolchild in need of correction, to create or
maintain avenues of challenge.
We come back then full circle to the requirement for politics as an argument about
identity. And the threat of expertise must always be treated as precisely that for
Berlin; namely, a threat, a danger that would lead to the cutting off or wishing away
ibid., pp.39-40.
120
of the very conceptual tensions and conflicts that make us what we are. The struggle
against this danger is ongoing for the threats come not only from the power of
experts to define discrepant identity as in need of therapy, but also from the very
tendency of ideas themselves to harden into constricting presences: "the history of
thought and culture is," he says, "a changing pattern of great liberating ideas which
inevitably turn into suffocating straightjackets, and so stimulate their own destruction
by new, emancipating, and at the same time, enslaving concepts."67 Where this
history is overlooked, ignored, or, at the very worse denied by the power of experts
to dominate agendas on what ideas are permissible at all, then the danger exists and
should be noted and, if necessary, acted upon. The problem Berlin sees with the
illiberal tendencies of contemporary society is precisely that as expertise and
authority coalesce within the stabilising requirements of the system, it potentially
becomes harder and harder not just to act on this danger, but even to note it in the
first place.
(b)
Though Berlin does not make the distinction Foucault does between juridical and
disciplinary power, nor does he attempt anything like the in-depth analysis of the
dispersion and techniques of power that one finds in the work of Foucault, there are
in the current context at least some similarities in their central preoccupations. At the
level of Berlin's "concepts and categories", Foucault sees in the notion of "subjugated
knowledges" which form the focus of his genealogical studies, the same concerns as
those identified by Berlin. By subjugated knowledges Foucault means
the historical contents that have been buried and disguised in a functionalist
coherence or formal systemization[sic] ... [and which draw attention to] the
67 Isaiah Berlin, "Does Political Theory still exist?", in P.Laslett and
W.G.Runciman eds., Philosophy, Politics and Society (Second Series), Oxford, Basil
Blackwell, 1969, p. 19.
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ruptural effects of conflict and straggle that the order imposed by
functionalist or systematizing thought is designed to mask.68
What the "genealogical project" seeks to do then is
to entertain the claims to attention of local, discontinuous, disqualified,
illegitimate knowledges against the claims of a unitary body of theory which
would filter, hierarchize and order them in the name of some true knowledge
and some arbitrary idea of what constitutes a science and its objects.69
The ambiguity in Foucault's use of the term illegitimate here is precisely that which
Berlin draws attention to in his plea for greater tolerance toward "idiosyncracy"; it
is not that some knowledge or identity is illegitimate or idiosyncratic as such, but that
it has been made so and becomes threatened by the "unitary body of theory" that
seeks to define it as such for specific purposes. Foucault's subjugated knowledges
then must seek to "wage their struggle" against "the coercion of a theoretical, unitary,
formal and scientific discourse"70 much in the same way as Berlin's 'idiosyncrats'
must fight against the power of the homogenising tendencies of the single all-
embracing system in whatever form that may take.
While in Berlin's version of liberalism the very existence of the individual is not
problematised as it is in Foucault's work, it does however see the power to define as
crucially implicated in the struggle to maintain and subvert identities. For Berlin, the
link between authority and expertise exemplified in the tendency to allow "vast tracts
of life to be controlled by persons who, whether consciously or not, act sytematically
to narrow the horizon of human activity to manageable proportions"(supra), is
paralleled in Foucault's reading of the complex relation between power and








insurrection of knowledges that are opposed primarily not to the contents, methods
or concepts of a science, but to the effects of the centralising powers which are
linked to the institution and functioning of an organised scientific discourse within
a society such as ours."71 Moreover, the problem of the "hardening" of new,
potentially liberating, knowledges, that Berlin identified in the history of ideas, is the
same for Foucault when he asks of the status of subjugated knowledges, "if we want
to protect these only lately liberated fragments are we not in danger of ourselves
constructing, with our hands, that unitary discourse to which we are invited ...?"72
For both writers there appears to be an undeconstructible tension between subjugating
and subjugated knowledges, combined, again in both, with the need for a theoretical
and political vigilance in regard to what exactly it is that is being masked.
Finally, where Berlin sees threats of control coming to be located in the power of the
"therapeutic", Foucault, as is well-known, identifies the "global functioning of ... a
society of normalisation"11 as one of the defining features of disciplinary discourses.
Yet what I take to be significant about Berlin's liberalism in this context, is, as I
have noted, his sweeping indictment of the possibility of a liberatory discourse. For
him, as we have seen, there may be positive, even moral, advances, in the
institutionalised use of therapy (though there is always potentially a price attached).
Yet the idea that it would be possible to escape aspects of normalisation in the sense
of escaping from normative influence at all, is as ridiculous for him as (as we saw
earlier) saying that when reason cannot be used to make all values commensurable
all choices become therefore arbitrary. Significantly, the effect of this realisation is
also to disallow the kind of liberalism Rorty espouses that would see the possibility
of a private realm of self-redescription as existing quite separately from the broader
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cannot be so naive as to assume, as Rorty appears to, that a private realm can ever
be cut off from the public realm of politics. Any private realm for Berlin will be
existent only as it is contested within the larger normative and political framework
of which it is a part, and exist as such in a state of reflexive and partly constitutive
tension. This is why politics as conflict is so central to Berlin's liberalism, and hence
also why, like Foucault, he is so keen to view the role of experts as integrally bound
up with the exercise of authority.
The liberty with which Berlin is so concerned in his "Two Concepts" is thus
coiisti ued as a contested but significant value in the ability constantly to be alert to
the processes of homogenisation and normalisation that he sees in contemporary
society. Where these processes are instituted or augmented by the dominant dicourses
of therapeutic expertise, then they ought to be opened to challenge. The irony is of
course, that as these processes themselves become more effective, the possibility for
a politics that would maintain the openness to conflict itself recedes. Hence again, for
Berlin, the importance of the value of being able to challenge authority as such, and
the difference he sees between this and the desire to have authority in one's own
hands. Clearly related - "twin brothers" even - these two values play out quite
differently in cases when it is either not possible to consult everyone all the time, or,
when the paternalism of expertise assumes that it is neither necessary nor desirable
to do so. Expertise and authority, twin brothers themselves we might say, must then
be constantly opened to critique in Berlin's liberalism in order that, for him, politics
and identity do not become something that either a slide-rule or a headache tablet
might adequately deal with.
It now remains in this chapter to turn our attention to that aspect of authority that we
have not yet explored, in order to complete, for present purposes, the picture of




Roger Hausheer, in whose praise Berlin could drown, suggests that Berlin has
provided "one of the most complete, cogent, formidable and satisfying accounts of
the radical liberal humanist conception of man and his predicament that has ever been
formulated."74 If this is so, then Berlin does not seem to have thought that distinct
attention to law was required for such an account. There is, scattered through Berlin's
writings, mention of law, but little systematic treatment of it. Rather than try to build
up a coherent picture from what does exist I intend in this section to outline first a
duality appreciable in Berlin's work regarding the relation between law and conflict,
and second, to draw out some tentative conclusions for the use of law in the "radical
liberal" theory Berlin does offer us. To do this I will build on the features of his
liberalism that have already been discussed, and add a few more where they seem
necessary. Let us turn first to the duality.
(a)
Hausheer is correct to say that Berlin's is a humanist approach. What might
distinguish it from many recent postmodern writings with which I have said it has
some affinity, is Berlin's strong belief in certain empirically observable features of
human beings against which the "all-embracing systems" and the powers of
therapeutic experts may do damage. We have seen earlier how the ability to choose,
to behave rationally according to one's or one's groups appreciation of what is
valuable, is central to Berlin's conception of human identity. Implicit then in Berlin's
74 Roger Hausheer, "Introduction" to Isaiah Berlin, Against the Current: Essays
in the History of Ideas, ed., H.Hardy, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1981, p.liii.
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work is, so to speak, a consensual norm which should not be breached if the very
idea of humanity as we know it is minimally to stay intact. In an essay entitled
"European Unity and its Vicissitudes", Berlin makes clearer what this is:
if we meet someone who cannot see why (to take the famous example) he
should not destroy the world in order to relieve a pain in his little finger, or
someone who genuinely sees no harm in condemning innocent men, or
betraying friends, or torturing children ... they are as much outside the
frontiers of humanity as creatures who lack some of the minimal physical
characteristics that constitute human beings. We lean on the fact that the laws
and principles to which we appeal, when we make moral and political
decisions of a fundamental kind, have, unlike legal enactments, been
accepted by the majority of men, during, at any rate, most of recorded
history ... we cannot conceive of getting these universal principles or rules
repealed or altered ... [because they are] presuppositions of being human at
all, of living in a common world with others, of recognising them, and being
ourselves recognised, as persons.75
This is what I will call the first part of the duality. If it sounds like a minimalist
natural law position, Berlin openly agrees. The main difference between his and
traditional and many modern natural law theorists is however that Berlin refuses to
treat such fundamental principles as he thinks do exist as having "theological or
metaphysical foundations."76 They find their origin instead in the empirical
observation of rules of behaviour, and their universality in their acceptance by a
majority of people over time. They constitute what I have called a consensual norm,
which, when rejected, disallows us from living in the common world of humanity.
The examples Berlin gives above of what constitutes this norm are, I imagine, quite
unproblematic, yet his expression finds him perhaps unguarded. For there is here a
curious mixture between the normative and the descriptive which he seems unwilling
to problematise. It is instructive that he should use a physical comparison in the
above extract to make his point. Thus he says that universality is a feature of




observation: just as we might say that most cows over time have tails and most
humans do not, an animal with a tail, while not necessarily a cow, is probably not
a human; they are barred from being called human because of the classification of
what a human is (an animal without a tail). Likewise, the argument runs, a person
who sees no problem in torturing innocent children is "inhuman", since one of the
requirements of being human is to treat torturing innocent children as wrong. Yet, we
do not have to stretch our minds too far to notice a difference between physical
classification and the normative power that attaches to moral principles. Moreover,
just what features count as so essential that to override them makes us inhuman,
would seem to be clearly a matter of degree, of political debate. Is work such a
feature; or play? In other words, though Berlin does not produce a list of what these
universal features are, once we imagine starting to go beyond the ones he does list,
we come up against clear definitional difficulties. Nevertheless it does seem that
Berlin believes some such features can be identified, and the reason he sees
identification in at least certain instances as unproblematic is that their identification
depends not upon a priori criteria, but upon observation over time.
There thus exists a second part to the duality and this is where contestation about
moral and political principles takes place in a far more conflictual manner. Here the
degree of universality is rightly seen as problematic and the force of principles
opened to debate. Here now we see a different approach to the nature of conflict. As
he writes:
When such canons seem less universal, less profound, less crucial, we call
them, in descending order of importance, customs, conventions, manners,
taste, etiquette, and concerning these we not only permit but actively expect
wide differences. Indeed we do not look upon variety as being itself
disruptive of our basic unity; it is uniformity that we consider to be the




Here we return to the familiar terrain of Berlin's dislike of uniformity. But what this
duality draws attention to is the minimal consensual level that such conflictual debate
requires in order to take place in the first place. This is not of course to suggest that
all would-be first principles are not themselves debatable; presumably Berlin would
think that they may well be, but, that there are at least some which no-one who called
themselves human would deny, and that this can be confirmed by observation. But
it is upon this minimalist edifice - which "constitutes our basic unity" - that all
further politics takes place. Anything beyond those most basic principles not only is,
but should be, opened to the broadest range of dissent: as he says, "we not only
permit but actively expect wide differences." Here then we find the equally ultimate
values, the incommensurably varied ends which different people pursue and which
the "all-embracing systems or solutions" would hamper. But these conflicts should
not be seen as "disruptive of our basic unity"; indeed, they are, in a final ambiguity,
required to combat the possibilities of extending that basic unity too far.
We thus end up with another tension in Berlin's work; a minimal requirement of
unity and an expression of fear that too much be done in the name of unity. But this
tension is again constitutive; "temperaments differ," he says at one point, "and too
much enthusiasm for common norms can lead to intolerance ,.."78 Hence the
vigilance he espouses to keep channels of conflict open, to sustain that discord that
does not disrupt the basic unity, to stem the curtailment of politics that would take
place in the name of those who know what the true self, or proletarian, or nationalist,
requires. And, finally, his belief that historically, attention to negative liberty has
been less destructive of this meaning of politics than that which has been carried out
in the name of positive liberty.
If this minimalist, empirically-grounded, natural law is like other forms of natural
law, it will exist even though it is not recognised in particular legal systems at
particular times. And indeed this is the case as far as Berlin is concerned; basic
"Introduction" to Four Essays, op.cit., p.lvii-lviii.
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principles have been, and no doubt continue to be, breached. But to the extent that
such principles are not given legal backing, there would be clearly a moral imperative
to try to institute them. But what of the "principles of dissent"? How should legal
institutions deal with that second aspect of the duality, that part where conflict does
and should take place? To answer this we need to extrapolate from Berlin's "radical
liberalism" and make the best of the small insights on law we get from his work.
(b)
John Gray has recently drawn attention to what he sees as the distinctive radicalism
of Berlin's "agonistic liberalism" as it compares with traditional and even most
modern liberal theories. Where these latter, he says, attempt to draw a distinction
between the right and the good they tend to see the institutionalisation of liberalism
as a way of setting in place a framework of rights within which the pursuit of
disparate goods can occur. In his words,
in this standard liberal view, principles of justice or liberty are not
substantive goods to be traded off against other goods, but regulative
principles, principles of right which set the terms on which competing goods
and conceptions of the good can be pursued. Liberal principles of justice and
liberty are deontic principles which specify constraints on the pursuit of
goods; they are in a different category from the goods themselves.79
What is intriguing about Berlin's thesis however, is that it refuses to accept this
distinction. While it does, as we have just seen, adopt a stance towards certain criteria
as being essential to human beings as such - at least as perceived as such by most
people over time - it rejects the possibility that when it comes to conflict it should
be possible to set in place neutral laws of right within which that conflict should
occur. The reason for this goes back to the incommensurability thesis discussed
earlier; and if it is correct, the consequences are indeed radical. Again in Gray's
79 John Gray, Isaiah Berlin, op.cit., pp. 146-47.
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words, "The central flaw in this common [standard liberal] reasoning is in the
assumption that principles of liberty or justice can be insulated from the force of
value-incommensurability. If Berlin is on the right track, this is an illusion, since
there are conflicting liberties, rival equalities, and incompatible demands of
justice."80 We will come shortly to look at how this compares with Maclntyre's
critique of liberalism, but first let us look a little further at the reasoning here.
We will remember from earlier Berlin's line that everything is as it is, that a clash
of values may not be a mistaken interpretation of one genuine or overarching value,
but instead be a real and incommensurable clash of values equally ultimate. The
value of justice might clash with value of liberty, and concepts of liberty may
themselves clash with other concepts of liberty. What Gray is getting at is that, given
this argument, it becomes unfeasible to suggest that there are existent principles of
justice or liberty on which we all agree, perhaps even minimally, which could either
direct the rational resolution of a genuine clash of values, or, for that matter, act as
a framework within which the pursuit of disparate goods could take place. In refusing
to draw the distinction between the right and the good, Berlin takes the notion of
value-incommensurability to the point where there are not, or at least, there should
not be, uncontested singular principles which, when applied, allow us to produce
criteria of right. As Gray pointed out, to do otherwise is to insulate any such
principles from the incommensurability thesis itself; that is, it is to fail to realise the
absolute conflicts amongst values themselves, and thus would put principles of right
beyond the pale of politics.
But why is it also the case that there "should not be" such principles? The answer can
be found in Raz's analysis of incommensurability: "incommensurability speaks not
of what does escape reason, but of what must elude it." That is, it means that reason,
as we saw earlier, should play a limited role in attempts at resolving clashes between
values. To insulate certain principles from contestation, in the form of instituting
ibid., p. 147.
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them as right say, may work to override and mask the genuine clash of values taking
place. Furthermore, and this again was the significant point we saw earlier, there are
good reasons why reason - or any putative overarching principle - should be limited
in this way: there are "social forms" (Raz) that would be in danger of disappearing
otherwise. This will be the case not just for the example of friendship we considered,
but by extension also for conflicting values "embedded in different cultural
traditions."81 As Gray notes,
The standard view that liberal principles are regulative principles which can
be insulated in their content and their application from deep conflicts of
values suppresses the fact that the liberties and equalities these principles
specify derive all their content and weight from their contribution to forms
and aspects of human flourishing which themselves generate such
conflicts.82
What I think Gray I suggesting here can be traced through aspects of Berlin's thesis
with which we are already familiar.
Primarily, it means that what I called earlier the reciprocal or constitutive relation
between values, commitment and identity, and the importance of conflict to that
relation, becomes integral itself to the critique of a rationalist liberalism that would
seek to set in place a theory of rights incontestible both at the level of content and
at the level of interpretation. That is, Berlin's thesis attacks the very core notion of
traditional liberalism that would see general regulatory principles being put in place
to allow for the flourishing of disparate views of the good. Moreover, it would deny
that such principles as were put in place were in fact neutral as to competing values
or views of the good. What Gray thus suggests merely confirms our earlier analysis




The inability rationally to resolve certain clashes of values lies in the very heart of
Berlin's thesis about both incommensurability and the limited role of reason as they
relate to the constitutive relations between values and identity. But if it is the case
that resolution of conflict cannot, and in certain instances - in those cases where we
have a clash of values equally ultimate - should not, be finally resolvable, then this
has clear implications for the meaning of such compromises that are reached. What
Berlin's argument brings out is that the reaching of compromises in cases of
incommensurable clashes always involves the potential for harming identities since
the genesis of the clash is rooted in the commitment to values that are themselves
integral in defining identities and the social forms and institutions which they exist
and make sense. Berlin refuses to acknowledge that a neutral framework can be set
up within which clashes can take place for precisely this reason. Thus the terms of
such frameworks as do exist are no less susceptible to claims of incommensurability
than the forms of good they are supposed to allow to flourish. Moreover, they no less
embody a claim to a view of the good than do the other goods they would seek to
adjudicate between. Berlin cannot therefore be committed to a proceduralist version
of liberalism since any procedures will themselves be, and indeed ought to be, just
as open to conflict as any other claims that are made, as they are just as supportive
of any particular values they embody.
In order to hold to this insight, it would seem necessary to set certain bounds on the
exercise of authority, a point I will return to later. As we have seen already, Berlin
is wary of the use of expertise because of the effects it may have on the way in
which conflict is channeled or diverted. Yet if this is true, then the authority of law
and the expertise of lawyers must similarly be questioned. As Berlin says, "We must
submit to authority not because it is infallible, but only for strictly and openly
utilitarian reasons, as a necessary expedient."83 While this is certainly in line with
Berlin's commitment to the value of negative liberty, the more interesting dimension
of this claim is just what it means when we consider how compromises are reached
83 "Political Ideas in the Twentieth Century," in Four Essays, op.cit., p.40.
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in those cases where we must "adjust the unadjustable." The problem Berlin
perceived with the use of expertise has been outlined already, and is worth repeating
here:
It consists [he says], not in developing the logical implications and
elucidating the meaning, the context, or the relevance and origin of a specific
problem - in seeing what it 'amounts to' - but in altering the outlook which
gave rise to it in the first place ... The worried questioner of political
institutions is thereby relieved of his burden and freed to pursue socially
useful tasks, unhampered by disturbing and distracting reflections which have
been eliminated by the eradication of their cause.84
In a later chapter I will develop more fully the argument about how contemporary
law and legal reasoning tends to "eradicate" the causes and original contexts of
"specific problems", but already within the confines of Berlin's theory we can see
how the reluctance to accept any overarching formula, some "single central
principle"83 to resolve political problems, must have consequences for the role of
law as an authoritative resolver of social problems. This is due not merely to the fact
that even liberal theories of law must fail to produce neutral standards of
adjudication, but because of the deeper claim that the exercise of legal authority is
itself susceptible to the very claims made against other disciplines of expertise. For
it too comes with the same tendencies and dangers to mask and distort conflict, and
hence to treat individuals or groups as in need of treatment, as does any other
exercise of expert authority. Berlin's argument must therefore acknowledge that, in
Foucault's terms, "law's power is also, and most importantly, disciplinary."86 If this
is so, then presumably law's exercise of authority, as well as its techniques for
resolving conflict must be opened to the same kind of political critique as other
expert disciplines.
84 ibid., p.23.
85 "Introduction" to Four Essays, p.lv.
Sheila Duncan, "Law's Sexual Discipline: Visibility, Violence, and Consent,"
22(3) 1995 Journal of Law and Society 326-352 at 327.
133
(c)
I want to suggest both that this follows from Berlin's work, and, that it constitutes
in its radicalism a departure from other liberal legal theories. However, there is an
instructive objection that can be brought in at this point, and it is one suggested by
Perry Anderson. While Anderson also draws attention to Berlin's lack of treatment
of law in his theory of liberalism, he nevertheless reads Berlin's version of value-
pluralism as one that ultimately suffers a failure of nerve, a failure to live up to its
potentially radical premises. He suggests that "beneath the surface radicalism of
Berlin's assertion of irreducibly discrepant norms lies a tacit ecumenicism willing to
compound them."87 One reason why he sees this is because he takes the "minimalist
natural law" position which I identified earlier in Berlin's work as such a pervasive
and significant bedrock for his theory that it actually shifts the balance away from
radicalism and towards a universalist moral position. But more than this, it also shifts
the focus, he argues, away from conflict over values to one that rests on a theory of
choice. As he says, "Although [Berlin's philosophy] appeals to our intuitive sense of
the rewards of human difference for much of its persuasive force, it is actually not
a theory of individual identity at all, but of social choice."88 In other words,
Anderson takes the connection between values, incommensurability, and identity that
I have discussed as one that becomes undone when Berlin is prepared to hold out the
minimalist position of "what it means to be a human being at all" as a relatively fixed
point in human affairs and history. For Anderson, "even on the plane where value-
conflicts look most intractable, the doctrine seems on its inspection to lose its sting,
as the challenge of cultural diversity is neutralised by the insurance clauses of human
identity."89 In saying this Anderson concludes that conflicts over values do not come





down to serious questions about identity, but instead remain simply at the level of
choice between available options for people whose identities are largely the same.
This seems to me a point open to interpretation, and one that, in line with my earlier
examination, would not necessarily put a hole in Berlin's theory. There is, as I have
argued, a dualism evident in Berlin's work, and one that is productive of a constant
tension between those empirically observable norms of general concurrence, and
those norms that are always contestable as a function of their origin in social,
conflictual settings. That Berlin certainly does believe there are some features that are
constant as part of human being, does not necessarily deny that what these are, nor
their limits, are not themselves up for debate. It seems to me to some extent to be a
matter of degree, and the limited argument Berlin puts forward in terms of where to
draw lines, prohibits a conclusive interpretation. I believe, as I have tried to show,
that his work cannot rest simply on an "insurance clause" of human identity, given
his insistently strong reaction against those whose theories seek to put in place any
version of what the "true self" is or requires. It seems to me then that Berlin's
antipathy toward homegenisation does come down to an argument about the
contestability of identity. That said, Anderson has another reason to object here, and
it is in the current context, more pressing since it goes to the issues of procedures
with which we are presently concerned.
Anderson argues that when it comes to reaching decisions in cases where there
appears to be an incommensurable clash of values, the nature of such decisions as are
reached - that 'adjusting the unadjustable' - is one which further reduces the potential
radicalism of Berlin's ideas. Once again, he says, we see a failure of nerve on
Berlin's part. Anderson notes, quoting Berlin, that
he writes that 'claims can be balanced, compromises can be reached ...
priorities, never final and absolute, must be established' - 'we must engage
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in what are called trade-offs.' In other words, the major goods are
commensurable after all: how else can claims between them be weighed?90
Given this, Berlin's value-pluralism, according to Anderson, "is not ultimately
agonistic."91
I think there is a clearer case here to dispute Anderson's interpretation. As I have
tried to show using the examples taken from Raz, the fact that compromises can be
reached does not mean that we must therefore treat values as commensurable.
"Claims can be weighed" without invoking a ranking dependent upon the a priori
assumption of commensurability. The real issue instead, it seems to me, is just what
Berlin means by "trade-offs". And this leads us directly to a consideration of the
institutional settings and frameworks within which such trade-offs are reached. Now
it appears that on this point the general tenor of Berlin's argument is one that
endorses an openness to the occurrence of conflict within particular situations. We
saw earlier how great sensitivity was required in analysing just what was meant when
we talked about "trading off" friendship and monetary value, and such sensitivity
would have to be very carefully deployed when moving from analysis to
intitutionalising trade-offs in cases of similar conflicts. Thus Berlin's pluralism works
here, as ever, as a tension between strongly-held values and the need for
particularisation of conflict in any given context. Most of all the tension acts in such
a way as to forego any programmatic resolution of conflicts by requiring that
attention be paid to the causes of the conflict and the reasons for its emergence in the
first place.
"Trade-offs" may thus occur without a commitment to commensurability, but with
a commitment to an openness that demands that no necessary ranking between values
be given from the outset. What seems weak about this scenario is either the feeling
ibid., p.6, original emphasis,
ibid.
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that it masks some underlying values that determine outcomes to which value-
pluralists such as Berlin deny they are committed, or that there would be no reason
to be committed to any values whatsoever. Yet Berlin sees that commitment to
certain values on behalf of a group or individual is unproblematic; it is the assertion
that those values or any others ought to trump any or all others that is the problem.
The apparent weakness - a genuine openness to conflict - is in fact its greatest
strength, yet because of the position it adopts it cannot but seem to hold its fire in
the abstract, and it is this that may dismay those who do want to hold on to an a
priori commitment to commensurability and all that, for Berlin, comes with it.
The problem with trade-offs lies not in the theory, but in the institutional vesting
which they normally receive. This becomes extremely clear when Anderson takes his
final shot at Berlin's liberalism. For Anderson
the classical charge against pluralism as a theory of competing interests was
always that it was less plural than met the eye, since political power was
exercised within structural constraints set by one ultimate interest. However
unlike it in many ways, pluralism as a theory of values is open to a similar
kind of objection: in effect, that it is rather more discreetly monist than it
suggests.92
Anderson here has neatly drawn attention to the problem; that the issue of trade-offs
is dependent for its meaning in the "structural restraints" set by political and
institutional power. Where such power does act with a commitment to one "ultimate
interest" or ultimate value, then Anderson is correct in saying that it will treat trade¬
offs in a way that sees them as ultimately commensurable. Yet in the reading of
Berlin I have offered here, this position is as untenable and as dangerous for Berlin
as any other that treats values as ultimately commensurable. As a result, when it
comes to the matter and exercise of legal or institutional power or reasoning, to be
consistent with his overall approach, Berlin's liberalism must eschew any such
attempts that would reduce conflicts of value to a pregiven pattern within which they
ibid., p.7.
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could be ameliorated. If Berlin does seem to have an ultimate value to which he is
committed, it is one that seeks to allow the flourishing of identities and social forms
that do not admit of resolution according to values that supersede or override those
conflicts. His reluctance openly to endorse authority is thus premised on the fact that
Anderson is indeed correct in one respect, namely, that institutional power usually
will tend to assume a commensurability at odds with a radical pluralism. As Berlin
says,
The doctrine that accumulations of power can never be too great, provided
that they are rationally controlled and used, ignores the central reason for
pursuing liberty in the first place - that all paternalist governments, however
benevolent, cautious, disinterested, and rational, have tended, in the end, to
treat the majority of men as minors, or as being too often incurably foolish
or irresponsible ,..93
But this tends to confirm the radical reading of Berlin when it comes to the issue of
whether his theory is ultimately monist or not. It remains legitimate for Berlin to
argue for the value of liberty in its negative sense, say, while at the same time
realising (and in fact supporting) the fact that this clashes with other equally ultimate
values such as equality. And that Berlin, as we have seen, is so adamant that the
concrete circumstances of each occasion of a clash be given prominence further
argues against a hidden monism in operation. His point is neither to argue that
negative liberty should triumph in specific instances of a clash, nor to suggest that
liberty can thereby always be reduced to some other value such as equality. It is
instead to acknowledge that such clashes do occur and that to relocate them away
from their original contexts and treat them as an instance of an improperly grasped
application of some overarching principle is precisely to fail to acknowledge the
genuinness of the values and identities at stake. And the consequent tensions that this
leaves in place work to disavow the monist accusations that Anderson levels.
"Introduction" to Four Essays, op.cit., p.lxii.
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We took this detour through Anderson's criticisms as a way of beginning to address
Berlin's approach to liberalism as one that breaks down any attempt to institute a
distinction between the right and the good, any attempt, that is, to institute a neutral
procedural framework within which disparate views of the good can be pursued. In
outlining a response to Anderson's criticism, we can now see that in reading the
notion of trade-offs as highly dependent on the institutional setting in which they
occur, then Berlin's insights into the incommensurability of values can only be made
concrete and meaningful where that setting is itself attentive to the particular origins
of conflict, and tends to assume no a priori substantive or procedural values that are
not themselves seen as integrally bound up with the way in which a trade-off is
reached. Now this does seem to be a radical thesis since it opens up any norms of
decision-making to critique in a way that goes beyond the regulative "framework"
liberalism of norms within which goods can be pursued. It does so because of its
insistence that such norms themselves will be located in a particularity that ought not
to be masked as they themselves interact with the clash of values that they seek to
redress.
In this sense Berlin's is a radical liberalism more attuned to contemporary critiques
which seek from various perspectives - critical legal studies, feminist theory, for
example - to query the "way that is not a way"94 of liberal legal structures. Of
course often liberal theorists would not deny at least some of these charges. Indeed
they will defend the political values that these structures set in place.95 But I would
argue (and I will develop this point subsequently) that when it comes to the legal
realm of decision making, Berlin's thesis constitutes a greater challenge. For Berlin
is seriously questioning the terms on which authority (and thus legal authority) is
exercised, and, whether it ought to be exercised at all, rather than that when it is it
Ngaire Naffine, Law and the Sexes: Explorations in Feminist Jurisprudence,
Sydney, Allen and Unwin, 1990, p. 123.
See for example Neil MacCormick, "Reconstruction after Deconstruction: A
Response to CLS," Oxford Journal of Legal Studies (1990) Vol.10 no.4 539-558.
139
has to be done in a way that reflects as much as possible what, for example, Dworkin
calls the "best constructive interpretation of the political structure and the legal
doctrine of [the] community."96 Berlin is always going to ask of such a line, best
according to whom, or according to what? That there could be a single, "best"
interpretation is something Berlin is always going to be wary of when he glorifies,
the "very right to disregard the forces of order and convention, even the publicly
accepted 'optimum' goals of action"97, that such uniformity may impose.
(d)
As I have noted already, there is some similarity here between Berlin's thesis and
those who would seek to find new challenges to liberalism in the realm of
postmodern theory. One example will suffice to show both the similarity, and, how
at least one postmodern theory has painted in too broad strokes the notion that
liberalism can be condemned across the board when it comes to the relation between
law and conflict.
Thus in a critique of Dworkin's liberalism Anne Barron writes that
The living person becomes an abstract legal subject, characterised by an
autonomous responsible will, and as such becomes bound to obey rules of
which s/he is notionally both author and addressee. Liberal theory thus posits
freedom as a universal human essence, but only in order to legitimate the
imposition of limitations upon that freedom. Our sameness as human beings
is said to enable the expression of diversity, but also to require its
suppression', we are free to choose to be different, but 'choices' that conflict
with the law are proscribed.98
Ronald Dworkin, Law's Empire, London, Fontana Press, 1986, p.255.
"Political Ideas in the Twentieth Century," in Four Essays, op.cit., p.28.
Anne Barron, "Ronald Dworkin and the Challenge of Postmodernism," in Alan
Hunt ed., Reading Dworkin Critically, New York, Berg Publishers, 1992, pp. 154-55,
original emphasis.
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While this criticism may well be levelled at Dworkin it seems out of place when
directed at Berlin's theory. For one it would seem to be entirely in agreement with
Berlin's critique of Kant's rational legislator we saw in the section on expertise.
Moreover, as we have seen, Berlin's theory is insistent in its demand that law and the
exercise of authority not be put out of reach of the challenge of politics; that while
law will indeed put forward a version of what is to be suppressed this has no
precedence of allegiance just because it is the law. Indeed to the extent that law tends
to put in place freedom (or equality, or whatever) as a "universal human essence"
Berlin's liberalism would seek to question the uniformity that this would impose
where it neglects to take into account the "meaning, the context, or the relevance and
origin of a specific problem"(supra). Because Berlin refuses to endorse the notion that
there are principles which, in Gray's terms, can be insulated from the
incommensurability thesis itself, it does not fall prey to the notion that certain
principles of right or law remain above the fray of conflict. "Choices that conflict
with the law" are thus not proscribed in Berlin's theory for the very reason that the
values embodied in law spring from sources that make the notion of an "abstract
legal subject" meaningless; the subject is abstract only in the sense that it is
abstracted from a specific social form, but one that once instituted is always in
danger of supervening multiple identities and value-clashes in the particular contexts
which it, perhaps inevitably, fails to acknowledge.
To some extent Barron's criticism is the same as Anderson's, namely that liberalism
tends to assume a monism it claims to shun. But, again as I have shown, when we
read Berlin's argument as one that relates value incommensurability and identity, then
the diversity at issue is not just one that deals with "expression", but treats expression
as intimately bound up with identity itself. In fact when Barron outlines the
postmodern position as she takes it from Lyotard, both the language and ideas she
associates with postmodernism are stunningly similar to Berlin's (and, arguably,
Hume's):
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That which precedes and makes possible individual consciousness is itself a
fractured, highly differentiated and always unstable reality: it yields a
plurality of incommensurable identities, both within and between persons. In
opposing the Enlightenment vision of a society as an ordered totality, unified
by reference to an essential subjectivity, postmodernism insists upon the
irreducible heterogeneity and multiplicity of human experience ...
Postmodernity demands that 'dissensus' be given a voice where otherwise it
would be repressed in the production of coherence and truth."
Hear, hear, one might imagine Berlin saying. Still, he would insist that there remains
the consensual norm identified earlier, and I will return to this later when I look more
closely at postmodern theories to see to what extent they can escape or merely vary
such a norm. But it should be clear that Berlin's theory, while similar to such
postmodern thinking in relation to dissent and conflict, nevertheless as a theory of
liberalism still stands in opposition to the kind of non-radical liberalism Barron is
criticising. In its agonistic dimension it is prepared to put the issue of authority to
questions of politics in much the same way as all along it has demanded the openness
to conflict as a way of allowing the flourishing of social forms a space that is
constantly in danger of being closed off by a dominant narrative, whatever that might
be. And since it is the claim to totality and uniformity that it rejects, be that in the
form of reason or the nation or a class, then where law assumes the same form of
claim, it too is just as susceptible to its critique.
(e)
It remains then to draw attention to a curious conjunction in relation to law and
conflict that emerges from this analysis, which comes from a comparison of the
arguments of Maclntyre and those of Berlin. For where Maclntyre criticised the role
of law in liberal societies when it tried to apply something like "community
standards" his argument was that it could not do so because there were no such
standards available, it seems Berlin would agree. Now one reason for this agreement
ibid., p.155.
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could be that Maclntyre is entirely correct in diagnosing the state of contemporary
liberal theory as it relates to law, and that Berlin's simply falls foul of his criticism.
But this conclusion is too hasty. The reasons for Berlin adopting the position he does
are precisely because at some level there are shared values, identities and social
forms that in fact the kind of rationally resolvable theory Maclntyre is searching for
would threaten. I should say here that this still does not, for me at any rate,
differentiate Berlin's theory from the postmodernists; the "dissenting voices" Barron
talked about and which may exist as, in Foucault's terms, subjugated knowledges are,
even if fragmented, still voices that are saying something, something that cannot be
heard but which should be acknowledged presumably because they have some value
at least to those who are trying to get them heard. (Interestingly Martha Nussbaum
has recently suggested that feminists might also have been too hasty in rejecting
liberal theory out of hand; it could well be argued, she says, that the problem is not
with liberal theory itself, but that its premises have not been pushed far enough.100
I will return to these points later.) If values are reduced to interests then Maclntyre
would be justified in criticising Berlin's version of liberalism as a failure. But Berlin,
as we have seen, writes to support conflict and difference as an argument about
maintaining both identities and choices that have their location in groups, individuals,
and social forms which are themselves concerned with values. That is, for Berlin,
problems of conflict do not simply arise over conflicting interests, but arise over
conflicting interpretations of commitment to ideas and values that constitute a
meaningful life at all. To reduce such conflicts merely to conflicts over interests or
preferences fails to see the embedded nature of values in Berlin's theory. That there
are no mechanisms that would rationally resolve such conflicts is a precariously
balanced advantage, since if there were some such mechanisms the danger is always
that, in Raz's terms, "success would mean failure"; that such resolution might have
a high cost for that which has to be suppressed in order to achieve it.
Martha Nussbaum, op.cit.
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Here we come then to the curious conjunction I suggested exists between Maclntyre
and Berlin, and it lies not in their acknowledgment that liberalism provides no shared
standards of rationality by which its clashes can be resolved. As I have just noted,
this would be too superficial a treatment of Berlin's theory. It lies instead in what
both these theories have to say about the role of law in liberal societies. This will be
the subject of the next chapter. As such I want to make some concluding remarks on
Berlin's theory of liberalism.
Conclusion
There is inevitable oversimplification in attempting to summarise the complex ideas
that I have tried to draw out in interpreting Berlin's liberalism. All I will do, then,
is distil two aspects of the work that, while not focussing on the detail, exemplify the
tenor of his theory, but also hint at things beyond. The first is what I take to be the
spirit of the work, the second, its - related - outlook. Judith Shklar outlines what she
calls the "barebones liberalism" of her own approach and it seems to me to bear the
same spirit as Berlin's and is worth quoting in full:
It is, at its simplest, a defence of social diversity ... committed only to the
belief that tolerance is a primary virtue and that a diversity of opinions and
habits is not only to be endured but to be cherished and encouraged. The
assumption throughout is that social diversity is the prevailing condition of
modem nation-states and that it ought to be promoted. Pluralism is thus
treated as a social actuality that no contemporary political theory can ignore
without losing its relevance, and also as something that any liberal should
rejoice in and seek to promote, because it is in diversity alone that freedom
can be realized ... What is evident, however, is that diversity and the burden
of freedom must be endured and encouraged to avoid the kinds of misery
that organised repression now brings. This is a type of liberalism quite
common among members of permanent social minority groups, and it surely
reflects both the apprehensions and positive experiences which their situation
creates.101
101 Judith N. Shklar, Legalism: Law, Morals, and Political Trials, Cambridge
Mass., Harvard UP, 1986, pp.5-6.
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There is a lot still to be worked out within such a position and I hope to have drawn
attention to what some of these issues are and begun to delineate some the
assumptions they involve. Given this is the spirit of Berlin's liberalism, it will be
necessary subsequently to work through what I have called the radicalism of this
position.
The second aspect can be brought out by considering the outlook within which such
a spirit operates, and by observing some ideas of particular concern to it. In The
Broken Middle Gillian Rose uses the notion of diremption as a way of understanding
philosophical relations in the treatment of morality and law. Diremption for her can
be understood in the way that it differs from contradiction. So,
'Contradiction' implies 'resolution', whereas 'diremption' may only be
manifest as paradox ... 'diremption' ... implies 'torn halves of an integral
freedom to which, however, they do not add up' - it formally implies the
third, tertium quid, implicit in any opposition, qua sundered unity, without
positing any substantial pre-existent 'unity', original or final, neither finitely
past or future, nor absolutely or transcendent.102
While Rose considers relations that do not gain explicit treatment in Berlin's theory,
nor in my review of it, this is, nevertheless, a good way of understanding the kind
of approach that can be found in Berlin's version of liberalism. It is one way of
understanding the series of tensions one finds in his work concerning the relations
between values and identity and commitment and pluralism. It is indicative, when
thought of in the context of Berlin's theory, of the need constantly to be open to
conflict whilst simultaneously being aware that closure is always present whether in
the form of the 'hardening' of once liberatory ideas, or the contrary effects of
apparent progress; that sometimes success might mean failure and that though we
must live in a common world that world ought never to be too common. Finally it
points to notion that the very idea of 'resolution', that is, what resolution means or
102 Gillian Rose The Broken Middle: Out of our Ancient Society, Oxford,
Blackwell, 1992, p.236.
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signifies, is something to be contested and problematised when it seeks not to
reconcile or mend some greater unity or once complete whole, but instead to "adjust
the unadjustable" for a future as fractured as the past. As Berlin himself writes in a
passage that summarises his thesis,
The universe is not a jigsaw puzzle, of which we try to piece together the
fragments, in the knowledge that one pattern exists, and one alone, in which
they must all fit. We are faced with conflicting values; the dogma that they
must somehow be reconcilable is a mere pious hope; experience shows that
it is false.103
It is time now to see how ideas such as these work through in the context of law.




Law and Liberalism: Maclntyre and Berlin
The most prominent characteristic that Maclntyre's and Berlin's theories of liberalism
share, for they do share some, I take to be this: it matters just how disagreement is
constructed. One obvious manifestation of this is the disparaging treatment that
experts receive in both theories. For Maclntyre, as we have seen, in contemporary
liberal societies, "the range of possible alternatives is controlled by an elite, and how
they are presented is also controlled."(supra) In the way that Berlin sees the linkage
of expertise with authority, a liberal theory such as his likewise expresses disdain
where choice is narrowed so far as to make it meaningless. We have seen this several
times in Berlin's work: "paternalist governments ... have tended in the end to treat
the majority of men as minors", and again, "vast tracts of life [become] controlled by
persons who, whether consciously or not, act systematically to narrow the horizon of
human activity to manageable proportions."(supra). For Berlin however, it is a matter
of degree, of something that exists as a constant threat, and this assumes, differing
here from Maclntyre, that something can and perhaps should be done to check this
for it is not a definitional problem of liberal theory as such. Yet to the extent that
both theories see conflict and disagreement being channelled by the techniques they
identify, they equally see a loss occurring.
Berlin's expression of this was found in the way that conflict was always in danger
of being treated like a disease in need of a cure; Maclntyre's was both that radical
disagreement did occur because of the nature of contemporary morality being one of
"fragmented survivals" from disparate traditions, but that the resultant
inconclusiveness tended to be concealed within liberal debate because of the
rhetorical and institutional channelling which it received. Conflict for Maclntyre
could thus, as I said earlier, be made unreal, much in the same way the therapeutic
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discourses for Berlin tended to do the same thing; both drew attention to the power
and logic of institutions to restructure and ameliorate conflict. Of course where they
differ is that for Maclntyre this is the condition of liberal society as inheritor to the
failed Enlightnment project; for Berlin, it is the result of a prevalent illiberal
tendency.
Both then point to features of contemporary societies that show how conflict can be
masked. In particular Maclntyre pays attention to the positioning of law and legal
structures as pivotal in understanding how conflict is dealt with. It will be instructive
therefore to compare how Berlin's analysis responds to the four-level breakdown
Maclntyre offered, and to see where differences and similarities emerge. This again
involves some reconstructive work in relation to Berlin's thesis, but this can be done
by concentrating on the central values of his liberalism that emerged in the foregoing
analysis of his work.
The clearest difference between the two approaches can be witnessed at the first level
in Maclntyre's breakdown. Here for Maclntyre, it will be recalled, was the root
problem of liberalism. Debate at this level was interminable and this was due to the
way in which rival positions were expressed; that is, as "expressions of preference".
The "emotivist self", freed from rational argumentative contraints in the form of
teleological or universalist reasoning, could do no more than express "attitudes or
feelings" taking the form "I want it to be the case that such and such"(supra). Berlin's
analysis clearly takes issue, and does so, I suggest, on the following two grounds.
First, that the inconclusiveness of debate at this level is non-problematic. Indeed to
assume that a form of reasoning exists, grounded either in teleological terms
(construed most often by Berlin in the form of arguments for the destiny of a class
or a race) or universalist terms (which he associates most clearly with arguments
derived though skewed from Kant), which could finally resolve debates, was the
source of an intolerance to the empirically grounded claim that people just do
disagree about what the ultimate ends of life are. Rational argument at this level - as
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we saw through noticing the ambiguous sense in which he treated rationality - did not
fail by being inconclusive; indeed, as the argument from Raz showed, it may well be
that success in the power of reason would be detrimental to social forms that require
for their existence incommensurably varied commitments. The fact that debate was
interminable therefore was a beneficial feature of the limits of reason; but this did not
mean that, in Maclntyre's terms, "nonrational persuasion replaces rational
argument."104 Debate could still be rational without necessarily assuming that the
application of reason could answer any or all conflicts. Rational argument has not
then been "replaced"; it may be possible to reason out the limitations of reason
without resort to non-rational means of persuasion. Interminability may be a success.
Why this is so is explained by the second ground for disagreement.
Here Berlin's theory argues that Maclntyre is mistaken about the form which
conflicting positions take, even before they conflict. For Maclntyre that form is the
"preference", the attitude or feeling, which finds its expression as "I want it to be the
case that such and such." As I have interpreted it, Berlin's version of liberalism finds
such a description untenable. Values cannot be expressed merely as preferences since
values require a commitment and entail a reciprocity with identity that goes beyond
that which the form "I want it to be the case that such and such" would offer. It is
not in itself the necessary link Berlin makes with identity that suggests this. It might
be possible to have an, albeit emaciated, version of the self that was merely the
constituted repositary of preferences in this form. (Marx's critique of bourgeois man
may perhaps be one version of this.) Instead what Berlin's version counters with is
the argument that commitment to values cannot simply take this form and be validly
descriptive of individuals and groups and the social forms in which they engage and
which engage them. The clearest example we have of this was the one offered by
Raz.
Alasdair Maclntyre, Whose Justice? Which Rationality?, op.cit., p.343.
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To be engaged in the institution of friendship requires a commitment to a value
grounded in a social practice that is far more subtle and inescapably contextual than
could be captured in the expression of a preference. We might imagine a child (a
rather prosaic one, admittedly) saying, "I want it to be the case that I have a friend",
and being told, "That's not just something you can choose to have like a toy; you
have to be patient and giving to have a friend." What is valuable may well be
something that one could say one has a preference for. But that is different from
saying that how one achieves and lives in those practices that are valuable can be
gained through having a preference, a manifestation of will or desire, satisfied.
So when Maclntyre's analysis suggests, in this related sense, that moral deliberation
and "debate" merely takes the form of saying "I prefer" such and such, and that
simply expressing this provides a bedrock of justification, it too misses the mark. For
as we have seen, preferring one value to another may be the result of reasoned
interpretation of what a particular practice is and requires, and standards will exist
within that practice that cannot be shrugged off. I suggested when discussing
Maclntyre's conception of the emotivist self that there existed at the very least
linguistic constraints. Now we could add to this the dimension that social practices
require participation in and commitment to shared understandings that provide further
constraints, and that to live up to and engage in what these are, requires - even
(perhaps especially) when one seeks to disagree with the meaning of a particular
practice - a justification for which the form "I prefer" will be inadequate. Within any
particular practice the question "Why do you prefer such and such?" will not be
sufficiently answered by saying, "Because it is my preference." If there is a
preference at work here it is in the form of a commitment to a set of social forms
that are deemed worthwhile. It may not be possible in the end to produce rational
criteria for all those practices which one finds valuable. In the end the requirement
for justifications reaches a place where to ask for more and more reasons becomes
pointless.105
Cf. Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, op.cit., s.217.
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Of course Maclntyre never pushes so far; he merely asserts the stronger argument
that debate in liberal societies cannot produce even minimum criteria of justification
that go beyond the form of issuing preferences. But as we saw in the argument about
the incommensurability of money and friendship, there is a subtlety to reasoning and
even to understanding such debates that the notion of preference simply fails to grasp.
That reason is inconclusive in determining which values ought to be ranked higher
or lower than others, neither signifies the end of rational debate as such, nor forces
one to conclude that all the liberal, emotivist self can do is therefore express
preferences.
It would be naive of course to assume that ranking does not occur in forms that
resemble the issuing of preferences. "I prefer" is simply a matter of will; it can only
be satisfied, or it can be countered by another will. The prosaic child may have
someone to tell them to be patient in the matter of friendship, and that simply willing
it will not achieve it, but that does not mean that, for example, politicians in the
mould of Berlusconi do not believe that enough money will buy them political power
or ability, nor that there is someone to tell them that the values of politics might
require more than money can buy. Maclntyre is right to point out that it matters who
controls the settings in which debate occurs, and we will come to this in a moment.
But Berlin is equally wary that conflict be masked by turning it into something that
can produce a single standard across a range of activities, something that treating
conflict as preference-alignment might well engender. And the ultimate reason why
he is so wary is not, contra Maclntyre, because he sees the mere expression of
preferences as being something worth holding on to, but because the constitutive
commitment to values that make for a meaningful life in diverse practices and which
requires more than the expression of preferences as a will to be satisfied or not, holds
out the possibility that humans be treated as reasoning human beings and not simply
as automatons in a supreme system. And to seek to maintain this, for him, requires
argument and commitment, not the lack of it.
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Maclntyre's second level witnessed a failure to produce standards of justice because
there were no rational criteria available to judge the outcome of any such debate. In
this instance Berlin agrees that there are no such standards, beyond those minimally
observable features existent through time that allow human interaction to occur as
human interaction. But Maclntyre suggests further that such liberal debate that does
occur fails in its goal since that goal is to produce standards of justice that can be
agreed upon. Now the argument for the radicalism of Berlin's liberalism becomes
important here. While someone like Rorty suggests uncritically that the "institutions
of procedural justice" can be used to debate such issues, Berlin's position is different.
It would be foolish to suggest that Berlin is not interested in the existence of
standards of justice in liberal society. But the problem will always be the one
identified by Gray's reading of Berlin, namely, that the principles of right sought in
standard liberal theories (as he put it) cannot themselves be insulated from "deep
conflicts of value." Again, it could be argued in relation to this point that Maclntyre
simply provides a correct diagnosis of liberalism. But the point Berlin is making is
that where, for example, rationalist theories of liberalism have assumed that the
search for such principles may be productive of general programmatic solutions (and
in pointing out their failure to deliver Maclntyre would be correct), the radical liberal
position opens up principles of right to critique in the belief that the
incommensurability of values requires an openness to conflict at all times and places,
and that to produce rational agreement on uncontestable "framework" procedures
overlooks the fact that any such values, in Gray's terms, "derive all their content and
weight from their contribution to forms and aspects of human flourishing which
themselves generate such conflicts."(supra) The levels of debate model Maclntyre is
using allows us to see a symmetry in argument here between the two interpretations
that explains Berlin's point.
Where for Maclntyre the failure at level two was largely explainable by reference
back to the way in which debate at level one took place, we can read the radical
liberal response at level two as similarly dependent on the (different) view it took of
the meaning of conflict at level one. That is, the existence of social forms productive
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of and produced by incommensurably varied values at level one, works as an
argument to deny the feasibility of producing criteria of right that will be rationally
demonstrable for all people at level two. Once again the caveat for Berlin is that
there must exist some minimal standards, but these, he would argue, are not confined
to debates within liberal society but are observable features across time. Failure to
maintain such standards has clearly been as much evident in other societies as it has
potentially in liberal ones. To be blunt, this is not a failing attributable to liberalism.
This may be correct, nevertheless the tension, as I pointed out, exists in his liberal
theory both as to what these are and how far they extend. In the duality I drew
attention to in Berlin's work, this remains an open issue. But in one sense, as far as
Maclntyre's critique of liberalism goes, this does not matter since the two writers are,
in a significant issue at least, disagreeing about the same thing: Berlin champions
inconclusiveness, Maclntyre disdains it; they simply read the same thing
(inconclusiveness) differently. Maclntyre's reading suggests failure, Berlin's an
ultimately precarious success.
Now if Berlin is correct in arguing for incommensurability at level one then he would
seem to be, as Gray suggests, committed to incommensurability at level two. What
this means is that, at least for this theory of liberalism, inconclusiveness cannot be
measured as a failure since inconclusiveness is a condition of its success. As such
inconclusiveness or interminability at level two is justified, it is a principled response
to the existence of the conflicts and social forms at level one which demand an
openness to conflict that rational resolution, even in the form of settled principles of
right, would always be in danger of heading off. Consequently Berlin is committed
to a form of liberalism and will not endorse a return to the supposed benefits of
earlier forms of political theory and organisation which might be thought, by those
such as Maclntyre, to begin to provide ways of terminating debate. As he says, "It
is neither realistic nor morally conceivable that we should give up our social gains
and meditate for an instant the possibility of a return to ancient injustice and
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inequality and hopeless misery."106 Debate then is not, as Maclntyre suggests,
simply "continued for its own sake"107; it is continued, interminably, for good
reason.
This point is an important one and one that I will come back to in a later section. It
will be recalled however that Maclntyre rightly observes that interminability does not
preclude the existence of what he called "socially effective" principles that do operate
in liberal societies. Maclntyre's diagnosis of failure however seems to be matched by
a radical liberal theory that could offer up a principled response. Maclntyre rightly
demands a response from a liberal theory, and, I suggest, the one that is given forces
a radical approach to analysis of the role of law in liberal societies. To claim that at
level two "preferences are tallied and weighed" as Maclntyre does, would seem to
require the assumption either that values are reducible to preferences (which Berlin's
theory denies), or that some means exist whereby decisive answers are produced
which effectively reduce conflicts to a single scale for the purposes of ranking,
whether in the form of preferences or not being unimportant. It is this second
possibility that I want to explore.
(In order to develop this issue I should be clear that to call the radical liberal position
I identify with Berlin "Berlin's argument" when we look at the level four debate is
unacceptable. I have drawn on Berlin for what I take to be his radical liberal position
yet his limited discussions of law preclude me from putting any more words in his
mouth than bear reading in his texts. At the end of the last section I drew some
tentative conclusions about the relation to law of a theory such as Berlin's which I
believe are consistent with these texts. Now however I take the presuppositions of
Berlin's position regarding conflict as a radical theory of liberalism but no longer
claim that it is Berlin's liberalism, which clearly lacks a developed legal theory. I
106 Isaiah Berlin, "Political Ideas in the Twentieth Century," in Four Essays,
op.cit., p.39.
107 Alasdair Maclntyre, Whose Justice? Which Rationality?, op.cit., p.344.
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believe it to be consistent with his overall approach to political theory, and as such
productive of many valuable insights, yet from now on do not claim that he would
read the conclusions I draw from it in the same way.)
I will leave aside the third level in Maclntyre's analysis which dealt with the
"justification back the way" from principles to their particular application which,
though clearly important, replicates on both sides the structure of argument already
outlined. The issues of interest arise again at the interpretation of level four. This is
the level, says Maclntyre, "at which appeals to justice may be heard in a liberal
individualist order, that of the rules and procedures of the legal system."(supra) What
Maclntyre drew attention to was the question of how it was possible to produce
coherent principles to guide legal decisions when levels one to three had failed to
come up with any; but, I noted, what he problematised was not the techniques
whereby legal reasoning did produce such principles but instead the significance of
the law's, and specifically the courts', function and position within liberal societies
given this earlier failure. I brought out several features of this point, the most
important of which related firstly to the capitulation of rational philosophical enquiry
where the pressing requirement of the legal system became the production of verdicts,
and secondly, to the way in which conflict had therefore to be manipulated into a
form that would allow such verdicts to be given. How would a radical liberalism
respond to these issues?
First, I suggest, the extent to which law functioned to bring conflicts on to the same
plane (for the purpose of, in Berlin's terms, ranking, in Maclntyre's tallying and
weighing) would clearly be a concern to a theory that saw ultimate values as
incommensurable. Just how far could the legal system respond to Berlin's idea that,
in such cases where "trade-offs" had to occur, it was vital to examine the "meaning,
the context, or the relevance and origin of a specific problem"; or how far might it
instead replicate the techniques of expert discourses by "altering the outlooks that
gave rise to it in the first place" (supra) in order to bring the problem to the point
where a verdict could be given? How similar is a "verdict" to a "trade-off"? When
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I considered Anderson's criticism of Berlin that he (Berlin) did in the end make
values commensurable ("how else can claims between them be weighed?", asked
Anderson), I suggested that what was of paramount importance was that attention be
paid to the institutional setting within which these trade-offs occurred. Where there
was a commitment to commensurability assumed in the settling of a conflict, then I
argued that radical liberalism, to be true to its initial insights, must by extremely
wary if not reject outright such an approach. The reasons for this I discussed
previously, but they also coincide now with Maclntyre's analysis that in current
liberal institutional settings conflict is either made to be appear unreal and thus
commensurable, or it does not get picked up as a conflict at all. It will be recalled
that for Maclnytre the central institutional means of effecting these techniques was
the legal system: as he said, "The nature of any society is not to be deciphered from
its laws alone, but from those understood as an index of its conflicts. What our laws
show is the degree to which conflict has to be suppressed."(supra) If this is indeed
the case then the radical liberal theory would be forced to enquire into the terms on
which conflict was suppressed; it would be forced, in other words, to question the
extent to which the legal system tended to become another instance of a "single,
overarching principle" whose logic was to impose unity to the detriment of
difference.
May it be then that although the radical liberal position clearly disagrees with the
level-one analysis of Maclntyre, it nevertheless comes to share the suspicions offered
by Maclntyre at level four? I suggest that it does and most of what follows in the
thesis is directed to providing an argument why. But still within Maclntyre's
framework further questions can be raised. So, the second issue Maclntyre drew
attention to concerned the implications of the positioning of the legal system in
relation to the debates at the previous three levels. Maclntyre's point, as I interpreted
it, was not simply that law's role was to decide between competing claims and thus
inevitably reject some (the "jurispathic function" of the courts in Cover's terms), but
that given the failure of moral debate to produce rational agreement at the other three
levels, the result was the collapse of the distinction between power and authority as
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an instance of what he called the broader collapse of the contrast between
"manipulative and non-manipulative social relations." This I took to be an open
challenge to the legitimacy of the liberal legal system. Let me explain further why,
since it demands a response from the radical liberal theory.
The problem is this: how can liberal legal reasoning invoke shared community
standards when there is none? Any responses to this by liberal legal theorists might
be seen to be caught in a double bind. Either they could accept that there were no
such standards, in which case decisions were a matter solely of power since they
could not be grounded in consensus; or, they could accept that some such standards
could indeed be found in legal reasoning, in which case law potentially fails to live
up to its liberal premise that it allowed dissent and conflict to flourish. (This
ostensible difference between theories within liberal legal reasoning I will come back
to in more detail in the next chapter.) What Maclntyre's analysis brings out is that
in either case, the legal system must be opened to the question of legitimacy. And
this too, I suggest, would seem to follow for the radical liberal theory. Where the first
position becomes open about the use of power, that power must be questioned from
a point external to itself; that is, legal reasoning cannot answer the question of its
own legitimacy since it has given up the possibility that such reasoning can be
grounded in appeals to shared standards. To suggest this would be radical indeed, for
it would require the conclusion that courts' decisions were not prima facie
authoritative. Here imagined reponses might invoke a separation of powers
argument.108 But this would be unpersuasive. It could be argued either that courts
are already open to democratic review in that Parliament can indeed reverse even the
final court's judgments, or that all the powers courts have are delegated from another
source that is itself legitimate. But such reasoning of the former type would not work
in those cases of countries (such as the United States and Australia) where Parliament
is not supreme and a constitutional court sits. Alternatively, where Parliament was
108 Cf. Hugh Collins, "Democracy and Adjudication," in Neil MacCormick and
Peter Birks eds., The Legal Mind: Essays for Tony Honore, Oxford, Clarendon Press,
1986.
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supreme (and this was Hobbes' argument109), justification would depend on the
derivative authority of courts from the sovereign. But this would assume (as Hobbes
did) the now rather dated view that courts do not make law but only interpret it, and
thus overlook the fact that serious political matters were decided by the courts. And
in those cases where there was a constitution say, what legitimacy would
interpretations of a constitution have that were barred from making appeals to shared
standards since it was agreed they did not exist? The distinction between power and
authority clearly then would become problematic since legitimacy would seem to
depend not on any substantive grounds but be a matter of efficiency in imposing
decisions. If this were the case then, as Niklas Luhmann has put it, "What counts is
not a principle, nor a logical deduction, nor the elegant conceptual construction, but
the difference a decision effectuates either in social reality or in the legal system
itself ... Logically then, the validity of a programme depends on its own
execution."110
The second justification - that shared standards can indeed be found - would have to
be questioned by the radical liberal approach for the very reasons that it has
questioned such assumptions to shared standards all along. We do not need to repeat
these here, except to point out that where such justifications are put forward they
most often take the form of a grounding in rights, which as we have seen is no less
problematic when the incommensurability thesis is taken seriously. Here again,
though the starting points of Maclntyre and a theory such as Berlin's differ at level
one, their attitude to legal structures for dispute resolution seem to come together.
Two final points should be raised from Maclntyre's analysis, and they bring us back
to the opening of this section. It matters how disagreement is constructed, and the
role of experts was seen to be an important feature in both theories. As I suggested
109 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, op.cit., Ch.XXVI.
110 Niklas Luhmann, "The Third Question: The Creative Use of Paradoxes in Law
and Legal History," 15 (2) Journal of Law and Society (1988) 153-166 at 160.
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in the analysis of Berlin on expertise and authority, a radical liberal theory must be
attentive to the role experts play in being able to channel conflict. The suspicion here
is always directed to the possibility that conflict be treated as in need of a cure for
which only experts have the diagnosis. Maclntyre expressed disdain at the rhetorical
powers of the "cosmetic arts" of liberal spin-doctors to distort conflict, and, albeit
from different premises at level one, this suspicion is replicated in the radical liberal
theory. The terms on which disagreement takes place, the nature of the "trade-off"
processes, clearly require a sensitivity to the institutional settings in which these
occur, and to the role of those who run such institutions. And this leads the second
point that Maclntyre drew our attention to. Namely, that for both him and -1 would
now add, despite clear differences at level one - for the radical liberal theory, concern
must be focussed on the role and position of law, and specifically the decision¬
making of the courts, because of the reciprocal, constitutive, and dependent relations
that law will have with the broader social realm. In the sense that the legal has
effects back on social practices such as morality (it produces terms of debate,
constructs expectations etc.), a radical liberal position concerned with a genuine
commitment to values and conflict in moral and political matters, and to the contexts
of these conflicts, must be attentive to precisely what impact law has on these. It is
not just an issue of how liberal legal reasoning justifies its decisions, though this is
important, but of the consequences of the current positioning of law and the courts
within liberal societies, the point Maclntyre has raised so effectively. Thus it is to




Legalism can be defined in a variety of ways. It can be construed more or less
narrowly, in either its outlook or in its applications. Judith Shklar set the terms of her
definition broadly as "the ethical attitude that holds moral conduct to be a matter of
rule following, and moral relationships to consist of duties and rights determined by
rules."1 An ethical attitude then, but also a "political ideology" when it came to that
subset of legalism endorsed by "those who cherish those [great] systems of law" of
the "European world."2 "Legal" legalism, so to speak, was an attitude more precisely
located, the ethical perspective focussed down to the institutional setting of the formal
legal system and upheld by the legal attitudes of its major proponents: "the legal
profession, both bench and bar", as well as, we might add, much of the traditional
legal academy. In this legal setting, "the court of law and the trial according to law
are the social paradigms, the perfection, the very epitome, of legalistic morality."3
This definition of Shklar's, with the caveat that follows in the next paragraph, is the
idea of legalism I want to explore in this chapter.
The caveat is brief and need not detain us. H.L.A.Hart described law as "the union
of primary and secondary rules"4, and on the face of it seems compatible with
Shklar's definition. Yet since Hart wrote this, the idea of law as rules has in Anglo-
American jurisprudence been refined to include more carefully the sets of principles
within which these rules operate, are interpreted, and make sense. Most prominently
Judith N. Shklar, Legalism, op.cit., p.l.
ibid., pp. 1-2.
ibid., p.2.
H.L.A.Hart, The Concept of Law, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1961.
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publicised by Ronald Dworkin, the working of principles in law is now less
contentious than it may have been thirty years ago, though what these principles are
and exactly what role they play is still debated.5 My caveat is though, that such
principles should also be thought to be included within the definition of legalism I
have settled on from Shklar. For as Hunt, for example, points out, "Even though
Dworkin insists that his move is characterised by a displacement of rules to a new
focus on law as interpretation, it is apparent that this does not displace "the model
of rules," but rather that rules remain the presupposition because it is, of course, rules
that are the object of interpretive activity."6 For my purposes then "legal" legalism
includes both rules and legal principles.
Let there be no doubt that this "legal" legalism is also an ethical or political attitude.
Even the most narrow, conservative, and, some might think, misguidedly rigid, of
judicial approaches to interpretation see their approach as ethically or politically
inspired. As a judge in Australia has noted7, even though the judiciary should,
according to him, "[insist] on the strict construction of all laws," the justification for
this is expressly political: "Liberty is founded on black letter law", no less. In far
more refined terms, "legal" legalism has been defined by Neil MacCormick as
the stance in legal politics according to which matters of legal regulation and
controversy ought so far as possible to be conducted in accordance with
predetermined rules of considerable generality and clarity, in which legal
relations comprise primarily rights, duties, powers and immunities reasonably
clearly defined by reference to such rules, and in which acts of government
Though in opposition to, for example, Dworkin, Critical Legal Studies has
also concerned itself with the working of principles and counter-principles in law. See
generally, Roberto Unger, "The Critical Legal Studies Movement," (1983) 96
Harvard Law Review 563-675; and for a particular application, Hugh Collins, The
Law of Contract, London, Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1986.
! Alan Hunt, Explorations in Law and Society, op.cit., p.302.
Mr. Justice F.C. Hutley, "The Legal Tradition of Australia as Contrasts with
Those of the United States", (1981) 55 Australian Law Journal 63-70 at 66.
161
however desirable teleologically must be subordinated to respect for rules
and rights.8
This last phrase hints at what exactly the kind of ethical stance the legalism identified
here is. It is, as I will call it, "liberal legalism".
Again MacCormick's theory helpfully explains:
The moral value at issue most deeply is that of independence, or, rather,
independence in interdependence, independence in community ... Laws which
themselves stifle autonomy, or warp the community to create forms of
interdependence inimical to independence, attack the very values legalism
prima facie sustains.9
I should say that the "liberalism" in this version of "liberal legalism" is, in one sense,
not at all far removed from that I have ascribed to Berlin: the value of autonomy in
community was recognised in Berlin's theory, albeit as one element in a complex
theory I drew out in the previous two chapters.10 Autonomy, or independence within
interdependence, is one of the key credos, if not the, key credo of liberal thought, and
usually is of the kind Berlin mentioned when discussing its roots in Kant.
The idea of autonomy has been treated in different ways by liberal theorists.
Sometimes its value is aligned more with the notion of equality, that all ought to be
treated equally under law. So, for example, the "constitutive morality" of Dworkin's
liberalism stresses that, "human beings must be treated as equals by their government,
not because there is no right and wrong in political morality, but because that is what
s Neil MacCormick, "The Ethics of Legalism", Ratio Juris Vol.2 no.2, 1989,
p. 184.
9 ibid., pp.188, 192.
10 MacCormick, at least when it comes to the concept of liberty, acknowledges
Berlin's version of negative liberty as the one he prefers. See Neil MacCormick,
Legal Right and Social Democracy: Essays in Legal and Political Philosophy,
Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1982, p. 147.
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is right."11 In a more developed, and thus contentious sense, it is similarly, the key
focus of John Rawls's liberalism, which draws on both autonomy in terms of liberty,
and equality. For him the "liberal principle of legitimacy" is that "our exercise of
political power is fully proper only when it is exercised in accordance with a
constitution the essentials of which all citizens as free and equal may reasonably be
expected to endorse in light of their common human reason."12 If we see a subtle
shift in this description (in a manner that will be drawn out shortly), the value of
autonomy in relation to law is still clearly in evidence.
Liberal legalism then is an ethical attitude as to how humans do or ought to relate to
each other when it comes to their legal relations in community. Such relations will
include both citizen-citizen relations and citizen-state relations, both sets of which
should be treated in the same spirit when it comes to the values of the approach to
law. Commonly this form of legal organisation has been given the title "Rule of
Law", though as MacCormick has suggested, "'legalism' is not the 'Rule of Law'
itself, but an attitude of commitment thereto."13 But the fact that "legal legalism"
(which I will subsequently refer to as "legalism" simpliciter) has an ethical
justification, does not necessarily suggest that the content of laws themselves must
have an ethical basis. The attitude to the doctrine of the Rule of Law deals with
values which may be thought of as meta-values. As Roberto Unger has put it,
In the broadest sense, the rule of law is defined by the interrelated notions
of neutrality, uniformity, and predictability. Governmental power must be
exercised within the constraints of rules that apply to ample categories of
persons and acts, and these rules, whatever they may be, must be uniformly
11 Ronald Dworkin, "Liberalism", in Stuart Hampshire ed., Public and Private
Morality, Cambridge, CUP, 1978, p. 142.
12 John Rawls, Political Liberalism, New York, Columbia UP, 1993, p. 137.
13 Neil MacCormick, "Reconstruction after Deconstruction: A Response to CLS",
op.cit., at 541.
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applied. Thus understood, the rule of law has nothing to do with the content
of norms.14
Now it may be that such values as uniformity and predicability (and others, suggested
by amongst others Lon Fuller15) do put some outside limits on the content of
possible legal norms, but the general proposition remains that such meta-values will
not supply in detail solutions to ethical problems any particular legal system will face
on any particular issue. It would be quite possible for one legal system to outlaw
marijuana use and another to decriminalise it and in both cases to do so on ethical
grounds, yet for both systems to conform to the values of the rule of law.16
A caveat exists here with liberal legalism however in that, as was noted above, there
is a commitment to autonomy under law which may potentially act as a more
prescriptive value than would, for example, the value of predictability under the Rule
of Law. According to principles of liberal legalism then, either the outlawing or
decriminalising of marijuana use may be justified on ethical grounds, but only so
long as individuals, most commonly through their representatives, have some say in
the way the decision is reached. Only in this way could we say the legal system, in
Nussbaum's terms, "[respected] the equal worth of persons as choosers."17 If the
decision was taken by one person alone, without consultation, reviewability or in
accordance with established procedure, or, by some one or group outside the
established political system, then it would fail to match up to the aspirations of liberal
legalism. Liberal legalism therefore in some sense narrows further those "outside
1! Roberto Mangabeira Unger, Law in Modern Society: Toward a Criticism of
Social Theory, New York, Free Press, 1976, pp.176-177.
15 See his, The Morality of Law, Newhaven Conn., Yale UP, revised ed. 1969,
ch.2.
16 This is indeed the case among the different states in Australia.
17 See Introduction.
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limits" within which law is expected to operate in liberal societies and does so on the
grounds that autonomy of persons is something to be respected.
Broadly then, liberal legalism is an attitude towards how, at least in the legal realm,
persons should relate to each other and to government. And it is, moreover, an
attitude as to how decisions should be made when conflicts appear before the courts.
To quote the definition again from Shklar, "the court of law and the trial according
to law are the social paradigms, the perfection, the very epitome, of legalistic
morality."
At this stage, let me repeat my opening hypothesis: that liberalism, in the sense I
have taken from Berlin's work, and liberal legalism, are incompatible. Specifically
now I want to test this in the setting of courts' decisions. I have suggested that
attention to the construction of moral disagreement provides the key to my
hypothesis. In the work of Maclntyre and Berlin I have focussed on that issue and
suggested that a radical liberal theory may draw on the critique of law in liberal
societies offered by Maclntyre. To begin to explore more fully why such a theory
may be incompatible with liberal legalism we need now to turn to aspects of judicial
decision making in more detail. As a prelude to this I will firstly outline two views
of law taken from the work of Roger Cotterrell, and draw out the assumptions and
consequences they exhibit. Though I have said previously that the main concern of
my argument is with the institutional setting and dynamic of courts in liberal society,
and the meaning of their position and function rather than with justificatory
arguments internal to their practice, I have also said that it is still necessary to look
at that practice. Using the two models Cotterrell employs is, I suggest, a helpful way
of doing so.
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"Law's Images of Society"
According to Cotterrell
Images of law's social environment in Anglo-American legal philosophy fall
into two distinct types: on the one hand, the image of a morally cohesive
association of politically autonomous people (community) and, on the other,
the image of individual subjects of a superior political authority
(imperium).Xi
These are, he says, "... merely images. They do not represent the complexity of actual
social systems or arrangments." For example, in reality, "any actual social
arrangments for community will also involve elements of imperium."(p.325, original
emphasis) Nevertheless, as images of society, they are different and can be
considered separately. But as different images, they have in common the fact that
both are, Cotterrell says, ideological, in the sense that they present "certain partial
aspects of social and political life ... as totalities."(ibid.) Neither image is, he admits,
new, but has extensive historical antecedents. As such neither presupposes a liberal
democratic theory of society or government, though it is as they play out in
contemporary liberal societies that I will consider them. Let us turn in more detail
to what they are.
(i) Community
Interestingly, Cotterrell suggests that law's image of society as community is shared
by the rhetoric of the classical common lawyers of the seventeenth century and by
contemporary American jurisprudence, though not by contemporary English lawyers.
18 Roger Cotterrell, Law's Community: Legal Theory in Sociological Perspective,
Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1995, pp.222-223 (original emphasis). Note: page references
in the text of this section are to this book; this section's title is taken from Cotterrell.
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If we consider briefly some influential American rhetoric we see his point regarding
how the American courts do or ought to view their role. So for example, John Rawls
writes that
The justices [of the Supreme Court] ... must appeal to the political values
they think belong to the most reasonable understanding of the public
conception and its political values of justice and public reason. These are
values that they believe in good faith, as the duty of civility requires, that all
citizens as reasonable and rational might reasonably be expected to
endorse.19
While Rawls does not use the term community in this passage, his notion of how law
views community is nevertheless at one with Cotterrell's idea of law's image of
community as, "a morally cohesive collectivity linked by its members' agreement on
or acquiescence in values that bind them."(p.320)
In a similar fashion Dworkin, whose insights Rawls acknowledges, writes that,
"Judges who accept the interpretive ideal of integrity decide hard cases by trying to
find, in some coherent set of principles about people's rights and duties, the best
constructive interpretation of the political structure and legal doctrine of their
community."20 Dworkin's "community" here is not a "bare" or "rule-book"
community, but a "genuine political community," a "community of principle" whose
members "accept that they are governed by common principles, not just rules
hammered out in political compromise."21
Rawls, op.cit., p.236. It should be noted that "public reason" means something
quite specific for Rawls: it is, he says, "characteristic of a democratic people: it is the
reason of its citizens, of those sharing the status of equal citizenship. The subject of
their reason is the good of the public: what the political conception of justice requires
of society's basic structure of institutions, and of the purposes and ends they are to
serve." (p.213)
20 Ronald Dworkin, Law's Empire, op.cit, p.255.
ibid., p.211.
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What makes Cotterrell suggest there is a coincidence between this rhetoric and that
of the classical common lawyers such as Coke is, as he says, that the latter similarly
[invoked] communitarian images with their reference to the ancient wisdom
of law, greater than any individual, and a form of reason distilled from the
entire history or ancient origins of the community the judges are considered
to represent and speak for.(p.224)
Although for those such as Coke, Rawls's notion that all reasonable citizens ought
to be able to agree to the values the court expresses would not be articulated so
emphatically, the appeal to community is nonetheless paramount for both.
Community, in the eyes of law, is constructable through critical insight into its
present values perceived in their historical and institutional setting. The law speaks
for and to that community and its decisions are legitimised only insofar as it does so.
In this sense another similarity between contemporary American and classical
common law rhetoric appears. The law cannot speak with a forked tongue. It must
be possible to realise in the courts' practice therefore a singular meaning both for law
and for the community. So for Dworkin, for example, even when tests of, in his
words, fit and substance, are passed, it may be that in particularly difficult cases two
reasonable but conflicting interpretations of the law are still viable. Where this is so,
he says, the judge must, "choose between eligible interpretations by asking which
shows the community's structure of institutions and decisions - its public standards
as a whole - in a better light from the standpoint of political morality."22 The
similarity Cotterrell rightly perceives here with the classical common law rhetoric
relates to who exactly is best placed to work out what this community morality is.
For Dworkin, there is no doubt: "The courts are the capitals of law's empire, and the




and experience, their interpretative and reasoning skills, are those not only best placed
but indeed expected to work out what the community, in its best light, requires.
And, that best light is, and must ultimately be, a singular light. In Dworkin's words
We accept integrity as a distinct political ideal, and we accept the
adjudicative principle of integrity as sovereign over law, because we want to
treat ourselves as an association of principle, as a community governed by
a single and coherent vision of justice and fairness and procedural due
process in the right relation.24
Now as Cotterrell explains, it is difficult not to see in this "a new version of Coke's
famous dichotomy: while the common law is the embodiment of the community's
reason and ancient wisdom, it is an 'artificial' reason which only the highly trained
can master."(p.228) The community may be the inspiration for and the justification
behind law's decisions, but it is for the judges, law's princes, to work out what in the
end the community's values are and how they ought to be applied.
We return here to the notion of legalism introduced above. The distinctive position
of the courts and their judges in the community image is one exemplification of the
line I have taken from Shklar above; namely that, "the court of law and the trial
according to law are the social paradigms, the perfection, the very epitome, of
legalistic morality." This line is also particularly clear in Rawls's approach. As he
says, "in a constitutional regime with judicial review, public reason is the reason of
the supreme court"; "the court's special role makes it the exemplar of public
reason."25 Any fears about the elitism of law's princes is allayed by their insistent
justification by reference to the community. And the values of community gain
specific expression, as Cotterrell puts it, through the form of law's ratio. This
ibid., p.404.
Rawls, op.cit., pp.231, 216.
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provides, he says, a belief that "law requires not just consistency and predictability,
but also that doctrine be intelligible in terms of generalisable values."(p.289)
Now while such an idea can also be present in the imperial image (and Cotterrell
wisely does not push the difference on this matter), it is perhaps more prominent in
that of community. The singularity of reason is ultimately more pressing for the
community image than the imperium. For Cotterrell
If ratio is the element of unifying moral authority in law it implies social
arrangments in which principles of justice are derived by elaborating a
substantive rationality justified as grounded in shared moral experience. The
idea of law's ratio suggests the image of a regulated population united by a
shared rationality which makes agreement on principles of justice
feasible.(pp.320-321)
I will return shortly to some initial criticisms of this image, but before doing so will
outline the other image Cotterrell identifies, that which he associates more clearly
with the contemporary English approach.
(ii) Imperium
The image of law as imperium has its roots in an ancient lineage, but finds its more
recent and direct ancestry in the influence of positivist legal theory. Though the
community model without doubt employs imperium-type force, it differs in terms of
its justificatory practices. For Cotterrell, "the typical imperium image of the regulated
population in modern legal philosophy from the end of the eighteenth century onward
is that of a mass of separate individuals (not a group), benefitting individually from
their subjection to a rationally directed superior political authority."(p.225) Here law
does not depend so much on direct community input, as on a diverse populace seen
as being at one remove from the main source of legal meaning, namely, that which
is systemically valid. As Cotterrell suggests, even when the overly-simplistic
Austinian model of "law as the command of the sovereign" is rejected, the more
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refined positivist theories that replace it still do not turn to the community as the
"author of law". Instead, he says,
Law itself is treated as ruling. Legal theory - as in Hart's concept of law -
asserts that there is no need to seek legal authority outside law itself ... Law
governs society. The image is not that of society (in the form of a morally
cohesive community) controlling and determining law.(pp.226-227, original
emphasis)
So in contradistinction to the community model, as Cotterrell sees it, "law's image
of imperium implies political centralisation but neither moral cohesion nor moral
diversity."(p.322) Now this may seem counter-intuitive: surely the converse of a
moral unity is moral diversity. In a sense this is true, and - certainly in contemporary
positivist theory - moral diversity under the rule of law is indeed used as an
aspirational justification for this model. But strictly speaking it is not the moral
dimension that is at issue. That dimension is again at one remove from the core
concern of the imperium model. Instead the key issue is not that individuals are
morally "united or divided"; it is that, "the political ties that link each of them to a
central authority are fundamental."(p.323, original emphasis) So when Cotterrell
suggests (above) that the existence of a group is not a postulate of this image, this
is only true in a moral sense. An organic moral community is not required, but a
group nonetheless exists though it takes the more precise jurisdictional sense of legal
subjects of the realm.
We see a clear difference here with the first model in at least two senses. First, the
imperium model need not articulate that strong sense of community on which the first
model was so reliant. It relies instead on some model of (usually) hierarchically
constituted and recognised validity. The sources of law are defined as internal to the
system, not dependent for their validity on their direct link to, in Dworkin's terms,
the community's constitutive morality. To repeat however, this is not to deny that
there may be moral reasons underpinning an imperium model (though it does not
necessarily confirm it either); certainly in the contemporary positivist strain liberal-
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democratic arguments are offered as support. But the justificatory rhetoric is quite
different; the way in which arguments about a community's moral values appear in
jurisprudential debate are not the same, and they do not operate in the same manner.
We can see this if we turn to a second difference, namely how the courts approach
questions of legal interpretation.
After a review of a series of English cases, Cotterrell concludes that the "idea of
judges as custodians of popular morality in various forms is sufficiently controversial
to make its explicit adoption generally counterproductive ... No accepted imagery of
community is now available to be linked to English law. Public values are invoked
but they are what political institutions declare them to be."(p.240) Now we will come
to query how this might also be true of the American style in a moment, but if we
turn to a recent theoretical formulation from Britain, we see the difference Cotterrell
is drawing attention to. Again I will use an article by Neil MacCormick as a
particularly lucid example.
Although MacCormick strenuously denies the autonomy of law in any pure sense (as
for example taken from a systems-theoretical approach), the approach to legal
interpretation he offers nevertheless relies on special types of legal argumentation
which do not make (contra Dworkin) direct appeal to the community's political
morality as a technique of justification. Part of the reason for this was brought out
earlier and concerned the controversial nature of a community's moral values and the
consequent need for (and ability of) law to produce some "relatively determinate
common norms of public action." In order for law to carry this out it relies on what
Robert Summers termed "authority reasons"; that is, a reason "which is supposed to
hold good as a reason by virtue of the authority of its source."26 In legal
argumentation then, the judge will focus, though not always exclusively, on providing
just such reasons. As MacCormick notes, "the law is a forum of institutional
26 Neil MacCormick, "Argumentation and Interpretation in Law", Ratio Juris
Vol.6 no.l, 1993, p. 18. Cf. Joseph Raz on "exclusionary reasons" in his The Authority
of Law, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1979.
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argumentation to the extent that it gives, and necessarily gives, a central place to
"authority reasons" in the form of statutes, precedents, doctrinal materials, and the
like."27 Here we see quite clearly the rhetoric of authority, of a primary reliance on
the valid sources of law. Of course, it is highly unlikely that those such as Dworkin
who were associated with the community image would deny that these sources matter
to the judge. Yet the emphasis is different, and this is especially clear when the
reading of these sources themselves do not in the first instance produce a relatively
clear conclusion.
Where Dworkin, say, turned to the "constitutive morality" of the community in such
cases, MacCormick's approach is more cautious. The interpretative restraints are
drawn primarily from "linguistic" and "systemic" sources internal to legal doctrinal
argument, and in cases where these may be insufficiently determinate, the
acknowlegment that "substantive" reasons are to be employed still asserts no direct
reference to the "community's values."28
In relation to substantive arguments, two types may be employed: teleological - "what
so acting or not acting will bring about" - and deontological - "appeals to principles
of right and wrong, principles about what ought or ought not to be or be done."29
However, while these are clearly general argumentative principles, that is, they are
not exclusive to law, they cannot be treated in law in the same way as they would
be in general practical argument. Such arguments must take a distinctive, institutional,
form in legal interpretation. Thus teleological arguments are concerned with (in the
example of statutory interpretation) the "end or purpose imputed to a piece of
legislation on the assumption of its having been enacted by a rational legislature in
27 ibid., p. 19.
28 It should be noted that MacCormick points out that linguistic, systemic, and




a given historical setting,"30 and not the telos of an independently conceived
common good. Likewise deontological arguments focus on the "terms and principles
of rectitude or justice," but again "what ought to be done" is limited to the "given
situation or subject matter" defined by a statutory context rather than by any vague
morally-conceived standards.31
In other words, substantive arguments in law have to become "special cases" of
general practical arguments.32 And how they are made special differs, at least
ostensibly, for MacCormick as compared to Dworkin. Where Dworkin had suggested
(supra) that "we accept the adjudicative principle of integrity as sovereign over law,"
MacCormick appears to reverse the relation:
The special sort of reasoning is one which leaves aside any general and
abstract deliberation on what in a given context it would be best or would
be all things considered right to do or not do. Where law is appealed to, all
things are not considered. Rather, the law's requirements (and, perhaps,
enablements and permissions) are considered, and decision focuses on
application of, or compliance with these requirements, or "norms" more
generally.33
Again it is arguable that Dworkin would also endorse the judge's decision as
effecting law's requirements, but the rhetoric is quite different. What makes legal
argument "special," and how it is special, is not the same for MacCormick as it is for
Dworkin. Law's image of community, and indeed, law's image of itself, is different,




Cf. Robert Alexy, A Theory ofLegal Argumentation, Oxford, Clarendon Press,
1989.
MacCormick, "Argumentation and Interpretation in Law", op.cit., p. 19.
Emphasis added.
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A final caveat: Cotterrell himself admits that these differences do not fall neatly
across an Anglo - or British - American divide, nor do they capture the full subtlety
of each approach. Still it ought to be clear there is a difference. The ratio of the
community image provided the "element of unifying moral authority in law," but that
rhetoric is not openly present in the interpretative concerns of the imperium image.
Cotterrell suggests the parallel element in the latter is that of voluntas, though I
would prefer to see it as an alternative ratio, since both images (and here I agree with
Cotterrell) must have both ratio and voluntas. His point is though that in the
imperium image, "the dominance of voluntas over ratio celebrates political authority
at the expense of moral authority in legal doctrine"(p.323); and moreover, that,
though again only as a matter of degree, order and systematicity provide a greater
force in the judicial mind, albeit often for moral reasons, in the imperium image, than
they do in the community image, which relies on a much more explicit use of the
language and determinacy of public morality.
Some Preliminary Issues
(a)
First let me suggest that the community image is ostensibly more problematic for a
radical liberal theory than is the imperium image. The problem can be reduced to one
key concern: Who are "we"?; What consitutes the "we" of "the community"? The
difficulty in asserting this is exemplified in the light-hearted story of the Lone Ranger
and Tonto one day riding through the country when they are surrounded by a group
of apparently hostile Indians. The Lone Ranger, realising a danger, turns to his trusty
side-kick and asks, 'What are we going to do?'; to which the astute Tonto responds,
'What do you mean "we", white man?'
While both Rawls and Dworkin give their support to a reading of community in
which the individual (and for the latter particularly his/her rights) is given clear
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prominence, they nevertheless resort to a notion of community that appears
unacceptably homegenous in its construction of who "we" are. Rawls's problem is
arguably an extension of the Kantian one identified by Berlin: that in practice, not
everyone can be asked all the time whether they consent to all enactments. So when
Rawls suggests that "our exercise of political power is fully proper only when it is
exercised in accordance with a constitution the essentials of which all citizens as free
and equal may reasonably be expected to endorse in light of their common human
reason" (supra) we face precisely the pragmatic problem of how and by whom that
expectation is constructed. As Berlin warned, with this "the door was opened wide
to the rule of experts." It has been suggested that this issue is particularly acute in
America: the "United States of Anomie", as Hutchinson remarks.34 More positively,
it has been made acute where, according to Chantal Mouffe, "new political subjects
have emerged, new forms of identities and communities have been created," and
where Rawls's notion of an "overlapping consensus" (amongst other things), "is
unlikely to capture the imagination of the new social movements."35
The issue of who "we" are thus becomes susceptible to the question of who asserts
the meaning of, in Rawls's phrase, our "common human reason." In terms of
constitutional politics, room is opened up for a split between who decides that
meaning and those for whom, and in whose name, it is decided. As Benhabib puts
it,
The republican formula of autonomy ['We the people decree as a norm ...']
disguises the dijferend in politics, insofar as what is heterogenous,
incommensurable, other and irreducible to a common denominator is here
tied together via a formula of identity ... [This] logic of identity does
34 Allan C. Hutchinson, "The Last Emperor?" in Alan Hunt ed., Reading
Dworkin Critically, op.cit., p.60.
Chantal Mouffe, "Rawls: Political Philosophy without Politics," in David
Rasmussen ed., Universalism and Communitarianism: Contemporary Debates in
Ethics, Boston, MIT Press, 1990, p.230.
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violence to those whose otherness places them beyond the homogenising
logic of the "we".36
Now if this is true in terms of the community at large, the problem is magnified
rather than reduced when we come to the legal realm. The Supreme Court, said
Rawls, "must appeal to the political values they think belong to the most reasonable
understanding of the public conception and its political values of justice and public
reason ... values that they believe all citizens as reasonable and rational might
reasonably be expected to endorse." (supra) While it is no doubt true that it is more
acceptable to appeal to such shared standards than to those, say, of one person in the
community, the doubt is again twofold: first, whether such standards and values can
reasonably be found, and second, who it is who decides on such standards and values
as are found.
As to the first, we return to the problem Maclntyre identified with law and in
particular the courts in liberal societies. In the four-level breakdown he used, his
argument was that at level four (the legal system) the problem of referring to shared
standards - or as he put it referring to Dworkin, our shared moral first principles -
was that "our society as a whole has none." Now I have gone into his reasons for this
and do not need to repeat them here. What is worth mentioning however, and I will
explore this more fully shortly, is why the problem becomes magnified when focused
in on the legal realm, and in particular on the practice of the courts.
It is magnified, I suggest, because the community image of law must make a
tremendous sacrifice of its proclaimed liberal premises of tolerance to diversity in
order to produce a single meaning for the values of the community. Dworkin's
language is startlingly clear on this. As was noted earlier, Dworkin argues that the
Seyla Benhabib, "Democracy and Difference: Reflections on the Meta-Politics
of Lyotard and Derrida," (1994) 1 The Journal of Political Philosophy pp.6, 10. For
an interesting historical reconstruction which sees this issue at the heart of the
founding of the American Republic see Elizabeth Mensch, "The Colonial Origins of
Liberal Property Rights," (1982) 31 Buffalo Law Review 635.
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value of integrity is paramount for law because, "we want to treat ourselves as an
association of principle, as a community governed by a single and coherent vision of
justice and fairness and procedural due process in the right relation."(supra) As
Kerruish and Hunt, amongst others, have pointed out however, what this fails to
acknowledge - and even where we do not take the extreme position Maclntyre adopts
in suggesting that there are no such shared visions never mind a single one - is that
[Dworkin's] simple unitary conception, epitomised by his unexplored
category 'we', has the effect of universalizing the interpretive perspective of
one constituency, namely of lawyers and judges ... [and] leaves unexamined
the sociologically important question of the complex coexistence of
interpretive consensus and 'dissensus' between constituent groups and classes
within any concrete community.37
Since Dworkin's judge must discover the right answer to the question of who has the
legal right in any case, it becomes impossible for the judge to run with any
possibility that does not produce a single answer. The "community's morality" must
therefore be homogenised sufficiently to produce the single standard from which the
right follows. He denies that any majoritarian principle can do this work; only the
"best light" that judges can shed is capable, or justified, in doing so. Of course,
Dworkin admits the possibility that judges might get it wrong sometimes, but even
here his response is telling. That they may err, he suggests, should not lead us to
abandon the present institutions or techniques of judging; "There is no reason," he
maintains, "to credit any other particular group with better facilities of moral
argument; or, if there is, then it is the process of selecting judges, not the techniques
of judging that they are asked to use, that must be changed."38 Change the judges
if necessary, in other words, but there is nothing wrong with how they do what they
do, nor with the fact that they do do it.
Valerie Kerruish and Alan Hunt, "Dworkin's Dutiful Daughter: Gender
Discrimination in Law's Empire," in Hunt ed., Reading Dworkin Critically, op.cit.,
pp.209-239, at p.227. These authors also suggest Dworkin's work has become
progressively conservative in this regard.
38 Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, op.cit., p. 130.
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Why might this be most problematic for a radical liberal theory? There are several
reasons, most of which I will cover more sytematically in the following sections. But
immediately prominent is that even where the community image has in its focus the
guaranteeing of individual rights, how these are justified seems to rely on an
intransigent process which must assume both that the community in any particular
case of determining such rights can be deemed to speak with one voice, and, that
there is one method and group of people - the judges, law's princes - who are to
carry this out. On the surface, this already suggests a doubt expressible through two
central concerns identified by Berlin. That is, the twin dangers inherent in assuming
a unity of perspective toward conflict-resolution (the a priori commitment to
commensurability), and of giving over that power of resolution to a single group of
"experts".
The construction of a single standard, which Benhabib addressed at the level of
constitutional politics in terms of the "logic of identity [doing] violence to those
whose otherness places them beyond the homogenising logic of the "we""(supra), is
both replicated and concentrated at the level of the court's decision, and is augmented
in those legal systems where a constitutional court sits to review the legitimacy of
acts passed by the legislature. This is of prime importance where there may be
questions of constitutive values and identities at stake. Here the radical liberal theory
argued that sensitivity toward the construction of disagreement and the danger of
overriding potentially incommensurable values, meant that particular attention had to
be paid to the settling and the setting of such conflict.
The question therefore is whether or not the single vision of community to which this
image refers is capable of paying such attention. Or, alternatively, how much this
process depends, as Maclntyre suggested, on the production of "verdicts". This is of
particular concern in those cases where clear results do not seem immediately
readable from the construction of the relevant legal texts. For, arguably, what makes
a case hard is usually precisely because there is a conflict between strong and deeply
held convictions in the first place; that is, that there is no easy answer to be found.
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Yet the idea that such difficult cases do have an answer if only the judges look hard
enough, and that they can and do construct what the community's morality actually
requires, goes against the very reasons why it is a hard case at all. Surely, the degree
of difficulty in the case is inversely proportional to the degree to which common
standards exist.
Moreover, a worry remains that the reading of a historical understanding of the
community "in its best light" remains fixed within the institutional bounds of the
legal system and its personnel, and I will address this issue specifically later. But
Dworkin is correct in noting also that it does matter who tells this story about what
"we" are and are required to do in a particular case. And, as we might expect, this
is by no means a new problem. The seventeenth century common lawyers were
opened to the same critique, in particular where their notion of the authority of law
was bound up with such vague notions as custom and immemorial practice. So in a
discussion between Sir Edward Coke and James I and VI about what was reasonable
as defined through adherence to legal precedent, the King had asked Coke to bring
him a precedent on a particularly disputed point of law. When he did, the wise
King's response is reported to have been that he wished "that he would bring
precedents of good kings' times"!39
What this last example shows is that it does indeed matter who reads the institutional
history's meaning into the present, but it also perhaps hints at something more. That
is, that Dworkin might be wrong to suggest simply that where we worry about judges
getting the decision wrong, "it is the process of selecting judges, not the techniques
of judging that they are asked to use, that must be changed." We would be hard
pushed to imagine the conflict between King James and Coke as a fight over the
meaning of liberal justice. Yet Coke's technique, as Cotterrell pointed out, of arguing
in a similar community-bound vein to Dworkin, might suggest that where a liberal
See, Christopher Hill, Intellectual Origins of the English Revolution, Oxford,
Clarendon Press, 1965, p.254.
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theory was to take seriously the existence of potentially intractable conflict, then such
a technique of relying on the "community's constitutive morality" to answer such
questions might well need to be rethought in a contemporary liberal setting.
I should emphasise that Dworkin's possible response that the courts do uphold the
rights of individuals and show "equal concern and respect" for them, does not
singularly rebut the point. For again what may be read into a legal solution
productive of a right will to some extent depend on the attitude and expectations of
those who construct the "we" within which the right makes sense. Arguably feminist
jurisprudence has been most innovative and effective in making this clear. For
example, Catharine MacKinnon's complaint about the law's attempts to deal with sex
discrimination is made precisely on these grounds. For her, "sex equality" in the way
in which it has conventionally come to be defined in law, appears as something of
an oxymoron. The reason for this is that where gender is defined initially as
difference and equality as equivalence, it is inevitable that there remain a tension,
even a contradiction, in attempts set up in this way to remove discrimination. What
this "difference approach" - that women are the same, only different - neglects to
account for is, she says, that its supposed gender neutrality in fact masks its use of
a highly particularised single standard. According to MacKinnon this is plain from
the very vocabulary employed: in the use of "different from" and "the same as", the
"referent for both [is] unspecified".40 Left unstated is that both are measured by or
against a male standard, and the issue is never even considered as to "why maleness
provide[s] an original entitlement, not questioned on the basis of its gender".41
But this is precisely what this perspective cannot see. In typical forthright style,
MacKinnon writes, "If gender is an inequality first, constructed as a socially relevant
differentiation in order to keep that inequality in place, then sex inequality questions
40 See her Feminism Unmodified: Discourses on Life and Law, Cambridge
Mass., Harvard UP, 1987, p.33.
ibid., p.37.
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are questions of systematic dominance, of male supremacy, which is not at all
abstract and is anything but a mistake."42 What this "dominance approach" seeks to
show therefore is that, in so far as law and legal regulation attempts to fit the broader
picture of how the world is, and presumably visions of how it ought to be, it will
merely reproduce features which are implicitly based on masculine standards. That
is, if, for example, in order to gain equal treatment under the law, it is required to
demonstrate how similar women are to the set standard (again, that equal to is
equivalent to "the same as"), then where this standard has been defined by men to
maintain difference in the first place, it now becomes very clear that sex equality is
something that is "conceptually designed never to be achieved".43 Or, more
forcefully, that there exists a "legally sanctioned inequality".44
One example, amongst many, MacKinnon gives in support of this reading is a case
where a woman applied for a contact job in an all male prison it was held she could
be excluded on the grounds that she was a woman. The reason for this was her very
womanhood, the possibility being that she might get raped. On quasi-paternalistic
grounds the issue of protection was defended as an issue of difference between the
sexes. However, for MacKinnon this was merely indicative of wider male dominance
throughout society in that the court could be seen to be "taking the viewpoint of the
reasonable rapist on women's employment opportunities".45 Furthermore, were we
to follow this logic through, MacKinnon asks whether, if a court were to realise that
the damage done to women as the result of sexual harrassment was as vicious as rape




45 Catharine MacKinnon, Toward a Feminist Theory of the State, Cambridge
Mass., Harvard UP, 1989, p.226.
46 ibid., p.318.
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So for MacKinnon, it is only once such categorisation is seen in terms of dominance,
not as difference transparent of substance, and therefore initially as a question of
power, that the political struggle to make law gender neutral can properly begin.
Now I do not want to suggest that MacKinnon's practice of empowering law through
instituting legal changes in America is necessarily one with which I agree,
nevertheless as an example of how the "we" of legal discourse in the community
vision can and does mask heterogeneity, and can and does do damage as a result, her
argument is particularly forceful. What makes this insightful for any radical liberal
reading, is the way in which the judge's or court's position nevertheless remains the
apogee of the settler of the community's morality: for Rawls the Supreme Court was
the "exemplar of public reason," for Dworkin, "the courts are the capitals of law's
empire." But that construction of the singular voice of the community, spoken in the
language of its judges, raises a doubt for the radical liberal who eschews the "a priori
commitment to commensurability", and queries - as a matter of course - the terms on
which the institutional setting of conflicts occurs. I will return to these points more
directly in the following chapter.
Yet the argument put forward by Dworkin here is precisely the legalism that Shklar
identified, and we have now asserted one significant problem with it, at least in the
community image. That is, the construction of the "we" is deemed to take place in
the "social paradigm, the very epitome" of legalist morality, the court of law. But that
"we" is constructed in and by law, in and by lawyers and their "artificial reason", and
this raises doubts for the radical liberal position which constantly seeks to be alert
to the possible masking of heterogeneity through a postulated uniformity. Peter
Goodrich, writing of the ideology of the classical common lawyers of late sixteenth
and seventeenth century England, has noted precisely the dangers, and they seem
fully apposite to the present discussion:
The judges take the role of custodians of a peculiar and antique "spirit of the
law," of the arcana iuris, which is to be defended as axiom, maxim, and
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judicial declaration, against all secular, imperite, or vernacular forms of
knowledge. Legal reason, in short, is conjoined with judicial power, tradition
with authority, source with truth ... 47
As a consequence,
There is an absolute force to the word of law as the expression of the
totality, a marriage of authority and reason that precludes from the very start
the possibility of any member challenging or even legitimately questioning
the reason of the whole ... the unity of reason is antithetically directed
against the possibility of its fracture or fragmentation.48
Finally there is an irony which, if it was perhaps less pressing in the time of Coke
and Richard Hooker, should concern us more where the notion of popular sovereignty
has ostensibly become the governing principle of contemporary liberal democracies:
"
... the authority of law in general, and of the judges in particular, is predicated upon
a concept of law as the proper form of a public reason which is paradoxically neither
accessible to the public nor open to public dispute."49
Here we have, I suggest, an example of the "incipient threat" that comes with the
legalism of the community image. Berlin had talked of the "tendency to assimilate
all men's primary needs to those that are capable of being met by these methods: the
reduction of all questions and aspirations to dislocations which the expert can set
right."50 This reduction recurs, and indeed as I have suggested is magnified, in the
community image of liberal legalism. The inability for the "public reason" of law to
fragment, or where it seems to begin to, for the expert to set it right, is endorsed by
47 Peter Goodrich, Oedipus Lex: Psychoanalysis, History, Law, Berkeley,
University of California Press, 1995, p.79.
48 ibid., p.92. This last point seems strikingly similar to Dworkin's argument





Dworkin's suggestion that if Herculean judges err it is not their method that is at
fault; that there is nothing wrong with postulating the community "personified" in a
single vision as stated by a court. The consequence is that those "partial reasonings"
which I identified in the Introduction need to be made uniform in law's reasoning,
and it is only the quasi-mystical insights of the judges to produce single answers to
deeply divisive and often constitutive (as say MacKinnon argues) disputes that can
be the measure of resolution. Little wonder that, in Coke's words, "it is an act which
requires long study and experience, before that a man can take to the cognizance of
it."51 For it is indeed a mighty task!
Liberal legalism in the community image encounters the mass of constitutive conflicts
but fails to do other than evade the potential radicalism of this encounter by shifting
terrain to the singular, aristocratic artificial reason of law. Administered by the
judicial elite, at the crowning moment of liberalism's claim to value pluralism, that
claim is dropped in favour of 'one right answer' given by the judges' perception of
the community's constitutive morality in its best light. The Supreme Court will have
to answer the question, say, whether abortion is legal or whether it is murder. The
promise of pluralism, of tolerance, is sufficiently cloaked in the language of principle
such that deep division in such a hard case means that not only can a decision be
given, but the fact that it is a genuine or real disagreement means that there is a right
answer to the question. In this sense, law's empire arguably colonises the very
landscape - moral and political - on which its radical sources are supposed to be
founded.
Once again therefore, the issue of legitimacy raises its head. Of course, it is answered
in the community image in terms of an assumed single vision, or of a "common
human reason" that "all citizens as reasonable and rational might reasonably be
expected to endorse." Indeed they might be so expected, but then it is unlikely that
if such was the case it would be in court at all, never mind in the Supreme Court.
51 Prohibitions del Roy (1607) 12 Co.Rep.63.
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The stunning and stubborn question that Hobbes asked hypothetically of Coke
remains: that the law is to decide according to reason "our lawyers are agreed ... but
the doubt is, of whose Reason it is, that is to be received for Law."52
There are points relating to this position that I will develop later, and do so not solely
with reference to this model. However, suspicion has been placed I believe
sufficiently to query whether liberal legalism's promise of community in these terms
is suitable for the radical liberalism I have outlined. For now though I will turn to the
other "image", the imperium, to formulate some more opening concerns.
(b)
The model of legal reasoning that does not appeal to the community personified, the
singular moral voice of the "we", also faces the problem of how to construct legal
decisions in cases where competing visions of what ought to be done conflict.
Cotterrell noted the openness of this model to a genuine plurality of moral values,
and it is this which makes me suggest, at least initially, that the radical liberal thesis
might be more sympathetic to it. That is, such a model seeks to allow for
disagreement in the moral realm, and acknowledge that no singular morality can
emerge from this to define a legal decision. However, I want in this section to
explore the idea that the logic of the production of decisions may impact on the
rationality of decisions that are reached when this model is used. I will suggest
subsequently that the contingency of expecting and demanding a court to reach a
decision is something that is seldom realised. Yet when such contingency is brought
into how we think about the role of law, particularly in hard cases, it arguably re-
sensitises us to what goes on in contemporary liberal legal structures, what extensive
impacts this might have, and how the radical liberal theory might respond to it.
See Introduction.
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Earlier I noted how the imperium model was seen to take a more focused approach
to legal decision-making by concentrating on the valid sources of law rather than
appealing to vaguer notions of community morality. It is unlikely however that such
a model will see itself as completely isolated from broader arguments or concerns.
One way in which this relation has been stated concentrates on what has been called
the "special case" thesis. That is, that legal argumentation is a special case of general
practical argument. In this section I focus on this as it appears in the work of Robert
Alexy, though he is not alone in making this argument.53 But to the extent that it
exemplifies legalism in Shklar's sense (and I think it is quite clear that it does) I
want to test the consequences of it for the radical liberal theory.
Alexy makes the point, as did MacCormick, that when it comes to the legal sphere,
"all things are not considered." For Alexy, legal discourse is limited in a way that is
emblematic of the "imperium" model. As he notes, "legal discourse can be
distinguished from general practical discourse in that the former is, in short, restricted
in its scope by statute, precedent, legal dogmatics, and - in the case of actual judicial
proceedings - by procedural legislation and regulations."(pp.18-19) And again, "legal
reasoning is characterised by its relationship with valid law, however this is to be
determined. This highlights one of the most important differences between legal
reasoning and general practical reasoning. In the context of legal discussion not all
questions are open to debate. Such discussion takes place under certain
constraints."(p.212)
There are a variety of such constraints, some pragmatic (for example, constraints of
time), others more technical (such as procedural and evidentiary rules). Nevertheless,
the special case thesis allows for, or promotes, the idea that legal reasoning is
See Alexy, A Theory of Legal Argumentation, op.cit. Note: page references
in this section are to this text. Other writings sympathetic to this argument include
Neil MacCormick's Legal Reasoning and Legal Theory, op.cit., eg. Chapter X.
Indeed I should note that though I use Alexy's discussion here I assume that as a
theory of legal reasoning it is appropriate in common law reasoning as well.
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"infused" with conditions of general practical argument. Thus the norms of legal
reasoning are not simply "subordinate" to conditions of general practical argument
(ie., that "legal discourse is nothing more than general practical discourse behind a
legal facade"), nor are they merely a "supplement" to them (in the sense that general
practical argument kicks in when the limits of legal argument are reached)(p.20).
For Alexy therefore, discourse conditions operate in both spheres, though in the legal
arena there are institutional constraints which may not operate in general practical
argument. For example, there may be no obligation for an accused to tell the truth,
their participation in the institutional setting will usually be involuntary, parties in
civil litigation may pursue their own interests exclusively, not all statements may be
admissible, etc.(see pp.212-220). As such, Alexy notes, claims to correctness in legal
argument are "not concerned with the absolute rationality of the normative statement
in question, but only with showing that it can be rationally justified within the
framework of the validly prevailing legal order."(p.22)
Flowever, the point I want to consider here is structurally similar to a point raised in
the previous section. But it concerns the question of why recourse to the legal
institution is seen as necessary under this model, and what this says about the
reflexive relation between legal and general practical argument. Alexy argues that
The need for legal discourse arises out of the weakness of the rules and
forms of general practical discourse. This weakness consists in the fact that
these rales and forms define a decision-making procedure which in many
cases leads to no result at all and which, when it does lead to a result, in no
way guarantees conclusive certainty.(p.287)
He gives three reasons why this might be so: first, "the actual normative convictions,
which are often mutually inconsistent, form the starting point of discourse"; second,
"not all the steps in argumentation are fixed," and finally, "since ... there are several
rules of discourse that can only be approximately satisfied, there always remains the
possibility of not reaching agreement."(ibid.)
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Now it strikes me there is a tautology here. To suggest, as Alexy does, that the need
for recourse to the legal institution lies in the "weakness of the rules and forms of
general practical discourse," is tautologous. Of course there would be no need for
such recourse if the rules were "strong" enough; if they produced a solution there
would be no need for legal institutions at all. The problem, in other words, does not
lie with the weakness or strength of such rules, but with the effectiveness of reaching
or imposing a solution.
Alexy is however correct in saying that the real issue is that "the actual normative
convictions ... are often mutually inconsistent"; or, more colloquially, people disagree
about what is the right thing to do. Yet it is not the adequacy of rules that causes this
failure to resolve a dispute, but the fact that the "inconsistency" cannot be resolved
by such rules alone, no matter how good they were. The so-called "inconsistency"
may potentially be a matter of a clash of genuinely held normative convictions; if
there existed a discourse rule productive of a solution the clash would be merely
ostensible, not real, and therefore resolvable.
And I think Alexy might agree with this last point, at least to some extent. Indeed,
he goes so far as to admit that there "would appear" to be something contradictory
in the special case thesis in this sense. In his terms, "how can [legal reasoning]
achieve these outcomes [results unattainable in general practical reasoning] if in the
last analysis it is after all dependent on general practical reasoning?"(p.292) Now this
is an extremely important question. But I think Alexy's response to it puts, as it were,
the cart before the horse. He suggests that there is a "structural correspondence
between the rules and forms of legal discourse and those of general practical
discourse."(p.289) Yet, as he admits, the correspondence is not exact, otherwise legal
discourse would be just as potentially unyielding of solutions as general practical
discourse. What then does legal discourse offer? In essence, one thing: it provides a
solution. And how can it do so? Because its institutional setting means that a solution
can be enforced.
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But here is Alexy's reading:
If one were always inclined to fill in this area of uncertainty [left by legal
norms] by no other means than recourse to general practical reasoning, the
weaknesses of general practical discourse would be transmitted to a
considerable degree into legal decision-making. So it is only rational to
introduce special forms and rales of legal argumentation and to
institutionalize it as legal science ... In this way it possible further to reduce
the range of discursive possibilities in the area of uncertainty left by legal
norms.(p.288, emphasis added)
But "only rational" according to what? It cannot be the rules of general practical
discourse since their "weakness" has led to failure. It cannot be "rational" according
to legal discourse since rationality requires something of legal discourse. It is "only
rational" therefore to introduce such forms, since a decision is needed. Such forms
"reduce the range of discursive possibilities" clearly, but only because it is rational
to demand of the legal system to do so in order to effect a decision.
However, Alexy suggests, "It is not the generation of certainty which constitutes the
rational character of jurisprudence, but rather its conformity to a number of
conditions, criteria, or rules."(p.293) It is this that seems to me to put the cart before
the horse. Yes, it may be rational within legal discourse to follow rules, but
"rationality" in the previous paragraph did not refer to that, but to a requirement
being placed externally on the legal system. What was rational in that sense was that,
as general practical argument could not necessarily produce a solution, the legal
system could be used to do so. But that is different from saying that procedures
internal to the legal system produce a valid solution within the system. So when
Alexy writes that, "The only question to be asked is what it means to decide
rationally in the framework of a valid legal order,"(p.289) I would suggest that there
is a question which comes before this, namely, whether or not it is rational in the
first place to ask the legal system to produce a solution.
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This is a separate question but it is not often considered. As Gunther Teubner has
noted, (discussing the role of conflicts between subsystems of society), "Here the
major problem is whether a translation of the conflict into the legal code is desirable
at all. We do not always see this as a problem because of the ban on the denial of
justice."54 Yet no matter how much the "special case" thesis produces appropriate
rules within legal discourse, it cannot seem to avoid the conclusion that what makes
law special, and different from general practical argument, is that it can effect a
decision. Whether or not it should do so does not seem to be opened to critique, and
this is something I will develop in a moment.
This, arguably "imperium", function of law is noted more boldly in some arguments
that I think it is in Alexy's. So for example, we have seen how MacCormick draws
on the difference between moral and legal argument to show how the latter can
produce relatively determinate and common norms of action. He is quite clear about
this authoritative role and the fact that the legal system has to be backed by power
to make its decisions and its setting of standards effective. And, again, he notes that
problems arise when the reading of the legal texts is not immediately conclusive of
a solution, that is to say, in hard cases. There, he notes,
We have a simple conflict of legal prima-facie rights or duties. But the law
does then require deciders to have recourse to general practical reasoning.
What that means is that only certain kinds of arguments have rational
persuasiveness here. There is no reason to doubt that quite often the relative
weight of the arguments may be such as to close the legally open issue. If
in a given case they do not, the issue is then one of pure decision (subject
to any presumptions that are applicable in case of uncertainty) at the best
intuitive judgment of the authorized decision-maker. That the decision has
been refined through so many levels of argument makes it arbitrary only in
a Pickwickian sense. That it is also political is what no one can or should
doubt.55
54 Teubner, Law as an Autopoietic System, transl. A.Bankowska and R.Adler, ed.
Z.Bankowski, Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1993, p. 109.
Neil MacCormick, "Reconstruction after Deconstruction", op.cit. p.555.
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This seems to me similar to Alexy's argument. That is, within the legal system
decisions have to be reached and legal discourse provides a way of cutting down on
the amount of norms available so that ostensibly intractable conflict can be levelled
to produce a solution. Now I agree that to suggest the process, internally, is arbitrary,
would be inappropriate. What I want to question is, in what sense is recourse to law
here rational? Elsewhere, MacCormick has written that, in cases of "speculative
disagreement" in law (in hard cases, unlike in general practical argument), "Judges
who disagree still have to decide ... 'Non liquet' is not an available judgment; the
Court must rule on the law and decide for one party or the other, and all concerned
must live with the result."56
This is where I think structurally, the same argument that was made against
Dworkin's right answer can be brought in. Both Alexy and MacCormick do not make
the open use of the community's "constitutive morality" as did Dworkin, but rely
instead on valid arguments and sources of law even though in the end an imperium-
type decision must be made. The difference then, as Cotterrell noted, was that the
"imperium" model (though non-arbitrary) depends upon a reference to
institutionalized politics, rather than the more vague construction of the "we" of the
community as a whole. Nevertheless both models seem to rely on a "special" form
of legal argument which is not either "common public reason," nor general practical
argument. Both or either of these are seen to be insufficiently determinative of a
solution. Only the "special rules and forms" of legal reasoning can be so determinate.
But what is going on here? Maclntyre argued that the legal system, as it cannot rely
on shared standards, is used in liberal societies to effect a decision, a "verdict", and
that this constituted a capitulation of philosophical argument, rather than its
embodiment. That is, the reason of law was not a shining example of the highpoint
of liberal philosophy, nor could it be, since such argument was necessarily
inconclusive. As such liberal legal argument was a way of channelling conflict within
MacCormick, Legal Reasoning and Legal Theory, op.cit., pp.248-249.
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the legal institution so that a "verdict" could be effected. Law and legal discourse
provided the only means whereby "resolution" of deep conflicts could be carried out.
Now this, despite the rhetoric of rational legal argument, does seem to underly the
special case thesis: legal forms are required to "reduce the range of discursive
possibilities", since "all things considered" will not produce a result. This has become
particularly clear in the "imperium" model (though not only in it). In the end the
court must decide, and must produce a winner, and must do so by reference to norms
that can produce determinate answers. My question is, in what sense is it rational to
do this, and how would the radical liberal reading respond? This will be the subject
of the next section. But insofar as the law's "artificial reasoning" works in this model,
it is arguably susceptible to similar critiques as were made of the "community"
image. In particular, issues recur as to: who decides what the institutionalized politics
of the legal system require?; how and on what terms radical disagreement has to be
homogenised to make a solution reachable?; what does it mean to "reduce the range
of discursive possibilities" and what effects does this have?, etc. In other words, if
in the imperium image, the courts are again the special place where legalism is
exemplified in community, how does the fixing of the meaning of institutional





(i) A Note on Decisions
As I have suggested, the structural concern is the same for the imperium model as
it was for the right answer thesis. That is, as a case becomes more and more difficult
(either the community's morality is contested or the legal materials are still
inconclusive) we reach a point where a decision still has to be made. Now, as
MacCormick suggests we may reach that point for reasons. But the issue seems to
me that as the case gets harder, it becomes less rational to decide it. As I noted
earlier in relation to the community image, "the degree of difficulty in the case is
inversely proportional to the degree to which common standards exist."(supra) The
more the law is unclear, or the more the community's morality is contested (perhaps
often the same thing in difficult cases), the more the "verdict" will indeed appear as
merely an exercise of power. But it will also appear as an increasingly illegitimate
use of power as the degree of difficulty increases. When the cases on either side are
so "finely balanced" why should it be reasonable just to decide it?
To explore this I need now to go into what I termed the institutional features of legal
reasoning, rather than internal justificatory arguments. The first deals with what
Shklar calls the "ideology of agreement" and the second with the contingency of
decision production.
Shklar argues that both natural lawyers and positivists agree about one thing: that
justice is a matter of following the right rules. This is what makes their respective
positions, according to her definition, legalist, and the debate between them, she says,
a "family quarrel". Their essential difference is, "about what to do when a conflict
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between rules occurs,"57 but what they share is the devotion to rules themselves. As
such, the judge will
... call for some rule, any rule, even if statute and precedent have failed ...
Either he will convince himself that some set of social facts, some set of
expertly developed "is" conditions, yields a rule for him automatically, or he
will appeal to a higher law, or he will rely on what he hopes is the majority
view of his fellow citizens. In all three cases it is obviously of greater
importance to him that the rules he relies on be based on universal agreement
among either the experts, the wise, or the whole people.58
This view also underpins the two views of law - community and imperium - as I
have discussed them above. The similarities and differences of the two positions are
replicated in this description by Shklar. What I have been hinting at though is what
the, as Shklar puts it, "ideology of agreement" - of the "community's constitutive
morality" or of the judges' conclusions of what valid law requires - means and
signifies beyond the internal realm of legal justification. I have suggested, contra for
example Alexy who noted that it was "only rational" to cut down on discursive
possibilities, that as cases become more difficult it becomes less rational to decide
them. However what made it "only rational" for Alexy - and for both models
generally - was precisely what Shklar calls the ideology of agreement. Yet this has
certain assumptions and implications that make this form of legalism unattractive for
the radical liberal position. Here are three aspects drawn from Shklar and elsewhere
that begin to explore why.
The first is an assumption and relates to how the need to decide impacts on the
process of reasoning. As Shklar notes, "A situation calling for a decision is already
the mental construction of the observer, rather than something that presents itself to
him "there" and ready-made ... the act of deciding implies estimating the character
Shklar, Legalism, op.cit., p. 106.
ibid., p. 101 (original emphasis).
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of a situation and following the rules applicable to it."59 Here the need for
agreement is directed towards the fact that unless a single rule (or principle-embedded
rule) can in the end be found, a decision cannot be made. Thus the need to direct the
understanding of the situation into a form in which a decision is reachable, requires
viewing the conflict in a particular way. In MacCormick's terms (above), "the Court
must rule on the law and decide for one party or the other, and all concerned must
live with the result." In order to do so, the court must produce a rule by which that
result is justified. And, there must be agreement on what that rule is, even it is the
minimal requirement of a majority of the court. If there was no such agreement
(regardless of how it was reached) the decision could not justifiably follow.
The second aspect is that this assumption produces an in-built implication. As
Marshall has put it, "it is difficult to separate the idea of an issue from the procedure
by which it is settled, and difficult to define a deciding agent without reference to an
implied mode of action."60 In other words, the construction of the issue itself as in
need of a decision, draws into play both the way in which the rules are set, and how
the judge ought to act. That is, acting with a view to producing a decision infects or
constructs how the issue is to be viewed. As Marshall continues,
No dispute or issue is inherently justiciable or suited to judicial solution. The
supposition that it might be involves the assumption that a dispute can be
clearly contrasted with its methods of settlement and described
independently. But once an issue or contest of interests is defined it is
impossible to avoid mentioning or implying at least some indication of what
constitutes winning or losing ... once the description of the issue is filled out
the contrast between the issue itself and its mode of settlement crumbles.61
59 ibid., p.61.
Geoffrey Marshall, "Justiciability" in A.G.Guest ed. Oxford Essays in
Jurisprudence (First Series), Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1961 (reprint 1968), p.269.
61 ibid., p.278 (original emphasis).
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This last point is most significant. What it draws out is that the assumption of the
need to agree on a rule means that the issue has to be transformed in such a way as
ultimately to make such agreement realisable. But as Marshall rightly notes, this
transformation means that the (re-)constructed issue cannot be separated from what
is being demanded of the process, namely a single solution, a winner and a loser.
This is a point I will return to in more detail subsequently, for it directly relates to
the concern we saw in the radical liberal position over the a priori commitment to
commensurability.
The third aspect concerns what effects this has back on the source of the conflict
itself. Shklar notes that because legal conflict has been preset to require and produce
agreement, one effect of this is that "legalism may in practice make people especially
uncompromising."62 That is, if the logic of the legal system is aimed at producing
winners or losers, then as well as preforming alternatives there is a clear incentive
to strengthen one's case as far as possible under legal procedures to produce the best
chance ofwinning. Now Alexy noted this difference between legal argumentation and
general practical argument, but failed to notice properly how this would in turn
reflect back on general practical argument. When he suggested that part of the need
for legal argument was that there were inconsistent values or norms conflicting at the
level of general practical argument, he did not appear to acknowledge as significant
that the "infusion" might work in reverse. That is, that the determinacy achievable
through the "rules and forms" of legal discourse might impact both on how and on
what occasions recourse to legal argument was thought necessary or desirable, and
that the influence of legal expectations might be partly responsible for
inconclusiveness of general practical argument. The "structural correspondence"
between legal and general practical argument may thus be more reflexive than Alexy
seems to allow. For it is not simply the case that legal relations mediate disputes in
the legal realm, but further that such relations as it promotes often become in part
constitutive of social or political relations themselves. This is why I suggested that
62 Shklar op.cit. p. 105 (emphasis added).
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the question of whether it was rational to have recourse to law was so important;
dependency on the determinacy of law may itself predispose the construction of
normative conflict at the level of general practical argument in a particular and
potentially intransigent way. As Shklar correctly notes, given the expectations that
legal argument constructs, it may lead people to become particularly uncompromising
at the level of general practical argument.
This pushes us towards thinking about sociological dimensions of the role of law, and
again I will develop this subsequently. But the deeper point Shklar is making here
is that legalism as an ethical attitude, exemplified in the practice of the courts, tends
to exclude, ignore, or misdescribe other forms of moral understanding that do not
correspond to the model of legalism and its ideology of agreement. Perhaps
ironically, this is particularly true of the positivist or imperium model; ironical
because of its supposed tolerance to moral diversity. The prominent position of the
legalistic court tends, she says, in extreme form, to force legal argument to "seal
itself off" from political conflict:
The uncompromising character of justice [as rale following] as a virtue
militates against any latitudinarian view of social morality ... to maintain the
contrast between legal order and political chaos and to preserve the former
from any taint of the latter it is not just necessary to define law out of
politics; an entirely extravagant image of politics as a species of war has to
be maintained. Only thus can the sanctity of rale following as a social policy
be kept from compromising associations.63
Corresponding to the "imperium" - and its special case thesis - and the "community"
- the construction of the singular "we" - models I have been using, Shklar notes that
it will be the case that, "Either rules for their own protection must be magically lifted
out of politics, or society itself must be made safe for justice by imposing a unity
upon it, which will make possible a consistent policy of justice according to
ibid., p. 122.
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universally accepted rules."64 The point is therefore that both models, and not just
the community one in which it was most clear, have a converse impact on the terms
in which law and legal argumentation constructs and expects moral debate to be. So
even when MacCormick rightly notes that the ultimate decision is a political one, it
is political in a particular sense only, namely one that has been channelled in a
specific way in order to make it amenable to the reaching of a legal decision. A
diverse range of moral-political possibilities must be institutionalised in such a way
that what is political for law abstracts itself from the realm of conflict to produce the
conflict-immunised possibilities of settled institutional meaning. It is in this sense that
Shklar points out, "All politics must be assimilated to the paradigm of just action -
the judicial process."65 The ideology of agreement thus infuses the understanding
of political and moral conflict in a way that means that it is or becomes amenable to
"resolution." And there is no doubt that this expectation is projected back on to the
original realm of such conflicts: if one wants to be a winner, one's case must be
presented accordingly.
As I have said I will delve more deeply into these three aspects shortly. But let me
counter one argument that may be presented at this point. I am suggesting that an
ideology of agreement operates in the legalist model and that this has certain, perhaps
hidden consequences. These include the idea that conflict has to be understood in a
specific way in order to produce a conclusion, and that this becomes more
problematic the more difficult a case becomes. But what of the argument that this is
a necessary price to pay for the production of a decision? That judges are expected
to decide and if they did not do so there would be chaos; that we need authoritative
common rules, someone has to provide them, and that is what judges are there to do?




My response here is to say that it was not always thus; nor need it be. The
contingency of the decision-making function of the legal system is something I have
said that is seldom realised. Interestingly, J. H. Baker has noticed that in an earlier
period of English legal history and due in part to institutional differences, judicial
indecision was a prominent feature of the legal system. "Courts," he writes, "were
simply not perceived as having a strong decision-making role ... judges were very
much less inclined to reach decisions at all if the law was unclear."66 In a process
where the appeal system did not operate in such a clearly defined manner as it does
today, "Every opportunity for exploring doubts was therefore given before judgment
was entered."67 In cases where the point of law was particularly disputed, public
consultation amongst judges and different benches was expected. "If after all that,"
says Baker, "they still had qualms - they did nothing. Judicial inaction was not seen
as a dereliction of duty, as it would be today, because it encouraged and helped
parties to settle their differences when the merits were balanced."68
Now there may be more likenesses here with our present system than we initially
expect. For example, most of the time people act according to the law - in public acts
or private arrangements - without the intervention of a judge. Yet what is most
strikingly different is that when it does come to litigation under the system Baker
describes, the possibility of "non liquet" is an option. And as Baker says, "That is by
no means less wise or fair than our system, under which - even if the law is doubtful
at the outset - the winner takes all."69 It might, I suggest, if worked through, be
more wise and more fair, especially when the law is unclear not simply at the outset,
but towards the conclusion of the legal process.
!
J.H.Baker, "English Law and the Renaissance", in J.H.Baker, The Legal






I should note that this is not simply an issue of being concerned about the setting in
place of a retrospective decision; that is, of a legitimate worry about creating "new
law" in hard cases. Nor is it about the courts refusing to set in motion the power of
the law's sanctions, for example when it refuses to enforce gambling contracts or
"immoral" or "illegal" pacts. It goes instead to the theoretical point that the current
decision-making function of judges is more contingent than is often assumed.
Structurally, there is no necessity for judges to decide cases, particularly when they
are hard. Of course, our legal system is built upon the assumption that there is, but
the question arises of whether that is more or less fair or wise. At the very least
however, we might consider it to be an available option rather than an impossibility.
I do not want it to appear that I am recommending that judges should never decide
cases. Not at all. What I am proposing is that given the "ideology of agreement"
required by contemporary processes of legal reasoning, and given the varied
assumptions, implications, and effects that the model of legalism rests upon and
produces, there might be strong arguments in favour of exploring alternative models
of the court to its present one as "exemplar of legalistic morality." As Baker's
historical sketch shows, the court's role can vary depending on the expectations
placed upon it in society. Of course, it might be said that in these times of which
Baker writes a more homogeneous society was taken for granted, or even imposed,
than would be acceptable today. This is probably true, but it does not in itself
constitute an argument in favour of the currently dominant ideology of agreement of
the legalism that operates in liberal communities.
Indeed, if anything, it points in the other direction. The more legalism has to
postulate the reduction of radical conflict to the place where decisions can be reached
in terms of winners and losers, the further it gets from the premises of a liberal
theory that endorses in practice the possible incommensurability of ultimate values.
For as Baker suggested, part of the rationale for the judicial indecision was to
encourage parties "to settle their differences when the merits were balanced." The
airing of disagreement in a more or less formal public setting could not therefore be
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dismissed as time-wasting. Yet where the legalism of the contemporary court requires
the production of winners and losers, this inevitably also affects the channelling of
tactics, arguments and expectations in the realm outside the formalistic legal setting.
And where this is so, we might wonder whether or not the commitment to
commensurability that this ostensibly requires runs contrary to the radical liberal
position which treated with suspicion the channelling of conflict into pre-ordained
forms.
(ii) The Legal Person
Another aspect of the "ideology of agreement" resurfaces when we turn our attention
to the place of legal personality in the process of legal decision-making. Consistently,
it would seem, liberalism's conception of the legal person has come under attack
from critics of liberalism generally. In this section I want to look briefly at why this
is so, and to consider whether such critique is justified. I then want to ask how the
radical liberal position would respond. For it is my contention that even although
liberalism's critics have misconstrued what they take to be an essential element of
liberal argument, it is nevertheless the case that the radical liberal approach ought
itself to be wary of certain aspects of legal personality as they are endorsed by liberal
legalism.
Some of the most trenchant criticisms of liberalism in recent years have come from
feminist scholars. In particular they have concentrated on the political and legal
construction of the individual as an isolated, self-seeking, masculine-biased, figure.
Perhaps ironically, this figure is seen to be at once unrealistic, even non-existent, and
yet remarkably powerful. Its roots are usually taken to lie in the contractarian theories
of Hobbes and his heirs. Here the individual is taken to be a pre-social being, whose
problems begin when "he" encounters other equally egoistic individuals, and must
find some way of making arrangements to curtail the potential for constant war that
exists in the state of nature. (I should say, it always strikes me as odd that Hobbes
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is taken to be the founder of this social "war of all against all" scenario; it seems to
neglect the fact that he was writing in the context of a bloody civil war, where
individuals appeared to require no theory of liberalism to justify their aggression.) So
for example, Alison Jagger writes that one of the underlying foundations of liberal
thought is, "the metaphysical assumption of abstract individualism ... According to
this assumption, each human individual has desires, interests, etc. that in principle can
be fulfilled quite separately from the desires and interests of other people."70 And
as Val Plumwood adds in a similar vein, "For such a lone, self-sufficient wanderer
in the woods, he who encounters the other only accidentally and occasionally, the
well-being of others is merely a contingent, mutual arrangement of convenience, not
an essential part of his well-being."71
Now these kinds of arguments are familiar, though different in focus, from our
analysis of Maclntyre. It should be clear by now that such atomism has been
overstated, and the arguments from Berlin's liberalism have gone some way to
showing how the social construction of values and individuals' relations within
(broadly-defined) social institutions negates the very possibility of such a pre-social
being. Even Adam Smith, it was seen, rejected out of hand the notion of an atomistic
morality rooted simply in the desire for individuals to have their interests satisfied.
Nevertheless, as I also noted, the individual still plays a prominent role in liberal
theory, whose rational ability to choose ought to be acknowledged as an integral
feature of such a theory. So, as Jaggar correctly points out, "liberalism's central moral
belief [is] the intrinsic and ultimate value of the human individual,"72 and the radical
theory I have outlined from Berlin would certainly have little difficulty endorsing
this. What I want to concentrate on here however, is what happens to the approach
to individual worth when it appears in the legal realm, for it is here, arguably, that
Alison Jagger, Feminist Politics and Human Nature, New Jersey, Rowman &
Allanheld, 1983, p.30.
71 Val Plumwood, Feminism and the Mastery ofNature, op.cit., p. 152.
72 Alison Jaggar, op.cit., p.33.
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the radical liberal theory, and critics of liberalism generally, may have something in
common.
In line with the perceived contractarian assumptions of liberal individualism,
Benhabib has argued that law comes to play a specific though supporting role for
liberal theorists. As she has written,
The law reduces insecurity, the fear of being engulfed by the other, by
defining mine and thine. Jealously is not eliminated but tamed; as long as
each can keep what is his and attain more by fair rules of the game, he is
entitled to it ... The law contains anxiety by defining rigidly the boundaries
between self and other, but the law does not cure anxiety. The anxiety that
the other is always on the look [sic] to interfere in your space and
appropriate what is yours; the anxiety that you will be subordinated to his
will; ... 73
Law in this description plays, in theory, the role of setting the rules for social
interaction, without bias as to favouring one side or another, and the court's role is
to adjudicate impartially on any disputes that should arise. Of course, and again as
Jaggar has noted, the theory behind this was remarkably powerful in a historical
context of countering state- or Crown-sanctioned privilege: "Compared with medieval
political philosophy," she writes, "which interpreted the social hierarchy as the god-
given natural order, this basic egalitarianism in liberal theory was extremely
radical."74
My contention of course, is that arguably it still is. However, the concept of the legal
person presents problems for a liberal theory such as the one presented here. So in
what follows I will argue that it is not liberalism that fails law, but that it is law that
fails liberalism - that liberal law, in other words, is insufficiently liberal.
Seyla Benhabib, "The Generalised and Concrete Other", in S.Benhabib and




Ngaire Naffine has argued that the liberal conception of the legal person is not
gender-neutral, but is best represented as "the man of law." In this form, she says,
For the law to be regarded as a fair, impartial, non-arbitrary and universal
system, it is essential that it invoke a universal person. The fiction of the
equality and essential sameness of all before the law, the idea that the man
of law is in fact a human prototype, is thus the very basis of the ideal of the
Rule of Law. The legal person's very abstractness, his very paradigm quality,
serves to show that the legal approach is not an approach in fact but an
inherently neutral way of organising and arbitrating relations between human
beings.75
According to the critique Naffine develops, the problem with this model is the
assumption that all people are deemed to be a particular type of person in law. That
is, they are expected to correspond to the image of the "liberal individual" who is
atomistic, self-sufficient, and self-seeking. The problem she identifies however, is that
this is merely a fiction, that not everyone can, nor is indeed allowed to, live up to
this image. As such, the abstraction that constitutes the capacities of the legal person
(or the "man of law") represents a supposed universality, but in effect involves
abstraction from a particular type of person.
This is not a particularly novel insight, and has been around at least since the
writings of Marx. But the issue I want to raise, is, I think, more fundamental. It
concerns the relation between the ideology of agreement (as just discussed) and what
law requires of legal personality. We saw in the discussion of Berlin's liberalism, the
problems associated with postulating a "real self," the notion that the strong sense of
reason (delineating uniformity and ultimately justifying "rational" imposition by the
benign legislator) could only operate where "man's true nature" was identifiable. As
was noted then, there were two steps to the logic of such a position: one, "if there
is no true self then claims to reason cannot attain an authoritative objectivity,
morality cannot be "the correct use of a universal human faculty""; and two, "it is up
to those who do accurately perceive the dictates of reason to make sure that those
75 Ngaire Naffine, Law and the Sexes, op.cit., p. 123.
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"poor, ignorant, desire-ridden" others who do not properly grasp such dictates, are
shown the path to enlightened, rational behaviour."76
The reason for rejecting these assertions was their failure properly to grasp the
incommensurability of values, since they relied on the notion that all values could
ultimately be made to conform to a harmonious pattern, and since the consequences
of which involved an unwarrantable imposition on those who were deemed to have
an insufficient grasp of what reason required. The fundamental issue now therefore,
is to what extent does legal personality assume the same kind of logic - that which
follows the assumptions and dicates of the "real self" - in effecting the dictates of its
own impositions? As we have just seen, the need for contemporary law to produce
single determinate answers to hard questions relied on the ability of law to formulate
single standards, standards moreover that fitted or cohered with the overall pattern
of law. Given that one of the responses to Maclntyre's diagnosis of liberal morality -
as the mere lining up of preferences of the form "I want it to be the case that such-
and-such" - was that it misconstrued the construction of moral disagreement, how can
a radical liberal theory deal with a concept of law which appears ostensibly to rely
upon a notion of singular personality in order both to justify its pronouncements and
to legitimise its own authority? How can a theory committed to the idea of
incommensurable values and the collapsing of the distinction between the right and
the good be at ease with a legal theory that assumes a detailed harmony of standards
and legal personality in order to effect a "weighing and tallying" of putatively
commensurable claims?
One of the problems the radical liberal theory will have with contemporary liberal
legal conceptions of personality concerns the possible input into defining the features
of the identity of such a person. This is not merely a problem with liberal law, but
with notions of legal personality that have long pre-existed liberal theory. However,
the problem becomes particularly acute for a radical liberal theory that does espouse
supra.
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a commitment both to incommensurable values and to the realisation of the
constitutive link between such values and self-identity. When we recall what I termed
Berlin's distinct view of rationality, that is, that when it came to conflicting values
then, "where choices must be made in such [concrete] circumstances then the ability
of the choice to be made by individuals or groups themselves, "is part of being
rational or capable of moral judgment","77 we must ask to what extent can this be
upheld in relation to the legal person.
When it is acknowledged that legal decisions are productive of political outcomes and
involve choices that constitute moral and political expectations, it is clearly of
importance that the rationality of actors is not completely superseded by the defining
of characteristics by the legal system. Yet how far is this the case with legal
personality? I want here to give an example that suggests problems with legal
personality for a radical liberal theory of law.
Consider a part of the construction of a duty of care for negligent acts. In
ascertaining whether a particular act ought to be considered negligent, the common
law invokes a standard that is ostensibly general and objective: "Negligence is the
omission to do something which a reasonable man, guided upon those considerations
which ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs, would do, or doing something
which a prudent and reasonable man would not do."78 The "reasonable man" test
may be seen to work in this way: it will help to determine what the law regarding a
particular claim for damages is, and it will do so by providing a standard through
which to judge how someone (the "reasonable man") should act in a situation like
that of the defender's. In other words, it is used both to construct the general norm,
and to particularise it in the case at hand. However, even though particular features
of the instant case may be taken into account in say, assembling the knowledge
expectations of the "reasonable man," the law will not judge until it has universalised
ibid.
Alderson B, in Blyth v. Birmingham Waterworks Co. (1856) 11 Exch. 781.
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the obligation that it will eventually find. The law cannot invoke and judge by the
particular. As Samuel Weber has noted, "The first and foremost act of the law, then,
is to prohibit itself from using proper names to define the object of its pre- and
proscriptions. The more "proper", ie., the more individual and particular, the name,
the less lawful the law."79
In creating the norm to judge the case at hand, the law must move up to a standard
that is not that (at least in principle) of any particular person. Up until the last
moment when the defender must be named ("You, defender X, are/not liable") the
law's particularisation cannot announce in justification this particular name (X).
Justification comes only in the name of the "reasonable man", not "this man" or "that
man". As Weber continues, "The law, in short, must be anonymous."80
But here of course is an irony. For anonymity is no name; not just no particular
name, but no name at all. Conventionally then, the "reasonable man" assumes an
anonymous voice, and speaks in law for no-one in particular, but instead for "all
men." As Brennan J has put it, "once the facts are proved all that remains for the
court to do in determining the standard of care is to apply community standards - the
standards of a hypothetical person in the defendant's position."81 Commonly there
is much debate as to whether this "hypothetical person" is an objective determination
of what "community standards" require, or an inevitably subjective imposition of
what some particular group (the judges) thinks is the best decision according to law,
given that the community as a whole may have no single standard on which it could
reasonably agree.
79 S.Weber, "In the Name of the Law," in D.Cornell, M.Rosenfeld, and D.Gray
eds., Deconstruction and the Possibility of Justice, New York, Routledge, 1992,
p.247.
81 Brennan J in Gala v. Preston (1991) 172 CLR 243.
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But what I want to suggest is that the "reasonable man" is both subjective and
objective. On the one hand, the process of assessing negligence, say, can only take
place in the particular terms that are already pre-set by legal forms, legal forms
which, as we have seen, must reduce the possible range of normative input to
produce a decision. Subjectivity might be thought to enter therefore in two forms:
one, the creation of a single norm from a mass of potentially available norms, and
two, the application of a legal, as opposed to any other normative, decision-making
framework. Here Alan Norrie has noted the issue precisely:
In order that the 'language of equality' may be heard and obeyed it must be
tied to its opposite: a general and omnipotent power source which, while
presenting itself as representing the general social interest, in fact embodies
particular social-political interests and points of view ... [Moreover] ... to the
extent that law embodies individual right, its rationality will be a rationality
of individual right.82
On the other hand, however, the connection between the universal (the legal standard
to be applied) and the particular (the alleged wrong being addressed and the finding
of fault or not in the instant case) cannot be severed. The very reading of the instant
case as one involving a legal issue to be resolved, involves formulating the particular
in such a way that it becomes "prepared" to receive the legal decision; that is, to
receive the application of the universal. As Wietholter has noted, "Legal relations ...
are always premediated general decisions about the way facts [and, we can add,
questions of fault] are assigned to a particular law in the process of being introduced
as a qualification of the legal response to social questions."83
: Alan W. Norrie, Law, Ideology and Punishment: Retrieval and Critique of the
Liberal Ideal of Criminal Justice, Dordrecht, Kluwer, 1991, p. 184 (original
emphasis).
83 Quoted in Teubner, Law as an Autopoietic System op.cit., p. 108.
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In this sense then, the "reasonable man," "is not the ideal legal subject but the means
by which the object of legal regulation is conjured up."M The law therefore
objectifies the assessment of the requirements of the "reasonable man," in order that
it be, in Samuel Weber's term, anonymous; it makes objective that which has been
underdetermined. But, it cannot relinquish the subjective determination that is
required both to produce the general norm and to subsume the particular as an
instance of the application of that norm, a process which can only ultimately be done
as each case presents itself to the court.
Yet the argumentative force provided by the "reasonable man" remains objective in
its appeal to legitimacy. The sense of objectivity that this gives comes, in Cohn's
terms, as "the premise that right and wrong is a matter of derivability" from a pre¬
existing rule; that "the case is not new, it was known already to the norm and has
thus been disposed of."85 And here we have a formulation that is essentially the
same as the one taken from Erskine in the Introduction: the law must "speak the
same uniform language to all individuals" instead of being left to their own "partial
reasonings." But the radical liberal's problem is not simply that the law's subjectivity
cannot be eliminated, that it cannot but promote one set of partial reasonings as the
one with which to answer the case, but instead relates to the question of how and by
whom this is determined, a point of great importance. So when, for example, Collins
suggests that, "We must reject the pessimism which preaches that law necessarily
involves a scheme of ranks and entitlements imposed from above by the established
elites ... The law is an open system, capable of receiving and endorsing any standards
which have proved acceptable to the community,"86 it is precisely the dubiety of this
latter phrase that is at issue. Unless the community does indeed speak with one voice
Lindsay Farmer, "The Obsession with Definition: The Nature of Crime and
Critical Legal Theory," Vol.5 (1996) Social and Legal Theory 66, emphasis added.
Georg Cohn, Existentialism and Legal Science, New York, Oceana
Publications, 1967, pp.119, 78.
Hugh Collins, "Democracy and Adjudication", op.cit. p.82.
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- in negligence cases with that which belongs to the "reasonable man" - some
irreducible element of partiality will always be present in that voice. Then the
question becomes, how far do the parties themselves contribute to defining, assessing,
and deciding, the conflict? That said, however, if indeed the community did speak
with one voice, departures from what was required of the person in law would merely
be treated as "unreasonable", not potentially as an alternative normatively justifiable
stance.
The constraining issue then in the legal construction of the requirements of the
"reasonable man" is again its determination, as Shklar put it, to find some rule, any
rule, by which to legitimise its decision. And as Cohn puts it, the consequence of this
is that, "The concrete cases must be homogenised by a process which fits them into
the rule whenever they occur. The law chooses from the concrete situation those
elements only which seemingly co-respond to the rule. All else is rejected as
irrelevant."87 But if there is, as I imagine there always must be, the element of
subjectivity in the process of rule-construction and application, then in order to retain
the rationality of actors themselves (their reasonableness), how much significance
should be placed on the uniqueness of the instant case "which never existed before
and will never exist again"?88 Is there not the danger here that requirements for
"correspondence to the rule" treats the conflict as something that those involved are
really not responsible for dealing with?
Even those who would seek to bring more "voices" into the discourse as it takes
place before the court, fail properly to acknowledge that the "ideology of agreement"
required by the model of liberal legalism, precludes a multiplicity of voices from
being heard in their own terms. For the structural and institutional teleology of law
and its mode of determination cannot, as we saw in the previous section, be separated
from the construction of the issue itself. So when Martha Minow writes that,
Cohn op.cit., p.l 11.
ibid., p.l 13.
211
"Dialogue in courtroom arguments can stretch the minds of listeners ... [and]
inventive approaches can bring the voices of those who are not present before the
court ... The introduction of additional voices may enable adversary dialogue to
expand beyond a stylized either/or mode, prompting new and creative insights,"89
this neglects fully to account for the way in which the legal voice speaks, in
Erskine's terms, "the same uniform language to all individuals," and that it must
therefore translate multiple voices into the one language.
Reversing a metaphor I used in an earlier discussion of Maclntyre, for liberal legal
reasoning, dreams of Babel lead straight back to Esperanto. But, like the would-be
global language itself, such law is not no language, but involves its own grammar,
its own predispositions to particular solutions and assumes, worryingly for the radical
liberal thesis, that everything can be translated into that language. Law then, to vary
and push a metaphor one last stage, is more akin to - and indeed even more
demanding than - the French language council which stands as a gate-keeper against
the corruption of the genuine form. The question remains as to what the price of
entry entails.
The construction of the legal person then is one way in which law sets a grounding
for the comparison of what may be incommensurable values. But in doing so, sources
of descriptive and normative input have to be re-channelled to effect the legal
translation. Jan Broekman has stated this case in perhaps its strongest terms:
... those elements of social reality which are under the grip of legal thinking
are structurally altered. Transformations have occurred. This simply means
that the one reality is not the other. Legal provisions form a unique whole
of its own kind which is a special category of human experience. One cannot
M.Minow, "Justice Engendered," (1987) 101 Harvard L Rev 88-9, quoted in
E.A.Christodoulidis, '"A New Constitutional Reality for Civil Society'?", R.Bellamy
et.al. eds Democracy and Constitutional Culture.
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understand a contract or a delict unless one recognises one's being as de
iure.90
The inability of law to sever the connection between the norm-to-be-applied and the
instantiation of that norm in the particular case means that the particular has to be
presented in a way that is already conceived of as legal. It therefore "structurally
alters" other normative or descriptive realities where they do not match the law's
requirements, in the process itself severing what may be the constitutive relation
between values and identity as presented in the radical liberal theory. Again
Broekman puts the case forcefully: "The first word that the jurist utters to me by way
of his typical manner of speech already transforms me into a legal subject. I am not
a legal subject. I am not a legal subject by nature but nevertheless I must be such
because it is the price that I have to pay for being in society and enjoying my rights
therein."91
I asked earlier in this section whether or not Berlin's distinct view of rationality - that
when it came to conflicting values then, "where choices must be made in such
[concrete] circumstances then the ability of the choice to be made by individuals or
groups themselves, 'is part of being rational or capable of moral judgment'" - was
compatible with the notion of the legal person under liberal legalism. The question
now is just how much input do people have into the descriptive and normative
meanings of law and legal regulation? Or how much, in the words of Roland Barthes,
does law and its construction of legal personality exemplify a case of, "the spectacle
of a terror that threatens us all, that of being judged by a power which wants to hear
only the language it lends us"?92
Jan Broekman, "Revolution and Commitment to a Legal System," in
N.MacCormick and Z.Bankowski eds., Enlightenment, Rights and Revolution: Essays
in Legal and Social Philosophy, Aberdeen, AUP, 1989, p.323.
91 ibid., p.321.
Roland Barthes, Mythologies, London, Vintage, (reprint) 1993, p.46.
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When we think of the criticisms earlier made against - in Dworkin's phrase - "law's
princes," is it still not a valid question to ask just who is that "person" who "speaks"
in law? At the level of identity, just where do the descriptive and normative inputs
into "personhood" come from in the strictures of currently institutionalised legal
reasoning? And, importantly, what chances are there within such structures of
reasoning for meaningful dissensus? This is the point we will now consider.
(iii) Legal Conflict
A third concern with liberal legalism therefore needs to be addressed, though it draws
on elements of the arguments in the preceding sections. This deals with the way in
which values conflict in law. I suggested earlier that what Maclntyre's critique of
liberalism and my reading of the radical liberal position shared was the importance
of recognising the way in which moral disagreement occurred. Where Maclntyre had
correctly drawn attention to the way in which "socially effective" means were
available for "weighing and tallying" preferences, I noted that the radical liberal
theory would be equally wary of overarching frameworks which tended either to
reduce the possibility of meaningful dissensus by postulating a single norm according
to which conflict would simply disappear (the a priori commitment to
commensurability) or where conflict was not picked up on at all. The reason why
meaningful dissensus was so important for the radical liberal theory was partly its
recognition of the constitutive relation between identity and values, and partly
because the consequence of this recognition entailed the ability to participate in social
forms that were themselves constituted by their incommensurability with other values.
Since Maclntyre's attack on liberalism rested in part on the claim that liberalism
tended to stifle debate by pushing it into pre-ordained forms, my defence of the
radical liberal position therefore rested (and rests) on the possibility that any trade¬
offs which occurred between conflicting values take place without any a priori
commitment to commensurability.
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And this is where such a thesis encounters problems in the institutional vesting it
might receive at the hands of the legal system. If we think back to MacCormick's
definition of legalism, we recall that its central feature constituted, "the stance in
legal politics according to which matters of legal regulation and controversy ought
so far as possible to be conducted in accordance with predetermined rules of
considerable generality and clarity, in which legal relations comprise primarily rights,
duties, powers and immunities reasonably clearly defined by reference to such rules
..."(supra) Yet this apparently uncontroversial statement nevertheless contains
concerns for the radical liberal theory.
The first is the point raised above by Broekman; that to attract legal solutions
requires that the conflict be read in such a way as to abstract it into the form of legal
rights v. legal duties, and the question is to what extent this works to "structurally
transform" the initial conflict. Now this is precisely the query Berlin raised about
expertise. There he considered the problem to be whether an issue was dealt with by
focussing on, in his words, "the logical implications and elucidating the meaning, the
context, or the relevance and origin of a specific problem," or whether instead a
solution was reached by "altering the outlook which gave rise to it in the first place."
The problem with liberal legalism's focus on rights arguably works against the full
attention being paid to the original location of specific problems. As Lyotard has
written, the formulation of conflicts and differences in terms of rights has precisely
this drawback: "Now, completely occupied with the legitimacy of exchanges with
others in the community, we are inclined to neglect our duty to listen to this other;
we are inclined to negate the second existence it requires of us. And thus we will
become perfect ciphers, switching between public and private rights without
remainder."93 It is that last phrase that is so important; the notion that there are
"rights without remainder" as perceived by the legal system, works to preclude in law
Jean-Francois Lyotard, Political Writings, transl. B.Readings and K.P.Geiman,
London, UCL Press, 1993, p.lll.
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possible sources of different types of reasoning that do not match up to those
recognised by law.
Now it may be objected that this is indeed the case, but that this is merely the price
to be paid for entering legal discourse. Moreover, that rights are and have been
historically an essential element in liberal thought. Thus it could be argued that all
groups or individuals will benefit equally assuming they have a right or duty to be
protected. Yet this does not fully take into account the effects of channelling the
conflict in this way. Here are two examples.
First, one need only think about the way in which, for example, Anglo-Australian
common law reasoning has worked consistently to deprive indigenous populations of
the ability to assert "land rights" by refusing to acknowledge different forms of
relations with land that did not conform to the property conceptions of the dominant
legal system.94 Doctrines such as "terra nullius" were thus employed to negate the
possibility that native land relations amounted to something recognisable as "genuine"
property rights. Moreover, even when, as has happened in recent years, the doctrine
of terra nullius has been overruled, it still remains the case that the implementation
of "rights without remainder" provides the dominant system itself with the legal and
political means to define what will and will not count as valid "native title" claims,
since it still retains control over the (legal) techniques of legitimising recognition. In
other words, even though conflict has been picked up here, the inability of the
common law legal system to do other than negate different sources of reasoning (or,
more fundamentally, of world view) on its own terms, seems to sit uneasily with a
radical liberal theory which aspires to recognise the genuine incommensurability of
social forms and values. There seems to be no better example of a case where, rather
than looking to the "meaning, the context, or the relevance and origin of a specific
94 See for example in the North American context, Robert A. Williams Jr,
"Documents of Barbarism: The Contemporary Legacy of European Racism and
Colonialism in the Narrative Traditions of Federal Indian Law" (1989) 31 Arizona
Law Rev 237-278.
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problem," the role of law has been to alter "the outlook which gave rise to it in the
first place." In this sense, the difference I pointed to earlier between a possible "trade¬
off" being required in a pragmatic sense (in terms of dealing with conflict in a way
meaningful to those involved), and a "verdict" as the result of the legal decision
seems to be strikingly clear.
If this shows a case of tangible harm being done through dispossession legitimised
through the form of rights, the second example is more symbolic. In parallel with
earlier arguments, the legal regulation of conflict in terms of rights has effects, in
turn, back on the expectations and possible presentation of moral and political issues.
This goes more to what Lyotard identified as the tendency to "neglect our duty to
listen to this other," and has been suggestively enunciated by Milan Kundera:
The world has become man's right and everything in it has become a right:
the desire for love the right to love, the desire for rest the right to rest, the
desire for friendship the right to friendship, the desire to exceed the speed
limit the right to exceed the speed limit, the desire for happiness the right to
happiness ... 95
The institutional dependency on law and the legal form of rights-claim has the
potential to cut swathes across social forms. Arguably it constitutes a case of Raz's
suggestion that, at least in certain cases, "success might mean failure"; a justiciable
right to happiness, or love, or friendship (or realistically in America of good
parenting, say) would make those most elusive of social and individual pursuits
"unrecognisably different" from the hopes and desires we may painfully though
rewardingly grasp for.
I do not want to press this point too far, but instead merely recall Berlin's opening
lines as I quoted them, and to suggest that the symbolic, and sometimes real,
dimensions of legal intervention potentially constitute another example of what he
Milan Kundera, Immortality, transl. P.Kussi, London, Faber and Faber, 1991,
p. 153.
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called "a world stiff with rigid rules and codes," where the individual's choice and
"capacity to cause mental stress and danger and destructive collisions, is eliminated
in favour of a simpler and better regulated life." It may of course appear as a paradox
that I suggest that this diminishes conflict, when the common criticism of the
increasing dependency on law and general litigousness is that it increases conflict.
But the point here is that how such conflict is constructed, channelled and resolved,
tends to obfuscate the notion of meaningful dissensus; that such conflict as does
occur in law is singular in terms of its construction in a way that cannot fully grasp
the complexities of social forms, and works in fact to mask or distort genuine
problems and in particular work to reduce the difficult responsibilities required in
understanding such varied social forms.
It may be then that the historical liberal mantra of the sanctity of private property
rights - as Locke put it, that "property is the bulwark of liberty" - needs to be re¬
thought in the light of the radical liberal thesis. For not only is the relation between
the rights-discourse of law and the premise of tolerance to incommensurable values
problematic, especially where rights in law are lifted out from the input of various
and diverse forms of good, but also where today the expectations placed on private
property rights in particular, no longer do the work earlier liberalism required them
to do. As Nedelsky has cogently argued, "Private property was, for 150 years, the
central and defining instance of the boundary between governmental authority and
individual autonomy. Property can, however, no longer serve this function because
it has lost its original political significance."96 This is not to say that private
property has lost all useful functions, but instead that it has lost its original political
significance.
Where in the late seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, private property may well
have had the function of challenging the vested and intrusive interests of the Crown,
Jennifer Nedelsky, "Reconceiving Autonomy: Sources, Thoughts and
Possibilities," in A.C.Hutchinson and L.J.M.Green eds., Law and the Community: The
End of Individualism?, Toronto, Carswell, 1989, p.233.
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we might wonder how those same rights can, again to quote Nussbaum, ask of
"society and politics ... [to] respect the liberty of choice, and [to] respect the equal
worth of persons as choosers."97 To respect people's private property is only to
respect one very small part of their liberty of choice, and a fortiori what people's
human worth might be. It is a consistent confusion exemplified by the conservative
Right to assume that "liberty of choice" means simply liberty to dispose of and
acquire private property. Even, I suggest, a radical reading of Berlin's negative
liberty, requires no a priori commitment to private property as a definitional element.
Respecting the moral autonomy of individuals is in fact unacceptably homogenised
to a "single overarching principle" when that principle is the property right. Attention
to the detailed and contextual conflicts that we face seems, as the land rights example
tends to show, to be overridden when law's re-construction of the conflict is in terms
of rights and duties, winners or losers. Here we may have the clearest of example of
an incompatibility between the radical liberal view, and the logic and power of the
institutionalised decision-making role of the courts in the liberal legal system.
This forces us to think about the role law itself may have come to play as a strategy
in dealing with conflict, a meta-role, so to speak, that may not often be picked up on.
I quoted Marshall earlier as saying that "once an issue or contest of interests is
defined it is impossible to avoid mentioning or implying at least some indication of
what constitutes winning or losing," and it may be important that reliance on legal
conflict-resolution can be seen as a way of attempting to cut off or stem other forms
of conflict. Here then, it is important to consider the effects of the way in which law
stages conflict. As Christodoulidis has shown in a recent critique of Dworkin's thesis
of law as integrity, what is most often neglected in arguments which see law as
providing the means for pursuing political debate in community, is that, "taking the
conflict to law ... becomes a strategic move in the situation of conflict, an ideological
move aiming to conceal what the conflict is really about." That is, " ... by taking the
law as a neutral forum for conflict, one loses sight of the position of law itself within
Introduction.
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the grander framework of conflict."98 In parallel with the argument we have
canvassed already, this oversight and the ideological position of law which it masks
is, he notes, largely attributable to a disregard for the way in which law treats conflict
as having "an inbuilt tendency to resolve itself."99 In other words, attention needs
to be paid to the fact that where the conflict is staged in law, there is a
presupposition that that conflict can be resolved, and this alone may provide a reason
for having recourse to law. But as we have seen however, this necessarily overrides
the broader political question of its irreconcilability.
The production of verdicts may, in this sense, not merely be a capitulation of moral
and political argument, but a deliberate attempt to refuse to engage in finding a trade¬
off solution. While we might think of this in terms of a failure of private parties to
negotiate solutions to particular problems, it is perhaps most commonly recognisable
as a tactic of governments who refuse, for ballot-box reasons, to work towards and
instigate a political solution and instead rely on the solution being provided by a
court. In such instances, the reliance on the court's function and abilities exemplifies
a complicity with rather than a dependence upon the forms of conflict-resolution that
only the court can provide.
One final aspect to legal conflict needs to be considered, and that deals further with
some sociological significations of the problem. If conceptually it seems to be the
case that conflict is suspiciously channelled and potentially distorted by entering the
legal arena, as a matter of professional legal practice these suspicions are amplified.
As Christie argued some years ago, legal professionals in both official (or state) and
private practice roles contribute to the loss of conflict as property that might be
shared. As he says, "Lawyers are particularly good at stealing conflicts. They are
Emilios A. Christodoulidis, "The Suspect Intimacy Betwen Law and Political
Community," (1994) 80 ARSP p.16.
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trained for it. They are trained to prevent and solve conflicts."100 Here once again
the appearance of a conflict as such is not at issue, but the way in which it appears
is. For Christie and others the effect of legal professionalism is to take conflicts out
of the hands of those with whom they originate, and present them to a court system
that duplicates and depends on this process. This depersonalisation is best represented
when he considers that (writing of Scandinavia) "the symbol of the whole system is
the Supreme Court where the directly involved parties do not even attend their own
court cases."101 The ethos of expertise thus functions to remove the conflict from
the context in which it originated and present it such that only the applied expertise
in the legal institutional setting can reasonably resolve it.
Again this has broad ranging implications. For not only does the legal system control
conflict in this way, but this has once again a reflexive effect on the initial contexts
from which the disputes or conflicts came. As I said earlier, "it is not simply the case
that legal relations mediate disputes in the legal realm, but further that such relations
as it promotes often become in part constitutive of social or political relations
themselves". So for example, one of the effects of the power given over to expertise
is that there is instituted a dependency on seeking that type of solution; the more
unavoidable the resort to experts, the more it is seen to be the natural way of dealing
with conflicts. Moreover, and crucial for the present context, where only experts can
truly evaluate the strength of (legal) arguments it may, as Christie points out, lead to
the "destruction of certain conflicts even before they get going."102 In other words,
appropriation of conflicts by experts and the legal system not only defines the terms
in which legal arguments may be presented, but potentially reduces the possibilities
for self-expression in the wider setting where law is instrumental in defining (and
allowing) what counts as a political or moral argument in the first place. And if this
100 N.Christie, "Conflict as Property" in C.Reasons and R.M.Rich, The Sociology




is the case, then the ideological role that law as resolver of conflicts may
indiscernably have come to play must become of paramount concern to the radical
liberal theory.
Law and "Other" Problems
I have said in a few places that there appear to me to be certain similarities with the
radical liberal theory as I have taken it from Berlin, and certain postmodern writings
on difference and the ethic of alterity, of responsibility to "the Other". In this section
I consider one such approach, but do so in a critical way in order both to apply the
insights from the preceding sections, but also to draw attention to the pitfalls in
assuming that such an ethic can easily be brought into current structures of law and
liberal legal argument. Once again, I suggest that the problems an ethic of alterity has
with the institutional dynamic of liberal legalism - and to the extent that the radical
liberal position shares these concerns then that too - need to be addressed in a
broader manner. To that end, in this section I will draw on some arguments from the
prominent postmodern theorist Jean-Francois Lyotard to work through what I see as
the implications for the postmodern theory as presented, and also address how the
radical liberal theory might use such insights to challenge current legal assumptions.
This will involve considering how Lyotard's more powerful political arguments need
to be worked through in the context of law.
While certain postmodern thinking about law seeks to reinstate ethical concerns at the
core of its jurisprudence, it nevertheless tends too easily, I suggest, to replicate
several of the the assumptions of a modernity it claims to move beyond.
Concentrating in particular on the ethics of alterity, itself not a novel focus, it falls
prey to several of the dichotomies and categories of liberal legalism. As such it is not
surprising that it is often accused of a conservative inertia. To hold to the insights of
difference postmodernists espouse, requires not simply attention to the form of law,
but, as I have argued in terms of the radical liberal theory, its relative positioning and
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role as a source of obligation, as well as to a rethinking of the law-ethics relation as
part of an institutional critique of law.
Attempting to challenge and rework what is perceived as the obsessive modern
distinction between law and ethics, a postmodern jurisprudence faces three problems:
its conception of law, its conception of ethics, and its conception of the relation
between the two. As a constructive effort, the task of reinvigorating ethical debate
within and about law, may be thought to be timely. Yet hostility to postmodern
thinking generally comes equally from all directions. One of the most pressing
complaints is that of inertia, the apparent ability to say much but suggest little. The
more one hears about "deferring the undeferrable", of "conceiving a justice that
cannot but must be conceived", of "saying what cannot be said" and "listening to
what cannot be heard", the more one is tempted to produce a charge not so much of
relativism (for what values do these espouse?), but of serious fence-sitting. I suspect
that part of the problem here is the way in which postmodern jurisprudence (of which
I will give an example shortly) conceives of law and its relation to ethics still in a
way that condemns it to the modernist dichotomy it seeks to overcome. I will argue
therefore that in order to treat seriously the political claim that an ethic of alterity or
difference be invoked, the structural positioning of law as ambiguously protector and
enemy of justice needs to be reviewed. In particular, and drawing on the arguments
made earlier, both the constitutive and the destructive roles of law within a broader
context of the creation of normative meaning require attention. For what has been
said of the prescriptions and conflicts of morality applies equally to law: that they
make us what we are as much as we make them what they are. As such, in this
section, it is the relative positioning of law as a source of obligations that must be
addressed as much as the form of its deliberation and judgment.
In what follows I treat, and make, the charge of inertia as a serious one. As I have
suggested I will argue for a relocation of some of Lyotard's political arguments about
the role of the differend in state politics in the (to be contested) legal arena. By doing
this I hope to draw attention to a few of the problems that jurisprudence ought to
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consider if it wants properly to champion an ethic of alterity. Before that however I
want to look at three problems that can be identified in a recent version of
postmodern jurisprudence. They develop from, successively, the problems that
crystallise around the meaning of ethics in the law-ethics relation; the issue of form
in legal reasoning; and, finally, what is called here the problem of information.
(a)
To begin with here is a formulation of some of the central concerns and
presuppositions of a postmodern jurisprudence:
The law is necessarily committed to the form of universalisation and abstract
equality; but a just decision must also respect the requests of the contingent,
incarnate and concrete other, it must pass through the ethics of alterity in
order to respond to its own embeddedness in justice. In this unceasing
conjunction and disjunction, this alternating current between the most general
and calculating and the most concrete and incalculable, or between the
legality of form and legal subjectivity, lies the ethics of a critical legal
response to the material legal person, law's morality of the contingent.103
Consider three problems with this.
(i) The first concerns the consequences of replicating the structural distinction
that is seen as integral to the initial problematic of modernity. Thus justice is
dependent on the particular, the contingent, is fleeting and momentary, while law is
constructed as its opposite: abstract, dependent on form, with an eye to existence over
time and to coordination. Yet this same construction in another guise has been
identified with part of the failure of a modernity which has seen the retreat of
individualised or particularised judgments of ethics - into an inscrutable, private realm
Goodrich, Douzinas, and Hachamovitch, "Introduction" to Politics,
Postmodernity and Critical Legal Studies: The Legality of the Contingent. Edited by
C.Douzinas, P.Goodrich, and Y.Hachamovitch, London, Routledge, 1994, p.24.
(Hereafter "Introduction.")
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leaving them ostensibly immune from shared public evaluation or justification -
impact on the expectations placed upon law. Historically bound up with part of the
liberating potential of modernity, the effect of this retreat is most profound where the
viability of meaningful agreement or disagreement on ethical issues is seen to have
been largely excluded because of the way in which moral expressions are
conceptualised. We noted this at length in the analysis of Alasdair Maclntyre's work,
and the danger here is of reproducing what he saw as one of the failures of liberal
societies. We recall, for example, that such 'emotivism' worked to preclude rational
discussion and resolution of ethical and political controversies which liberal societies
face. The difficulty was this: where "moral assertions are seen as mere expressions
of approval or disapproval, there can be differences, but no contradictions."104 In
turn this was deemed to have consequences for how the role of law is characterised,
as well as the demands subsequently placed upon it. For Maclntyre, one of the
defining features of the contemporary liberal order was its inability to do other than
refer its conflicts to the legal system where verdicts could be produced. The question
then arises whether an ethic of alterity has sufficient critical ability to go beyond this
abdication to the legal system of debate and resolution, which effectively leaves law
as the sole fixer of any coherent values.
The response to this has been ambiguous. On the one hand it has been said that
"postmodern justice cannot follow the protocols of a theory, it is not a concept and
does not apply a principle, value or code."105 Even if we accept this as a non-
nihilistic position, though one admittedly "dedicated to failure", there would seem to
be insufficient articulation here alone to challenge law's hegemony of staging or
resolving contradictions or conflicts. Where an ethical response lacks a coherent
theoretical basis then given the structural opposition in place between law and ethics,
the force of Maclntyre's criticism of law in liberal society would still appear to be
applicable. On the other hand, and despite the admitted "dedication to failure" the
R.Wachbroit, op.cit., supra.
Goodrich, Douzinas, and Hachamovitch, "Introduction," op.cit., p.24.
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position the same writers adopt is not, however, deemed nihilistic, for one reason:
that "ethics precedes law". Consequently, if apparently contradictorily, and despite the
claim that ethics requires "a judgement without criteria"106 the aspiration of that
ethics is indeed defined, defined as an embracing of a responsibility "for the other,
the stranger, the outsider, the alien or underprivileged who needs the law".107
But here again, the problem Maclntyre identified with contemporary ethics and the
role of law in the liberal order cannot be fully addressed merely by expressing this
temporal dimension ('ethics precedes law'). As I have tried to show, the ethics-law
relation may be both more dynamic and fluid than this suggests, and the power of
law more constitutive (or destructive) in the ethical realm than either the
postmodernists or, for that matter, Maclntyre would seem to acknowledge. Moreover
the location, as well as the imaginative construction, of the solidarity that the
responsibility for the other would require is critical. Championing a radically
indeterminate ethic may be different from the failed moral emotivism of modernity
yet the case remains to be demonstrated how this is so. It is potentially little short of
disingenuous to suggest on the one hand the occurrence in modernity of "the final
accomplishment of Maclntyre's 'moral catastrophe'"108, and on the other the
uncertain certainty of the ready existence of an ethic of alterity. That "the other
comes first. (S)he is the condition of the existence of language, of self, of law",109
needs to be translated into a set of coherent if revisable terms that themselves
transcend the structural oppositions and prompt explicit consideration of the varied
C.Douzinas and R.Warrington, "The Face of Justice: A Jurisprudence of
Alterity", Social and Legal Studies Vol.3 (1994), 405-425 at pp.419-420.
107 Goodrich, Douzinas, and Hachamovitch, "Introduction," op.cit., p.22.
108 C.Douzinas and R.Warrington, "The Face of Justice: A Jurisprudence of
Alterity," op.cit., p.405.
109 C.Douzinas and R.Warrington, "The Face of Justice: A Jurisprudence of
Alterity," op.cit., p.414. See also by the same authors, '"A Weil-Founded Fear of
Justice': Law and Ethics in Postmodernity", Law and Critique Vol.11, no.2 [1991]
115-147.
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meanings and significance of the social forms (as I have called them) within which
these moral understandings might be expressed. Without this, the "unceasing
conjunction and disjunction" of abstract and concrete, calculating and incalculable
appears essentially to replicate the liberal legal predicament rather than fully confront
it. The unwillingness however, albeit for what are taken to be sound philosophical
grounds, of postmodern jurisprudence to put any such thing on the line in terms of
a developed critique, might then turn out to be hollow comfort for the alien or
underprivileged lined up in the sights of the law.
(ii) Part of the difficulty identified here links to a second problem. This concerns
the "critical legal response to the material legal person." At issue here is the
apparently uncritical placing of the person in the relation between law and justice
already in legal terms, the easy assumption of how "the other needs the law." The
aspiration in this instance is to see "the legal subject in terms of differences, of lives
composed or built up of accidents, contingencies and errors."110 Of course, not only
does such a suggestion appear to sit uneasily with the form which law is given as one
which is antithetical to disorder and contingency, but more importantly, as we have
seen, it fails properly to challenge the giving over to law of the means through which
difference is to be asserted. Yet to do so is to foreclose certain issues.
First (and this is acknowledged) it allows legal categories to define what is to count
as the same and different. This is the first and crucial step in the process of
legitimating legal judgment, and raises similar concerns to those brought out when
we considered the role of the legal person. As Valerie Kerruish has written, "if law
is seen as giving an objective or right answer to questions of how different
individuals are the same, then its generalities are legitimated."111 Thus only where
sameness can be constructed through law will it be possible for the law to claim
Goodrich, Douzinas, and Hachamovitch, "Introduction," op.cit., p.23.
V.Kerruish, Jurisprudence as Ideology, London, Routledge, 1991, p. 111.
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authority to compare competing assertions and in turn weigh them. Yet this process
of abstraction from a wealth of potential normative and descriptive possibilities can
only be opened to critique where the role of law in defining sameness is itself put in
question. To attempt to assert difference through law in the manner suggested is
already to have cut off certain vocabularies and self-descriptions, and to have taken
a stance on certain specific issues. Therefore the suggestion that the demand of an
ethics of alterity requires that the "other be heard as a full person" in the
"interpretation and application of the relevant legal rules"u2 appears as a
contradictory aspiration. And the expressed justification of postmodern jurisprudence
that "injustice is the inescapable condition of all law"113 is the consequence of a
failure fully to recognise this as a contingent feature of the ideology of agreement of
liberal legalism.
This latter point is intimately related to a second, which concerns the selection or
abstraction of issues themselves. This deals principally with the type of question,
'What is this conflict about?' Again, to formulate an answer to this in terms of how
law should respond is already to endorse the technique of a liberal legalism which
requires that the question be located within one or other of the categories of issues
or set of principles that law already understands. As we have seen, this is necessary
for law so that the conflict, which is of course never natural or given but always
constructible within a variety of possible milieux, be seen as a "genuine"
disagreement and thereby made to appear resolvable. Beverley Brown has considered
this effect writing of the way in which liberal legal debate responds to and prejudges
the construction and issue of pornography by forcing its location within categories
and principles that it can already recognise, such as harm or free speech. But, as she
notes, this technique of setting a legal test functions merely to present, "a way of
112 C.Douzinas and R.Warrington, "The Face of Justice: A Jurisprudence of
Alterity," op.cit., p.422, emphasis added.
113 ibid.
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determining the choices between available, preconstituted alternatives
perfect mechanism for asserting and deferring issues."114
It is thus the
Nevertheless the aspiration of postmodern jurisprudence here is one that maintains
that the "openness of the concrete materiality of the other arguably enables
postmodern ethics and justice to resist the totalising influence of politics and
law."115 Admirable as this sentiment may appear from the point of view of the
radical liberal theory, it remains the case that where that materiality is already
constructed as or geared towards (the question of) legal materiality - the person
constituted in law or in need of law - the choice of descriptions of both identity and
issue is, as I have suggested, already in a strong sense predetermined. Again a part
of the problem for postmodern jurisprudence here is that of defining the relation of
law and ethics as oppositional, such that the legal form is conceived as being
"committed to the form of universality and abstract equality." Yet this neglects to
take full account of the consequences of such a position.
As Pierre Bourdieu, for example, has argued, in a sociological dimension, "the force
of the form ... is that properly symbolic force which allows force to be fully
exercised while disguising its true nature as force and gaining recognition, approval
and acceptance by dint of the fact that it can present itself under the appearances of
universality."116 In other words it is to overlook the fact that this force of form "is
a force which is both logical and social", and that the 'legality of form' the
postmodern position accepts, "unites the force of the universal, the logical, the
formal, of formal logic, and the force of the official."117
114 B.Brown, "Debating Pornography: the Symbolic Dimensions" Law and
Critique Vol.1 no.2 [1990] 131-154 at 140.
115 Goodrich, Douzinas, and Hachamovitch, "Introduction," op.cit., p.23.
116 P.Bourdieu, "Codification" in In Other Words: Essays Towards a Reflexive
Sociology, Cambridge, Polity Press, 1990, p.85.
117 ibid., emphasis added.
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We have seen already how feminist jurisprudence has identified the significance of
this feature of law which "presents itself under the appearances of universality".
Combining, in varying degrees, a critique of both the form of universality itself and
the practical presuppositions and distortions it entails, it has sought to expose the
particularity of the values of universalism within a social and historical context. It has
shown how manifestations of such would-be universality recognisable in liberal
legalism itself supports and upholds very specific qualities, as well as the importance
of the link Bourdieu identifies between the image of form, and its manifestation in
relations of power. Thus, and this is the important point, any attempt to enhance a
responsibility to the other comes up against not just the posited universal form itself,
but that universal as 'another other', as another set of identifiable interests that may
or may not be open to the other's reception. Bringing the full person before the law,
it seems to have been demonstrated, is what the form of law, through its partiality,
precludes.
So again, maintaining the descriptive opposition here both masks and leaves in place
the relations of power that may be discerned, and also works against the possible re-
ethicisation of law through awareness of the other. The best it may hope for, and this
perhaps its true dedication to failure, is the replacement of one set of "universals"
with another. But then in this instance, the problem of the relations of power - the
force of the form of law and its personnel - is reproduced, never addressed.
(iii) Let me address one final issue implicit in the original formulation, namely the
problem of information. The difficulty here is with whether law, or even an ethics of
alterity, has sufficient information of the concrete other to make viable judgments at
all. The acknowlegment of this comes in these terms:
There is always a difference which exists between what we know of a
phenomenon in advance, even before being confronted with it, and what we
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are to learn from it a posteriori, what we could in no circumstances have
foreseen, anticipated or judged a priori,118
In the view of a postmodern jurisprudence, this is taken as indicative of the "fraction
or fracture of things", the "remainder that escapes the concept", the inevitable
existence of an epistemological gap. Not itself a novel realisation, what is problematic
with this formulation is the similar lack of an understanding of its potential political
implications.
For this is the very problem Hayek identified and used as a justification against state
intervention and planning. Like the postmodernists on the application of laws, he
argued that
general rules, genuine laws as distinguished from specific orders, must be
intended to operate in circumstances which cannot be foreseen in detail, and,
therefore, their effects on particular ends or particular people cannot be
known beforehand."9
Drawn into a dichotomy between the rule of law and coercion and discretionism, the
issue takes the form of a double bind: if there is insufficient a priori knowledge of
personal details and values, then to be impartial the government must accept that it
has "no answer to certain questions"; yet only through this acknowledgment will
government actions be predictable. But, if the government does presume to know
such information it asserts its control in such a way as to make any sense of
individual responsibility (to self or other) largely meaningless because of the
imposition of its own evaluations of what is best for those individuals; as such, the
required action here demands a detailed response to "the full circumstances of the
moment", and as a consequence, government action will in this case be unpredictable.
Goodrich, Douzinas, and Hachamovitch, "Introduction," op.cit., p.24.
F.A.Hayek, The Road to Serfdom, London, Routledge, 1944, p.57.
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Hayek's own resolution of this issue is familiar, and appends both economic and
moral arguments to utilise the problem of information as a justification for opposing
state planning. But what is noteworthy in the current context is not so much that this
argument is one which is conclusive in itself (which it is not), but that the dichotomy
it suggests is apparently inevitable for postmodern jurisprudence given the similar
way in which it poses the issue. I am not suggesting either that Hayek is correct, or
that postmodern jurisprudence has to take one or other side here, but simply that the
consequences of the stance adopted be explored in a way that goes beyond the simple
assertion of an epistemological gap. For it is (ethically?) irresponsible to expose,
perhaps even exult in, the gap, without thought to the way in which it will or ought
to be filled in practice.
A more detailed, informed response would seem to be required. For the radical liberal
theory, such a response would again require a closer analysis of the input into, as I
have termed it, the information available for decision-making. What I have addressed
in the previous sections goes some way to suggesting that what "escapes the concept"
(as postmodern jurisprudence put it) in liberal legalism, might well make the legal
institution an uncertain ally in attempts to hold onto an ethic of alterity. As such, it
is again an insufficient response to bask in the "fraction or fracture of things" without
due attention to how the form and power of contemporary legal institutions will, so
to speak, mend that fracture. The fact that not everything can be known in advance
becomes merely trite when the sensitivity sought in relation to the ethical awareness
of the other is not addressed as a matter of challenging the institutional requirements
and expectations of liberal legalism.
These three criticisms I have identified have been largely concerned with the
difficulties I perceive with the attempt of postmodern jurisprudence to reinvigorate
the law-ethics relation, mainly because of the ways in which it fails to acknowledge
and work through the implications of its premises. Thus while it does in fact
recognise some of the issues I have addressed, it does not do enough to situate the
ethic of alterity within a broader critique. As such, this potentially allows it to be
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subject to a charge of collaboration since it appears to leave intact the thought it
seeks to overcome.
(b)
Let me suggest then that there may well be insights from certain postmodern theorists
on political debate that could usefully be brought into the legal context in a way that
could also provide important insights for the radical liberal theory. To draw these out
I will use a part of the recent work of Jean-Francois Lyotard.
To begin with, take one of Lyotard's central definitions:
As distinguished from a litigation, a differend would be a case of conflict
between (at least) two parties, that cannot be equitably resolved for lack of
a rule of judgement applicable to both arguments ... However, applying a
single rule of judgement to both in order to settle their differend as though
it were merely a litigation would wrong (at least) one of them (and both of
them if neither accepts the rule).120
This is, I suggest, remarkably similar in formulation to the arguments about
incommensurability we considered in Part Two. There we saw how, in the example
of comparing monetary value and friendship, the a priori commitment to
commensurability not only failed fully to understand the complexity of the clash of
values, but also how, to use Lyotard's term, damage may occur to those social forms
when commensurability was assumed possible.
But we now see in this formulation by Lyotard, a clear problem with situating
conflict within law. If Lyotard's aim is to "bear witness to the differend," to "think
justice in relation to conflict and difference", we have seen how law has the potential
to distort both issues and consequences. That is why I have suggested that a political
J-.F.Lyotard, The Differend, Manchester, Manchester U.P., 1988, p.xi.
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response to the position of law within structures of normative reasoning is required.
In a previous section therefore I argued for the importance for the radical liberal
theory of pressing the question of whether or not it was rational to have recourse to
the processes of law at all, as a question that was prior to the rationality of law's
decision-making procedures themselves.
To ask such a question clearly involves giving a full consideration to political and
moral issues, but it should also be made clear that the notion of "politicization" does
not mean simply "getting the state involved"; for this too is potentially to eliminate
types of self-description and modes of reasoning. As such, the state itself may be part
of the problem, rather than the solution. As Readings has suggested in a way that the
radical liberal position might endorse, for Lyotard, "Rather than the political question
being what kind of state can establish the just society and realise human destiny, the
positioning of the state as the unifying horizon for all political representations
becomes the stumbling block for a just politics."121 In other words, the tendency to
allow the state to colonise political or moral conflict ought to be seen as - in Roberto
Unger's phrase - a false necessity that must itself be challenged in any attempt to
overcome the inertia that sets in when there is a failure to question the overarching
institutional structures within which the vesting of conflict presently occurs. The state
arguably, with its own dynamics and logic, provides a way in which the openness to
meaningful dissensus might be curtailed. While this might sound a dramatic
suggestion, it is nevertheless the case that where we are now witnessing the potential
breaking down of nineteenth century statist assumptions today, we are confronted
with the need - and the opportunity - to rethink new (and indeed in some cases old)
political associations and groupings formerly suppressed by the strong nation state.
Leaving this at the level of suggestion, the more detailed point is that if the state's
hegemony in these issues is to be challenged, so too must the law's. For as should
have become clear, the perceived need for the legal institution to decide, implies that
121 B.Readings, "Foreword", in J.-F.Lyotard, Political Writings, op.cit., pp.xix-xx.
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it must take a stance with a view to legal action (or inaction). The force of the
linking of "form and official" deems that law is bound to resolution, and this
presupposes that the conflict be understood in a specific way. While it has been noted
that this provides a way of asserting and deferring issues, the importance of reaching
a decision might further be seen to operate in tandem with the institutionalised
politics of the state without due regard for the alternative sources of normative
commitment that could be opened up as an integral part of the radical liberal theory.
In order to pay full attention therefore to the constitutive incommensurabilities that
may be in danger of being overridden, or, in Lyotard's terms, the danger of the
unacknowledged suppression of the differends, it becomes necessary at the
institutional level to explore ways in which the practice of judicial decision-making
can be made susceptible to an external critique; that is, one in which the issue of
whether the power to decide should be given to the legal system at all is seen as just
as important as how decisions are justified within that system. As Amy Gutmann has
suggested, such a notion would "justify judicial decision-making on the basis of the
legitimacy of judicial authority in deciding certain categories of cases rather than the
Tightness of its decisions or its special decisionmaking technique."122
For where it is otherwise, we might usefully introduce a parallel with an
interpretation Lyotard has given of Kafka's law machine in "In the Penal
Colony"123: in that well-known story, the cruelty of the machine is that 'guilt is
never to be doubted'; yet its ghost reappears even in the use of a "humane law" as
Tesolvability' is never to be doubted. What Lyotard's interpretation of Kafka draws
our attention to is that - in the first case, as well, I would add, as the second - law's
"inscription of the prescription" attests not to the prisoner or person who comes
122
Amy Gutmann, "The Rule of Rights or the Right to Rule", Nomos XXVIII:
Justification, eds. J.R.Pennock and J.W.Chapman, New York, New York University
Press, 1986, pp. 165-177 at 172.
123 J-.F.Lyotard, "Prescription" in Toward the Postmodern, eds. R.Harvey and
M.S.Roberts, New Jersey, Humanities Press, 1993.
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before the law, but to law's own instantiation. The fact that resolution may bask in
the logic of justification as consensus - 'we the people', or the 'reasonable man' - as
opposed to a machine-like instrumentalism, does not affect the fact that the
sovereignty of decidability is never relinquished. But this necessarily overrides the
broader political and moral question of whether, and on what terms, a decision should
be made by the legal system at all.
To be consistent then with Lyotard's wariness of any "machines" - be that state
politics, the means and pretense to speak in the name of others, the systematic
violation of the differend - of any machines that generate commonality, the use of the
force of law must be questioned itself as an issue of demarcation about which sources
of obligation we ought to promote and which we ought to reject. Thus the political
requirement to raise questions, so to speak, of jurisdiction, of law's interests and our
interest in law; questions that - and this is the most important point - should not be
answered by law itself.
Conceiving the person as in need of law, as did the postmodern jurisprudence which
I have discussed, is always to prejudge certain consequences and issues, and to go
beyond the dichotomy of "universal law/fleeting justice" therefore requires a rigorous
challenge to the mindset of a pervasive legalism. But it thereby also demands an
informed ethical response to the most pressing of questions: how to go about
considering what differences should count as making a difference. This is the opening
question of any ethical response and it cannot be deferred (or, more colloquially,
shirked). As Gutmann and Thompson similarly suggest, a liberal position which takes
seriously the commitment to "mutual respect" as more than mere tolerance
requires citizens to strive not only for agreement on principles governing the
basic structure but also for agreement on practices governing the way they
deal with principled disagreements, whether about the basic structure or
ordinary policies ... [Such a position] seeks agreement on how publicly to
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deliberate when citizens fundamentally (and reasonably) disagree, rather than
on how to purge politics of disagreement.124
If law is to be relieved in large part of the framing and answering of those issues,
then agreement on how to disagree is a central task of any ethical or political
enquiry. This is why the task is too important to be left to law and current legal
structures, but also why some coherent ethical premises, in the full light of an
understanding of conflict and difference, need to be explored and articulated. As the
much quoted Dylan line put it, to live outside the law you must be honest. While this
may well involve appeal to a development of the kind of consensual norms Berlin
drew attention to, it would also in particular, require fuller attention to the role of
what Raz called "constitutive incommensurabilities" as prominent elements of moral
and political reasoning.
For it is insufficient to talk of decentring justice merely by promoting our
responsibility to the other through legal means; the alien or underprivileged or victim
of "justice miscarried" is perhaps unlikely to be content with the idea that justice is
momentary, fleeting, without a "principle, value or a code", while all the while law's
machine grinds on. It is because legal norms come at least in part to constitute how
people come to and are allowed to relate to each other, that we must ask questions
about the institutional setting of law itself, its limitations and prejudices, the functions
it serves or should serve and its position in current hierarchies of normative thought.
In the end, this suggests more focus on the concerns raised by the radical liberal
theory, since there we saw the demand, not for a rejection of norms as such, but an
enquiry into their source as a function of their authority. And while this does not
require a redemptive narrative, it does require facing up to hard ethical questions,
without the easy fall back onto either exclusionary reasons or epistemological gaps.
To attempt simply to reinvigorate with a different, newly sensitive ethic, the
ossifying, bureaucratised, professional legalism, with which we are confronted is
124
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inadequate. For all that could be hoped for then would be the option of choosing to
replace within that system one "reasonable man" with another. But even then the
problem is merely replicated: for the question which remains is that even if this is
a choice, whose choice and on whose terms, is it going to be?
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CONCLUSION
I will finish on that note. I have argued that the concerns and insights of the radical
liberal theory I have brought out here go some way to challenging the bleak picture
of liberalism drawn by Maclntyre and other detractors. Such a theory's focus on the
worth of the individual makes sense, I have suggested, only when that worth is seen
to exist within shared forms of social life which are in part constitutive of individuals
themselves and the "partial reasonings" through which they live their lives. Yet the
caveat, from Berlin, remains, that, as I have said, we ought to be wary that these
forms never become too common; that that worth is itself prominently concerned with
respecting individuals themselves as choosers. But choosers not merely amongst
preferences, but ways of being, together and separately.
But in arguing this, I have also shown how the current role and structures of
reasoning which make up liberal legalism's practices fall short of such an aspiration.
The sometimes hidden assumptions of such practices, and the attendant consequences
of these, may work to inhibit or distort the genuine moral conflicts which we face.
To paraphrase Berlin, it is better to face up to these conflicts ourselves, and the
agonizing choices they bring, rather than be offered the choice in terms we may find
alien and alienating. Only then might we, in a last, beautiful tension, expressed by
Iain Chrichton Smith, become attuned to the "unpredicted voices of our kind".
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